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The role of  the media - East and West - in the East European  revolutions in  1989 has 
been the subject of  much discussion and research.  However, the focus has been on the 
extent to which the media directly influenced these events.  There has been very little 
work done on the impact of the revolutions on how the western news media reported 
events to their domestic audiences.  Yet for over 40 years, they had reported  Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union within a specific,  interpretative framework:  "Cold War 
News".  Suddenly,  in  1989,  the whole referential  structure appeared to fall  apart as 
assumptions  shattered and  certainties  crumbled.  This  study,  therefore,  examines  the 
impact  of political  revolution  and  crisis  on  'Cold  War  news'.  It  uses  in-depth 
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Introduction 
The role of  the media - East and West - in the East European  revolutions in  1989 has 
been  the  subject  of much  discussion  and  research  (Cox,  1989;  Chesshyre,  1990; 
Garton Ash,  1990;  Hanke  1990;  Hesse,  1990;  Prins,  1990;  Reich,  1990;  Simpson, 
1990a,  1990b; Tusa,  1990; Campearu,  1991; Goban-Klas,  1991; Gowing,  1991; Hoff 
1991 ; Jakubowicz, 1991). Indeed, events appeared to be happening live on television, 
and  at  such  a  frenetic  pace,  that  they  have  been  referred  to  as  "television 
revolutions".1  Yet their main  focus  of concern has been on the  extent to which the 
media directly influenced these events.  There has been very little work  on the impact 
of  those events on the western news  media  and  how they  reported events to their 
domestic audiences  (Cormack, 1992; Halliday et ai, 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). 
Long regarded as  propaganda organs,  some  official  media  in  Eastern Europe broke 
away from their traditional "governmental" role to become public "notice boards"  for 
reform groups.2  Suddenly,  it  seemed,  television  in  Eastern Europe was becoming  a 
contested public sphere,  an indication of  underlying forces of  liberalisation.  However, 
as early as  1988,  the communist government in Hungary was attempting to liberalise 
its economic and  social  system along  western lines.  According to Timothy Garton 
Ash,  the reform campaign  there was  "conducted  as  much  in  the  media  as  on  the 
streets" .  3  In Poland,  pressure for new,  democratic media came from the opposition, 
Solidarity, as far back as its inception in  1981.4  The control of TV, therefore, was a 
key  issue in  the Polish election in  June  1989.  A leading  Solidarity  candidate,  Jacek 
Kuron,  campaigned  for  BBC-style  television  that  would  be  "public",  not 
"governmental".  5  Television  in  the  GDR  and  Czechoslovakia  was  able  to  take 
tentative steps into  the public domain  not because of  new liberal policies but because 
the political situation was so uncertain. And in Romania, forty seconds of  television  -
images of a faltering  dictator - have entered into history as the critical moment of 
the revolution there.  But this was no revolt by state  television.  The pictures were cut 
to save Ceausescu's face.  Unlike  its  counterparts in  the GDR and  Czechoslovakia, 
Romanian TV was  taken into the public sphere by  force. 
Each East European country underwent  change  and  upheaval  according  to its  own 
time-scale,  and  its own political and ideological  specifics. 6  And,  as  much  as  in  the 
West,  each had  a very distinct type of television. 7  The degree to which anyone TV 
station  or  newspaper  played  a  role  in  influencing  revolution  must  be  assessed 
according to these specifics. Introduction 
In like manner,  care has to taken when assessing the role of  the Western media.  While 
their influence on the course of events in Eastern Europe has been affirmed in  some 
quarters,  it  has  been  questioned  by  other  commentators,  including  some  East 
European reformers,  and undermined by the recollections of  western journalists on the 
ground. 
The reputation of the major western media in  Eastern Europe was formidable.  They 
provided people with an alternative source of information about the world than that 
provided by the official media.8  Some writers suggest that the western media helped 
stimulate the revolutions.  Geoffrey Cox points to the  special  case of East Germany, 
where  a large minority of the population had been receiving West German television 
since the 1960s.  He argues that it was a powerful stimulant for change because it, 
carried, day after day into drab East German apartments, a  picture  of a society 
where  the  supermarkets  offered abundance,  where  the  people  holidayed  m 
exotic spots, where a car was something everyone had  or  could  aspire to.  9 
But Peter Hoff  reveals that as  far back as the  1960s,  the GDR government actually 
made the viewing of  West German television a citizens' right,  even though the citizens 
had already claimed their right illegally.lO Kurt Hesse sees this as  a deliberate ploy by 
the authorities to compensate the people,  both for the absence of western consumer 
goods  and  the  lack  of participation  in  the  political  life  of the  country.  The  plan, 
however, is said to have back-fired when the people received images  of their country 
which contradicted the official  propaganda given out on GDR state television.  Once 
the people realised there was another way,  they took to the streets to actively demand 
it. 11 
However,  Jens Reich,  a co-founder of the East German reform movement,  Neues 
Forum,  is sceptical about the power of West German TV to send the people onto the 
streets.  He argues that outside the main cities, in the provincial areas where the reform 
movement  began,  western  television  reception  was  poor.  For him,  events  in  East 
Germany were part of a  "see-it-for-yourself'  revolution  in  which the western media 
were reporters,  not  conductors, of  events. 12  So to assume that after thirty years  West 
German TV's images of  capitalism were suddenly responsible for what happened in the 
GDR seems rather simplistic.  The recollections and first  impressions of some western 
reporters  undermine  these  crude  effects  theories,  too.  Journalists  like  Nik  Gowing 
(Channel Four  News) and  John Simpson (BBC) covered most of the east European 
revolutions but  claim that there was nothing special about their role.  They had to wait 
2 J.r..::n:-i:tr=-=-od:T.u::-::c:7!fj7on::------ ~-
and wonder like everyone else. Gowing remarks that, 
There  tends  to  be  an  assumption  on  these  big  occasions  that  the  press  is 
getting  a  nod  and  a wink  that  something  is  afoot,  but  this  time we got no 
hint at all. 13 
While, for Simpson, 
there were times when it was harder  to  understand what was going on,  when 
being  on the spot, than by  reflecting  on  events in  the peace of  one's home, 
reading the news-papers  and  watching  news on television. 14 
Little  if any  research has  examined  the  question  from  a  reverse  angle,  that  is  to 
investigate how these rapidly unfolding events influenced western journalists and their 
interpretative  frameworks  for  reporting.  After  all,  for  over  40  years,  news  from 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was reported within a "Cold War"  framework. 
Suddenly,  in  1989,  the whole  referential  structure was  falling  apart  as  assumptions 
shattered  and  certainties  crumbled.  This  study  examines  the  impact  of political 
revolution and crisis on 'Cold War news'.  It is the first and,  so far,  the only systematic 
analysis of  how British television news reported events surrounding the collapse of  the 
Berlin Wall.  The breadth and depth of this study - which features detailed case-studies 
over a period of five  years - was only possible with unlimited access to the Glasgow 
University Media Group's archive of  main daily news bulletins on British television. IS 
Chapter Outline 
After  laying  the  theoretical  foundations  in  Chapter  Two,  the  study  will  feature 
quantitative-qualitative content analysis of television news with comparative reference 
to the press.  The work was carried out along two overlapping time-scales.  Chapters 
Three,  Four  and  Five  draw  from  the  main  research  sample  and  present  in-depth 
analyses of how the news media reacted to a moment of crisis,  that is  to events and 
developments surrounding the fall  of the Berlin Wall.  Chapters Six  and  Seven draw 
from  smaller samples.  They  trace changing news frameworks  since the  end of the 
Cold War over a longer, five-year period: late 1989 to mid-1994. 
Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework for  the thesis.  It looks  at  Thomas 
Kuhn's idea of  'paradigm'  and shows how that can be applied to dominant intellectual 
understandings of  the Cold War and to popular interpretations such as those offered by 
various mass media.  It uses Kuhn's  theory of 'paradigm crisis'  and  'revolution'  as  a 
means  of theorising  the  collapse  of  'Cold  War  news'  as  a  rational  framework  of 
interpretation. 
3 Introduction 
Chapter Three analyses the temporal and  thematic frameworks  that the  news  media 
employed to retell the history of the Berlin Wall.  The main focus  here is  the impact 
such a crisis may have had on these frameworks. It looks at three television news items 
about why the Berlin Wall was built.  These reveal  assumptions about  the nature of 
the Cold War, its causes and consequences,  and  the reasons why it reached a crisis 
point. 
Chapter Four features  a  major  case  study  in  the  Cold  War  news  paradigm  under 
pressure.  It is based on the  premise that  the opening  of the  Berlin  Wall  forced  a 
radical shift  in  the interpretative  framework  for reporting  a 'Cold War news'  story. 
This was the  East German 'refugee exodus' to West Germany from  the  summer of 
1989.  When the  Berlin  Wall collapsed,  so did the 'refugee' story. Language,  image 
and framework were transformed so that "political refugees"  became 'immigrants' or 
'economic refugees'.  So rather than 'fleeing'  from  repression,  they were 'flooding' the 
West and causing an 'economic crisis'. 
In Chapter Five, I will look at how the news filtered  competing visions of the future 
after the collapse of the Berlin Wall  and  the East German state,  and  what it  might 
mean for  East and West. Within a  year of the fall of the Berlin Wall,  Germany was 
united on a time  scale that exceeded even the most ambitious forecasts of the West 
German establishment.  Since then, however, the optimistic picture of Germany united 
and  prosperous has  been confounded by  a widening  economic,  social  and  political 
gulf  between the east and west.  Chapter Six  shows how television news journalists 
reported  the  official  'version'  against  the  backdrop  of the  political  and  economic 
realities of the new German state. 
Chapter Seven broadens the study to examine  coverage of  international issues  and 
developments since the end of the Cold War.  The post-Cold War period was initially 
hailed as one of  opportunity for peace. Yet there were significant differences in official 
rhetoric between visions of a new world order and hard realpolitik.  Thus the chapter 
examines coverage of events such as the US  invasion of Panama and the Gulf  War, 
and developments such as the Western approach to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
whereby the old Cold War consensus still seemed to persist. However it also looks at 
coverage  of  crises  such  as  Somalia  where  the  western  consensus  appeared  to 
breakdown and the media  played a more overtly critical  role  in  pointing up  western 
indecision and doublethink. 
4 Introduction 
Sample 
The principal  sample for  the study consists  of  news media output in  Britain for  a 
period  of five  days  from  the  opening  of the  Berlin  Wall  on  9  November  to  13 
November 1989.  This includes all main  television news bulletins from BBC News and 
ITN  (lunchtime,  early  evening,  late  evening)  and  the  off-peak  news  programmes, 
Channel Four News  (ITN) and Newsnight  (BBC2).  A parallel  sample  of the  daily 
press  - fourteen  newspapers  - covers  the  period  9-14  November.  I  include  other 
samples of news coverage where appropriate to specific  chapter concerns.  This was 
especially  so  in  Chapters Four,  Six  and  Seven  where  I  provide  the  necessary  and 
relevant details of  additional samples. (see Supplementary Appendix, p.249). 
Method 
Since the study is wholly based on  quantitative-qualitative content analysis it is useful 
to review the essential arguments and debates about the use and  abuse of the method 
as applied to media research. 
As  a "research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their 
context"  16,  content analysis has been widely used in research into mass media output. 
It has helped further understanding about the role of the media in  society:  how they 
construct or represent  frameworks  of interpretation  about  the  world  in  general,  or 
about controversial and  divisive  social  issues  and  beliefs.17  However,  from  its  early 
applications in purely quantitative and descriptive surveys of newspapers in the 1920s, 
it was used in later,  more qualitative analyses of propaganda in the second world war. 
This was and still  is  a contested development.  Critics have seen the move from  pure 
quantitative  to  quantitative-qualitative  analysis  as  a  departure  from  an  objective 
approach to the analysis of  media  messages.  For instance,  Harold Lasswell  insisted 
that the quantification  of symbols was the sole foundation of scientific insight. I8 Yet 
signs,  symbols  and  messages  are  not fixed  in  either  meaning  or shared  experience. 
Even with a purely quantitative application, the potential exists for imposing one's own 
value-system and social categories on what is being observed. 
Methods of quantitative-qualitative  analysis  have  been  used  in  research  on  media 
influence and  audience response,  and the means  and  processes of media production. 
For  example,  Philo  used  analysis  of coverage  of the  1984  miners'  strike  in  his 
investigation  into  the  connections  between  media  frameworks  and  audience 
understandings  and  beliefs. I9  Qualitative  content  analysis  has  considerable  value  in 
media research on other issues such as the  conformity of the media to institutional or 
professional  values.  These  might  include  objectivity,  balance,  accuracy, 
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informativeness,  or diversity.  The method can also  inform  a broader assessment  of 
ideological bias in context with media claims to uphold 'objectivity' or  'neutrality'.20  In 
the Bad News  series,  the  GUMG took  a  quantitative-qualitative  approach  in  their 
analysis of news coverage of  industrial relations in the 1970s. They examined content 
not according to their own standards but to the institutional and professional  standards 
of news producers.  Their results showed clear evidence of  ideological bias towards 
the powerful in society, in this case government and management. 
The response from  professional quarters to Bad News (1976) was fiercely  defensive 
and focused on the Group's use of quantitative analysis as grounds to launch an attack 
on the credibility  of the  study.  Geoffrey  Cox,  then  director  of  ITN,  accused  the 
GUMG of attempting to substitute editorial control with a statistical measure. 21  Yet 
this,  claimed the Group,  was to misunderstand the purpose of content analysis.  The 
purpose  of quantification,  when  monitoring  the  number  of interviews  given  to 
opposing interest groups, for instance,  was to check for  imbalance.  If imbalance was 
detected, even at the crudest level, "then the credibility of news coverage is challenged 
at  the  first  line  of defence".22  While  they  did  not  expect  news  producers  to  apply 
academic rigour to editorial  decision-making,  the  Group  argued  that  "the  (editorial) 
rule  of thumb  can  sometimes  lead  them  into  major  distortions".23  From  academic 
critics such as Schlesinger came the point  that the Bad News methodology neglected 
actual processes of journalistic production and the institutional and legal constraints to 
which these are subject. The GUMG acknowledged this was a valid point but argued 
that in the absence then of any  synthesis of content analysis with production studies 
and audience response methods, content analysis could still address a much-neglected 
area of  concern. The study of manifest media content was essential "for what is  it the 
studied producers produce? And what is it the audience react to?". 24  They continue: 
The spoken and visual vocabulary of news may be regarded as  the outward and 
visible expression of newsroom codes and conventions and not as  separate from 
them.  Since the output clearly has meaning,  then the production of that meaning 
can as clearly be studied on the screen as it can by interviewing either producers or 
audiences".25 
Nonetheless, much progress has been made since the Bad News series to close the gap 
between content analysis  and  other research methods.  The GUMG has been directly 
involved  in  this  project.  A  combination  of production  study  and  content  analysis 
informed  their  research  into  coverage  of the  Falklands  War  and  the  disarmament 
debate in  the  1980s.26  The approach has been further  developed into the  1990s with 
methods of researching audience  belief in context with production and content. It is a 
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methodology  with  the  potential  to  answer  hitherto  neglected  questions  about  the 
meaning and power of media messages.27 
The importance of the Bad News project is  still evident today and  suggests that it  is 
still justifiable to apply  quantitative-qualitative content  analysis  alone  to a particular 
problem in media research. This, for example, is quite evident in studies of propaganda 
frameworks in  relation to US  foreign  policy (Chomsky  1989,  1992a,  1993a,  1993b; 
J111b 
Chomsky and Herman,  1979a" A988; Herman,  1982), the 1990 Nicaraguan elections in 
the  British  media  (Broadbent,  1993),  nuclear  disarmament  (GUMG  1985,  McNair 
1988),  the war in  Northern Ireland  (Miller  1993,  1994),  and  the  Gulf war in  the 
British media (Morrison, 1992; Philo and McLaughlin 1993a,  1993b). It has also been 
successfully  applied  to  analyses  of media  representations  of social  problems.  For 
example:  AIDS  in  the  British  press  (Beharrel  1993),  or mental  health  and  illness 
(Philo, Henderson, and McLaughlin, 1993). 
One  of the  most  important  criteria  for  sound  quantitative-qualitative  research  is 
contextualisation. Philo is sharply critical of  researchers who have applied their own a 
priori categories to individual units of analysis  - such as language, image, agendas, or 
access - and draw conclusions about what they mean and the implications this has for 
our understanding of news and its representation of reality.28  An  appropriate example 
of this is  Chang's analysis  of three  major US  dailies  for  their  images  of the  Soviet 
Union.29  Chang draws some contentious inferences from their coverage on the basis of 
a problematical method. 
First, he selects a random sample of stories from the newspapers  over a period of one 
year, January 1988-January 1989. He then sets up  12 a priori categories of reporting 
and  fits  news  stories  into  these  as  isolated,  decontextualised  units  of analysis.  For 
example,  he  looks  at  coverage  of  the  category of Soviet  "Political  and  economic 
reform" and shows that it ranked second in the amount of space given to it. He points 
out that  although  only  two  percent  of  stories  were  "unfavourable"  these  received 
prominent front page treatment on two particular days in the sample period.  Yet,  he 
does not reveal  what the stories were about and  fails  to offer an  explanation about 
why  they were given such coverage. 
Second, Chang  measured "attention scores" for each story according to six criteria on 
the basis of the amount space given to each story and its location.  On  an  "attention 
score" of  one to six,  the greater the space and the more prominent the location the 
higher the  "attention score".  The problem here is that space and  prominence are not 
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always  sure indicators of news value.  They can also be explained by production.  As 
Philo points out in  respect to television journalists they  are,  "often obliged to cover 
events without necessarily believing that the story will be crucial". He has in mind here 
television  news  coverage  of the  miners  strike.  Contrary  to  the  assertions  of 
Cumberbatch et al (1982), routine,  daily  reports on the negotiations (or the lack of) 
between  Arthur  Scargill  and  Ian  MacGregor  does  not  necessarily  indicate  an 
assumption that they were crucial in themselves, rather that they were waiting for what 
they  might  produce:  in  this  case,  a  breakthrough  in  negotiations  and  end  to  the 
dispute.3o  To use my own  hypothetical example,  a breaking story about a US-Soviet 
spy row may only appear  as a  tiny news agency brief  on the front or back page of a 
newspaper: yet it would be foolhardy to conclude that it was not a significant part of 
coverage of  the unfolding story. 
Third,  Chang claims to measure the "direction of reporting" in terms of "Favourable, 
neutral,  and,  unfavourable"  emphasis.  Again,  these appear  to be subjective,  a priori 
categories  of  analysis.  Throughout  his  report,  Chang  uses  these  general 
"measurements" to judge news content. For example,  he  argues that the  Washington 
Post's coverage of the medium range nuclear arms control  in  1988 was "more neutral 
and  favourable  than  unfavourable" .31  Not only  this,  but  he  also  interchanges  these 
measurements with other values of "positive" or "negative". Thus,  coverage of  a story 
in different newspaper may be "more favourable" or "unfavourable",  "more positive", 
"mostly very positive" or even "slightly negative".  With this sort of approach one can 
only question the conclusion that the New York Times coverage of the Soviet  Union 
was "basically objective and free of  political prejudices and resentment".  32 
Philo further argues that some studies of  news set out to analyse the representation of 
a social problem only to look at the intricacies of news grammar and the allocation of 
technical  resources  to  coverage  of the  story.  This  may  provide  useful  research 
information  but  it  does  not  answer  the  original  questions.  As  examples  of this 
approach, Philo refers to the work of  Robert Frank (1973)33 and to parts of GUMG's 
early work in the first Bad  News volumes.34 
The GUMG developed a method of content analysis that works on the basis of three 
research questions. What are the key explanatory themes in coverage of a major social 
issue? How is each theme developed in its specific context? How should we assess the 
frequency with which each theme appears in relation to the others?35 It also refers to 
other media  sources  such  as  TV documentary  and  current  affairs,  newspapers  and 
specialist  periodicals,  and  to  extra-media  sources  such  as  the  official  documents, 
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reports, and press releases of  interested parties.  Such an approach provides us with an 
analytical framework that can filter out the a priori categories and assumptions of the 
researcher.  This  leaves  us with what  Philo  calls  a  map  of the  debate  and  how  its 
competing arguments are highlighted in the news over a sustained time period.36 It can 
reveal significant insights into the workings of media frameworks and the impact on 
these of  a crisis in the social world. It also points to an aspect of the method that has 
great relevance to this thesis and what it seeks to propose.  If  we approach Bad News 
in  the wider  and  more  revealing,  historical  context  of the  Social  Contract  and  its 
collapse in the late 1970s,  it is possible to discern a clear shift in news framework from 
one of consensus - whereby the contradictions in  the relations between capital  and 
labour are elided - to one of conflict whereby these antagonisms become self-evident 
and problematical. This would have been impossible without a sustained and detailed 
analysis of  news content over a long period of time.  The responses of the news media 
in  1989 to the extraordinary shift in  world view in  from  'Cold War' to 'end of Cold 
war',  represent  a similar paradigm crisis. 
This thesis, then, proposes to apply in-depth quantitative-qualitative content analysis to 
a  study of a  news framework  or paradigm in  crisis.  It will  pay  special  attention to 
images, language, themes, and structures of  access in order to trace the contours of  the 
shift and point up the contradictions that may arise as a result. 
Notes 
1 Cox  (1989)  Fletcher (1990)  Campearu (1991) 
2 Simpson (1990a) Hoff (1991) 
3 Garton Ash (1990:15) 
4 Jakubowicz (1991) 
5 Garton Ash (1990: 26) 
6  Prins (1990),  Reich (1990),  Simpson (1990a, 1990b) 
7 Campearu (1991),  Hoff (1991),  Hanke (1990),  Jakubowicz (1991) 
8  Chesshyre (1990),  Tusa (1990),  Jakubowicz (1991),  Goban-Klas (1991) 
9 Cox, G.  (1989) 
10 Hoff (1991: 12) 
11  Hesse, K.  (1990: 367) 
12 Reich, 1.  (1990: 85) 
13  Gowing, N.  (1991  : 29) 
14  Simpson,1. (1990b: 6) 
15 This archive was set up in 1986. 
9 Introduction 
16  Krippendorf, C.  (1980) 
17 Philo, G. (1993a:253-270) 
18 op cit Krippendorf (1980) 
19 Philo (1990) 
20 McQuail (1983) 
21  GUMG (1980:407-18) 
22 GUMG (1980:407-18) 
23GUMG (1980:407-18) 
24 GUMG (1980:407-18) 
25  GUMG (1980:407-18) 
26  see also GUMG (1985);  McNair (1988);  Miller (1993);  Williams (1993);  Miller and Williams 
(1993); 
27 Philo (1990);  Philo (1993a; 1993b) ; Kitzinger (1993) 
28 Philo (1990:162-171) 
29 Chang, W.H. (1992) 
30  Cumberbatch et al  (1986)  Television  and the miners  strike,  London:  BFI;  op.  cit.  Philo 
(1990:164) 
31  Chang (1992:79) 
32 Chang  (1992:82) 
33  Frank, R.S.  (1973) Messas:;e  Dimensions of  Television News, Massachussetts:Lexington Books; 
op. cit. Philo (1990: 166) 
34  GUMG (1976, 1980) 
35 Philo (1990) 
36 Philo (1990:168) 
10 CHAPTER TWO 
The Cold War News Paradigm Under Pressure: 
Contours, Crisis, and Collapse 
F  or forty years since \tPrld '\Jlr  Two, the western news media reported international 
relations  and  global  politics  within  a  definitive  framework  of assumptions  and 
certainties that can be called the "Cold War news"  paradigm. The subsequent collapse 
of the  Cold  War,  and  of Communism  as  an  alternative  system  of development  to 
capitalism,  represented a crisis point for the paradigm that has yet to be resolved  -
whether with modifications or, more radically, with its replacement by a new paradigm. 
In order to theorise  the dynamics of the crisis, I draw on Thomas Kuhn's concept of 
"paradigm"  in  Structure of  Scientific Revolutions (1970).  I also  refer to Masterman 
(1972),  Gutting  (1980),  and  Harvey  (1982)  to  specify  the  exact  sense  in  which  I 
deploy Kuhn's concept in relation to news and journalism:  that is,  the paradigm as  a 
framework for puzzle-solving and as  a way of seeing.  I then summarise the dominant 
assumptions underpinning Cold war ideology and  how these shaped  the "Cold War 
news" paradigm. 
Kuhn's concept of paradigm 
Kuhn's idea of "normal science" sheds light on a "non-scientific", cultural practice like 
journalism  because  it  identifies  a  community  of conservative  practitioners  whose 
research, or "puzzle-solving", is governed by an orthodox canon of norms and values. 
Ultimate authority rests not in the canon but in the community that abides by it.  Thus 
the abandonment of  one paradigm for another in the event of  a "scientific discovery" or 
"revolution"  is  dependent not so  much on theoretical validity  and the replicability of 
empirical  results,  vital  prerequisites  in  themselves,  but  upon  consensus  among 
practitioners. Kuhn used the term "paradigm" to illustrate the dynamics of  this activity 
but he referred to it in different senses throughout his work. Masterman  identified no 
less  than twenty-one different  senses  in  which  it  could be understood,  and  grouped 
these into three categories: metaphysical paradigms or metaparadigms, sociological 
paradigms,  and,  construct  or  artefact  paradigms. 1  In  its  metaphysical  sense,  the 
paradigm  can  be  equated  with  "a  set  of beliefs,  with  a  myth,  with  a  successful 
metaphysical  speculation,  with  a  standard,  with  a  new  way  of seeing,  with  an 
organising principle governing perception itself,  with a map,  and  with something that 
determines a large area of reality". In its sociological sense, the paradigm is defined as 
"a universally recognised scientific achievement,  as a concrete scientific achievement, 
as like a set of political institutions,  and as  like also to an accepted judicial decision". 
In its sense as  a construct or artefact, the paradigm can be  understood as  "an  actual 
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text-book  or  classic  work,  as  supplying  tools,  as  actual  instrumentation, ... as  a 
grammatical paradigm, ... as  an analogy, ... as  a gestalt figure  and  as an anomalous pack 
ofcards".2 
However Kuhn insisted that all but two of the twenty-one senses Masterman identified 
were "stylistic inconsistencies"  on his  part.3  He stated that his  concept of paradigm 
could be properly understood in only two senses: as "the entire constellation of  beliefs, 
values and techniques,  and so  on shared by members of a given community",  and  as 
"one  sort  of element  in  that  constellation,  the  concrete  puzzle-solutions  which, 
employed  as  models  or  examples,  can  replace  explicit  rules  as  the  basis  of the 
remaining puzzles of  normal science".4 
To explain the means by  which normal  science  reproduces itself,  or fails  to do  so, 
Kuhn introduces the idea of  a "counterinstance",  or"  anomaly". 5 The occurrence of an 
anomaly  in  normal  science  is  not  in  itself a crisis.  It will  not  necessarily  invalidate 
established theory but it may "help create" a crisis or reinforce one that already exists. 
When  confronted  with  an  anomaly,  then,  practitioners  will,  says  Kuhn,  "devise 
numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in  order to eliminate 
any  apparent conflict".  6  In other words, they will  undertake  repair work to restore 
order to the  paradigm.  Since  the  elimination  of counterinstances  in  themselves  is 
usually a successful activity,  Kuhn proposes that "if an anomaly is to evoke crisis,  it 
must  usually  be  more  than just  an  anomaly". 7  It  must  challenge  some  of normal 
science's  most  fundamental  assumptions  and  practices.  Indeed,  the  symptoms  of a 
paradigm-shift within a particular community include  "the proliferation of competing 
articulations, the willingness to try anything,  the expression of explicit discontent, the 
recourse to philosophy and  to debate  over fundamentals ... ". 8  More importantly,  "all 
crises close in one of  three ways":  normal science may successfully complete its repair 
work;  the  problem  "resists  radical  new  approaches"  and  is  "set  aside  for  a  future 
generation  with  more  developed  tools";  or  a  "new  candidate"  may  emerge  for 
paradigm  with  an  "ensuing  battle  over  its  acceptance"  among  the  community  of 
practitioners.9  This brings us to the question of whether the Kuhnian paradigm can be 
applied to the production of non-scientific knowledge within a particular  framework 
of  interpretation. 
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The Cold War paradigm: intellectual perspectives 
For my  purposes here,  I  draw  on  sense of a paradigm as  "a  way of seeing"  - the 
product of an organised and consensual routine of puzzle-solving.  It c~  I think,  be 
applied to the practice and  content of western liberal journalism and its end product: 
that is,  a definitive  picture of the world that supports and  reproduces the  dominant 
ideological norms and values of  western capitalist society. As Harvey argues, 
Kuhn's view of paradigms is  geared entirely to the  natural  scientific  enterprise, 
and, while it is innovatory in relating the philosophy of science to the sociology of 
scientific  practice,  it  fails  to  make  any  substantive  links  with  the  wider  social 
context.  Such  links  would  have  shifted  Kuhn's  notion  of paradigm  from  a 
mechanistic (in the sense of  concentrating on the 'internal history' of science) to an 
interpretative-explanatory device. 10 
We can trace the origins and growth of  the paradigm in parallel with the development 
of  capitalism (Schudson, 1978; Hallin,  19S~; Curran and Seaton 199  ).  But if  we take 
as a starting point the end of  the second world war and the beginnings of  the Cold War 
then we can talk of  the paradigm as 'Cold War news'. To understand its nature we first 
have to understand the nature of  its superior informant, the Cold War paradigm. 
In Deterring Democracy (1992), Noam Chomsky argues that there are two ways of 
looking at the Cold War:  as  historical process or as  an ideological construct of given 
assumptions.  He argues that the former view leads us to appreciate the true nature of 
the  Cold  War,  that  is  a  conflict  that  served  a  functional  utility  for  the  principal 
combatants - the United States and the Soviet Union. It helped them pursue their geo-
strategic interests not against each other but in their  own spheres of  influence. Thus, 
for the US SR the Cold War (was) primarily a war against its satellites, and for  the 
US  a war against  the Third World.  For each it  served  to entrench a particular 
system of domestic privilege and coercion.  The policies pursued within the Cold 
War framework have been unattractive to the general population which accepts 
them only under duress.  Throughout history,  the  standard  device  to mobilise  a 
reluctant  population  has  been  the  fear  of an  evil  enemy  dedicated  to  its 
destruction.  The  superpower  conflict  served  the  purpose  admirably  - both  for 
internal needs  ... and in public propaganda. 11 
F  or maximum  propaganda effect,  it  was importan! that  domestic  publics  saw things 
very differently.  The Cold War was thus explaineo  within  an  ideological framework 
that denied historical fact or at least provided plausible explanations for real events and 
processes since the end of  the second world war. It was explained as a contlict fought 
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between  two  superpowers  on  different  fronts  (East-West,  North-South)  and 
battlegrounds  (economic,  political,  military  and  ideological).  This  "imaginary  war", 
says Mary Kaldor,  was the sine qua non of two opposing paradigms of thought -
Stalinism in the East, Atlanticism in the West. 12 
Kaldor  takes a critical look at the Atlanticist paradigm.  She identifies several post-war 
developments,  both in  and  between the US  and  Western Europe,  that evolved  into 
Atlanticism - an ideological framework that provided a  common  identity and  ordered 
international relations.  The immediate post-war period  saw the emergence of a new 
elite from the fragments  of the  pre-war order.  This  involved  the construction of a 
centre-right consensus,  the marginalisation of  radical  politics,  right  or left,  and  the 
exclusion  from  political  participation  of popular  anti-Fascist  resistance  movements. 
Atlanticist  political  ideology  sanctified  parliamentary  democracy  and  promoted  a 
Keynesian  approach  to  economic  planning  and  management. 13  Atlanticism  also 
informed the reconstruction of the international economic order.  Essentially, this was 
US military  Keynesianism based on the dollar system.  Although promoted as market 
liberalism, it was characterised by inherently protectionist frameworks and institutions -
GATT,  IMF  , World Bank,  OECD.  It protected the US  economy  from  competitive 
markets  not  just  in  the  'Third  World'  but  also  in  Europe.  And  its  internal  logic 
demanded  that  in  turn  these  same  markets  should  open  up  to  US  exports  and 
investments. 14 In a social context, Atlanticism was influential in the depoliticisation of 
labour  and  consumption,  primarily  in  the  US  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Western 
Europe.  15 
In  a  military  and  security  context,  the  formation  of the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organisation  had  a  huge  impact  on  the  post-war  redevelopment  of economic  and 
political  infrastructures. It also  underpinned  the  development  of a national  security 
apparatus  that  could  devolve  power  normally  vested  in  parliament  to  military  and 
security elites in  Brussels or the Pentagon.16  And,  crucially,  the formation of NATO 
helped cement Atlanticism's ideological structure and coherence. In his essay, Outside 
the  Whale,  Edward Thompson referred to 'Natopolis',  a public space in which beliefs 
and  allegiances  were  tested  against  a  'Natopolitan  ideology',  an  "ideology  of 
imperialism in the defenSive era of  the Cold War"  (his emphasis). 17 Thus, for example, 
in the 1950's, Communism and radicalism in Britain were challenged by an intellectual 
and  cultural  counter-reformation  that  dismissed  them  as  the  "projections  of the 
neuroses of maladjusted intellectuals". 18  The counter-reformation, on the other hand, 
reproduced  and nurtured Atlanticism's common sense, self-Iegitimising explanations of 
the Cold War. 
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Kaldor  identifies  three  dominant  intellectual  perspectives  that  operated  within  the 
Atlanticist  paradigm  - orthodox,  revisionist,  and post-revisionist or neo-orthodox. 19 
She  argues  that  they  all  deny  alternative  accounts  of the  conflict  which  might 
undermine  it  as  a  means  of managing  or  stabilising  international  relations.20  Her 
schema is  worth summarising here  since  it  has  some significance for  my  discussion 
later of  media accounts of  the conflict and why these were insufficient. 
The orthodox perspective investigates the origins of  the Cold War and draws a burden 
of evidence from  official government and  diplomatic  sources.  It concentrates on the 
early 1940s and focuses on Soviet behaviour in eastern Europe.  Its main argument is 
that after the second world war the west could do nothing but contain Soviet ambitions 
within  its existing  sphere of influence.21  Cox (1993)  argues that  as  the  Cold  War 
moved into the 1950s and 1960s, both changes in the Communist world, and domestic 
debates about the consequences of  the arms race and military spending,  contributed to 
an erosion of the orthodox consensus.  This  one-sided  perspective  failed  to  address 
some searching questions about the west's part in the conflict.  An emerging revisionist 
school sought to provide the answers with some compelling critiques.  22 
Revisionist accounts focus on the immediate post-war period and argue that a general 
F  our Power  settlement in Europe would have  been possible only for US policies in 
favour  of  its  western  allies  and  against  the  Soviet  Union.  The US  provided  huge 
economic and  political  assistance in  Western Europe through Marshall  Aid  and  the 
Truman Doctrine and,  at the same time,  exerted  economic sanctions and  subversive 
political  pressure  against the  Soviet Union.  The  result  of all  this  was to create  an 
atmosphere of  hostility in which East-West relations became polarised,  and to seal the 
division  of Europe.  The  impulses  behind  the  US's  Cold  War  policies  were  the 
promotion of  an international, liberal economic order, and the imperatives of  US global 
expansion.23  Cox argues that  revisionist  accounts,  like  the orthodox approach they 
challenged,  were  one-sided.  They  ignored  Soviet  actions  and  focused  almost 
exclusively on US behaviour, sometimes viewing it as irrational, as with Reagan's Zero 
Option policy.  Their analysis of nuclear weapons had great explanatory power but it 
also suffered a number of self-defeating flaws.  Above all,  he argues,  most  revisionist 
analyses  seemed  to  assume  that  the  Cold  War  conflict  became  so  systemised  that 
nothing short of  a radical overhaul of  the international order could end it.24 
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The post-revisionist  approach covers both orthodox and  revisionist  time-scales  and 
attributes varying degrees of blame to East and West.  While  a typical account might 
reject the need for Cold War militarisation, it would nonetheless accept the balance of 
power system  and  the  idea  that  both  sides  coexisted  within  their  own  spheres  of 
influence.25  Like  its  competing  accounts,  post-revisionism  worked  entirely  on  the 
premise that there was no  alternative to the Cold War as  a  system of international 
order and stability. 
Kaldor  summarises  the  essential  differences  between  the  three  perspectives.  Post-
revisionist  accounts  see  the  Cold  War  as  a  great  power  conflict,  in  which  states 
sometimes act irrationally according to domestic pressures.  Orthodox and revisionist 
approaches take more one-sided and  diametrically  opposed views.  According to the 
orthodox account, US  policy is  thus seen as  a rational response to Soviet behaviour 
which  is  itself influenced  by  the  nature  of the  Soviet  state.  Revisionists  see  this 
relationship  as  more  or less the other way  round. 26  Yet,  argues Kaldor,  all  three 
accounts set up frameworks of  thought that, 
give  rise  to  good-bad  stories  which  reflected  and  indeed  served  to  maintain 
domestic differences.  Even though this was far  from  what was intended,  by  the 
revisionists  at least,  the  stories were used  to conceal  alternative  interpretations 
which might have helped to undermine the Cold War. 27 
Kaldor proposes a fourth approach, to think of  the Cold  War as "an imaginary conflict 
which conceals parallel but largely  separate internal  conflicts".  28  The imaginary war, 
she writes, "(served)  to maintain social cohesion".  As nationalism served to legitimise 
the nation-state with ideas such as  "identity"  and  "community",  so the imaginary war 
"specified the character of blocs  and gave meaning to the sense of belonging to East 
and West".  Identity  was constructed through, 
a  shared  social  system  and  set  of values,  democracy  or socialism,  which  was 
contrasted to an opposing system, totalitarianism or imperialism. Each system,  at 
least  in  the  imagination,  threatened  the  very  existence  of  the  other.  It was  a 
struggle between good and evil of  epic proportions. And it was sustained by a real 
military confrontation and, indeed, real wars in remote parts of  the world.29 
While  each  bloc  regulated  its  social  and  economic  systems  according  to  opposing 
doctrines,  the  imaginary  war  in  either  drew  its  power  from  popular  ideas  and 
experience. It was an identity based on abstract values like freedom and  equality that 
were apparently more progressive than criteria of nationality,  culture,  or race. 30  This 
idea of  an 'imaginary war' leads us to a consider some of  the most compelling common 
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sense  accounts  in  western  culture:  those  of the  media,  particularly  news  and 
journalism. 
The Cold War News Paradigm 
If we accept  that  the western news  media  reported  and  interpreted  the  Cold  War 
within  a  paradigmatic  framework,  we  have  to  make  a  distinction  between  an 
instrumental 'enemy image'  - not historically  specific to the  Soviet Union during the 
Cold War - and the actual paradigm, the  'deep structures' of  thought and action, that 
the enemy image served to rationalise.  It would be wrong to argue that they are one 
and the same.  The Cold War was characterised by alternating periods of hostility and 
detente and these determined the functional utility of  the enemy image. But periods of 
detente  did  not  signify  crisis  in  the fundamental  paradigm.  That  remained  constant 
throughout the conflict. 
The enemy image 
The western media mostly constructed their imagery through the orthodox framework. 
They  presented  the  Cold  War  as  a  stand-off between  two  superpowers  with  sole 
responsibility  for  danger  or trouble  lying  squarely  with  the  Soviet  Union,  "the  evil 
empire".  At  its worst, the framework restricted thought and  action.  It was as  much 
part of what Edward Thompson called  "the deep  structure of the Cold War,  or the 
thrust of exterminism"31  as  the  nuclear arms race because it  helped  dehumanise the 
'other side' out of  existence.  As Gerbner argues, the enemy image, 
has deep institutional sources and broad social consequences. It projects the fears 
of a system by dramatising and exaggerating the dangers that seem to lurk around 
every comer. It works to unify its subjects and mobilises them for action.32 
The sources of the Cold War enemy image are rooted in  the West's response to the 
October  Revolution.  Walter  Lippmann  and  Charles  Mertz  carried  out  a  content 
analysis of the New  York  Times'  coverage of the revolution and  found  it  hostile and 
propagandist. For the New York Times, they wrote, the Bolsheviks were "both cadaver 
and world-wide menace" .33  Popular fiction in books, on television and in the cinema 
promoted images of  the US in simplistic adversarial relationship with the USSR: Uncle 
Sam versus Ivan the Terrible, the Eagle versus the Bear (an image used in a Pentagon 
video  on the arms  race),  the Promised  Land  versus  the Evil  Empire.  In  the  Soviet 
Union the images were reversed.  The  West  represented the kind  of  economic  and 
social  inequalities  that  the  Revolution  sought  to  overthrow  and  replace.  The 
shortcomings of the Revolution were minimised with persistent reference to capitalist 
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commonly depicted peering at the other over the Berlin Wall with fear and suspicion.34 
Such depictions were prevalent throughout the Cold War but, in an historical context, 
they have  had  a universal  utility  that  can  be  applied  to any  external  threat  for  the 
containment of  the domestic populace.35 
Dennis et al (1991) show  that the most negative and virulent images  prevailed over 
relatively  short  periods of crisis  in  US-Russian/Soviet relations.  A longer,  historical 
perspective on how each side defined the other points to a more dynamic process of 
political and cultural  conflict and  struggle on all  fronts of the Cold War.  While the 
New Cold War of  the 1980s saw the picture at its blackest  extreme, other periods of 
Cold War and detente witnessed  mixed images and shifting perceptions. 
The Cold War  was successful in concealing a history of more  'normalised' relations 
between the US and Russia as competing 'great powers', periods when they engaged in 
much more open economic, political and cultural exchange. Dennis et al work within a 
broad historical and comparative framework to examine changes in  how the US  and 
Russia/Soviet  Union  saw  each  other  from  the  19th  Century.  The  essays  in  the 
collection are written by authors - journalists and academics - from both countries and 
they present a history of US-Russian/Soviet  images  as  one of mutual fascination  as 
well as suspicion, friendliness as well as hostility.36 For example, while condemning the 
inequalities  of  American  capitalism,  Leninist  journalism  would  also  praise  its 
productive forces, its technological advances and its great engineering feats.37  Among 
the US media, images of  stupid and violent Russians would mix with stories of Soviet-
American cooperation and friendship. 38 
In some cases, an "own worst enemy"  factor came into play.  McNair considers some 
of the constraints faced by  western correspondents when reporting from  the Soviet 
Union during the New Cold War and, conversely,  the failure or inability of  the Soviet 
authorities to shape  or influence  western news  coverage  of Cold  War issues.  This 
helped shape "enemy images" of  the Soviet Union as much as the West's own political 
and cultural assumptions. For example, during the Korean airliner crisis, in  1983,  the 
Soviet  authorities were more  concerned  with  presenting  their version  to their  own 
people rather than competing with the US in persuading Western publics that they had 
a  credible  defence.  Thus  US  propaganda  played  unopposed  to  more  sceptical 
European opinion  until  it  finally  began  to collapse  under  the  weight  of  its  own 
contradictions.39 
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There was a degree also to which the 'enemy' could influence and shape its image to its 
own advantage.  A  good  example  of this  was  a  new  Soviet  appreciation  of news 
management  strategies,  such  as  timing  and  creating  "exclusive"  or  "controversial" 
events for  media  consumption.  From  1985,  glasnost and perestroika  in  the  Soviet 
Union brought  major improvements in  Soviet  news management  and  concomitant 
changes in how western journalists reported the Soviet Union.40 Not least among these 
was the transformation of the Soviet leader from Evil Emperor to Nice Guy.  In the 
image-conscious West, Mikhail Gorbachev achieved 'superstar' status. Compared to his 
predecessors,  he was young,  photogenic,  and  charismatic.  And,  as  he  toured the 
capitals of  the West to popular acclaim, he became a propaganda  liability for the West. 
Take,  for  example,  his  performance  vis  a  vis  Ronald  Reagan  during  the  Moscow 
Summit.  On the last day,  he  held  a long news conference,  speaking to the western 
media  on all  issues,  sometimes without  notes.  The  event  contrasted with  a  poorly 
attended  news  conference  at  the  US  Embassy,  where  Ronald  Reagan  appeared  to 
struggle with the issues and was criticised for  selecting favoured  US journalists for 
questions. The comparison was highlighted in some sections of  the British news media. 
In  Gorbachev,  the  BBC  observed  "a  man  in  control:  quick-witted,  dynamic, 
formidable" .41  ITN  described  his  performance  as  "an  extraordinary  tour  de  force 
without a note".42 The Guardian reported that "Gorbachev was masterful and ... Reagan 
was  genially  feeble,  even  by  his  own  modest  standards".  The  Independent judged 
Reagan's conference "deeply embarrassing" and "a flop",  although a more sympathetic 
account in  The  Times  concluded that his  "rambling answers,  inconclusive  sentences, 
hesitations, and apparent difficulty in grasping the point of many questions" were due 
to fatigue.43  Gorbachev's  popularity  and  credibility  rating  in  Europe was  rising  as 
Reagan's was flagging:  the US  leadership role was under symbolic  assault.  This was 
especially significant at a time when NATO planners were arguing for  'modernisation' 
of  the alliance's nuclear forces in western Europe. 
So while images of  the enemy might alter according to the intensity of hostilities, or to 
PR  strategies,  the  Cold  War  paradigm  remained  intact.  Even  during  detente,  the 
superpowers were still  perceived as  no more than "Friendly Enemies" .44  In the next 
section, we will  see ways in which the enemy image informed media coverage of the 
most  crucial  and  persistent  theme of the  Cold  War:  arms  control  and  the  nuclear 
debate. 
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The news media and the nuclear debate 
Several research studies show how it was possible to understand the nuclear debate in 
the media  on a number of levels:  as  a propaganda battle between the  superpowers 
(GUMG, 1985; McNair 1988; Hallin and Mancini,  1989; McLaughlin 1989), between 
NATO and the peace movement (Aubrey et aI,  1982; GUMG,  1985; McNair,  1988), 
or between Conservatives and Labour in the 1983 and 1987 general elections in Britain 
(McNair, 1988). 
The  development  and  explosion  of the  first  nuclear  weapons,  argues  Paul  Chilton, 
marked  a  frightening  paradigmatic  shift  in  human  consciousness  to  the  Cold  War 
world. It was, 
a catastrophic jump to a new order of  experience in science, politics and everyday 
life.  In  1945, it was popular to refer to this jump as  a 'revolution' which would 
itself 'revolutionise' human behaviour, and to communicate about such matters on 
the fringe of experience and  imagination places strain on  our symbolic  systems. 
The language used  to talk about the  new  weapons  of mass  extermination  was 
partly a reflection of an attempt to slot the new reality into the old paradigms of 
our culture. It was also no doubt a language that served  the purpose of  those who 
were concerned to perpetuate nuclear weapons development and deployment  45 
To get some idea of the parameters of the framework,  it might be useful to offer an 
example of  how the  nuclear debate  was not  reported.  At the height of the New 
Cold War and the anti-Cruise missile demonstrations in the West,  the New Left Review 
published Exterminism and Cold War (1982), an international collection of essays that 
set out a socialist critique of  the nuclear arms race.  They  addressed the problem from 
four  points  of enquiry.  First,  "the  social  nature  and  basis  of. .  .'exterminism'  - the 
apparent drive of  industrial civilisation towards its own self-destruction in the post-war 
arms  race";  second,  "the  respective  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  two 
(superpowers)"; third,  "the  relative  importance  of the distinct  major  theatres of the 
Cold War - the Far East, Europe, and the Third World"; and fourth,  "the whole nexus 
of problems  posed by  the  quest  for  a  realistic  way  out of the  looming  dangers  of 
'Exterminism and Cold War'''.  46 
The  mainstream  media,  by  contrast,  offered  the  narrowest  possible  interpretation. 
According to their orthodox, Atlanticist paradigm, the nuclear weapon was a defensive 
deterrent  against  the  Soviet  threat  of  invasion,  domination,  or  even  nuclear 
annihilation.  Andrew  Wilson,  one-time  defence  correspondent  with  the  Observer, 
noted the culture of fascination with nuclear weapons and weapons technology among 
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the defence 'community'. The same could be applied to sections of  the media.  As with 
all lobby correspondents, journalists on the defence beat came into regular contact with 
officials in the 'defence community' and in  many instances forged  lasting friendships. 
They became immersed  in  a  defence  culture that,  as  Wilson  argues,  "provided the 
essential  framework  within  which  to  pursue  peace-time  planning  for  operations 
involving  the  death  of millions".47  Within  the  framework,  a  certain  language  was 
employed to defuse the lethality and destructive power of nuclear weapons, a clinical, 
abstract language that Paul Chilton calls 'Nukespeak'. Nuclear weapons were  labelled 
with anodyne  names  or  model  numbers  much  in  the fashion  of cars  or washing-
machines:  the  'MX',  'Cruise',  'Trident'.  When  the  enemy  built  better  and  more 
destructive weapons and in greater quantity they were 'escalating' the arms race. When 
the  friendly  Alliance  embarked  on a  similar  course  it  was  simply  'modernising'  its 
deterrent. All this had the marvellous utility of rendering nuclear weapons as anything 
but what they actually were:  instruments of  human  exterminism.48  It also  had  the 
power to shield the framework from attack by 'the enemy within'. With regard to the 
media  this  manifested  itself  in  a  hierarchy  of  access  that  excluded  alternative 
perspectives from dissident voices. 
Edward Thompson argued that news presentation of  the nuclear weapons debate was 
"extraordinarily Cold Warish" and dominated by "old Atlanticist types like Robin Day" 
whom he regarded "one of the greatest threats to the survival of civilisation next to 
(nuclear) missiles".  The caricature set up an important point about the interpretative 
framework within which news and current affairs mediated the debate.  For Thompson, 
"(Robin)  Day's  whole  tone  and  strategy  of presentation  is  to  imply  a  normal, 
consensual position which is  pro-defence, pro-nuclear weapons".  49  Those opposed to 
the process of  exterminism - such as intellectuals, politicians, the Greenham Common 
women, and CND - were labelled 'extremist' or 'unpatriotic'.  If  that cap did not fit - as 
with  religious  figures  or establishment  opponents  - then  they  were  called  'naive', 
idealistic',  or 'mad'.  All  opposition  and  dissent  was  apparently  voiced  against  the 
interests of 'national security'.50 The Glasgow University Media Group concluded that 
the implicit, damning assumption underpinning news coverage of the peace movement 
was,  'It won't change anything'. 51 
Thus, with the weapons defused and the 'peaceniks' disarmed, the most controversial 
issues  appeared to be arithmetical.  Concepts of 'nuclear parity'  or 'mutually assured 
destruction  (MAD) were underwritten  by  strict  adherence  to the  rules  of a  crude 
numbers game.  52  The debate became so abstract and quantitative that it distracted from 
an underlying, qualitative concept of  'first use' or the 'pre-emptive strike'. This assumed 
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that a limited nuclear war could be fought and won by such 'overwhelming force' that 
the enemy would never have a chance to retaliate.  As long the public understood that 
the goal of arms control was to ensure 'nuclear parity' between East and West - each 
side having a rough equivalence of nuclear  weapons - they would not think too much 
about what the  weapons  were  designed  for  or about  the  capability  of a  particular 
missile over and above its counterpart on the other side. It was explained to the public 
that  these  strategies  insured  against the  possibility  of nuclear  war  and  they  were 
translated into concepts of 'no-first use',  'mutually assured destruction',  or simply the 
'nuclear deterrent'.  Selling the nuclear deterrent to a sceptical public demanded good 
'sales  patter'  that  could  persuade  us  that  its  visible  flaws  or  contradictions  were 
unfortunate but nothing  to undermine  its  absolute  necessity.  For example,  Chilton 
refers to a glossy PR brochure put out by the Ministry of  Defence in the early 1980s to 
sell  the  virtues  of the  Cruise  missile  system.  The  MoD  reassured  'the  public'  that 
deploying the weapon system in Britain would not make the country a special target in 
the event of  a war because, it said,  "no part of this country  ... will be safe from danger 
whether we have Cruise missiles or not". 53 
The west could legitimise nuclear weapons in  this  manner  as long as the Cold War 
prevailed but change to detente undermined the tactic considerably.  The solution was 
to project 'evil'  and 'instability' from unseen metaphysical forces to what was visible. 
Gorbachev was a 'nice guy',  yes,  and the Soviet  people no  doubt wanted peace and 
friendship with the West but the West had to be careful.  The Soviet empire was not 
quite evil any longer but it had a long way to go before it could be trusted on western 
principles of human rights.  It was also undergoing unprecedented social and economic 
reforms with glasnost and perestroika.  That  brought its  own instabilities,  hence the 
oft-quoted truism of de Toqueville that an empire is at its most dangerous when it is 
reforming itself from within. 
Soviet uncertainty principles:  from human rights to glasnost and perestroika 
The Moscow superpower Summit took place in May-June 1988.  This  fourth meeting 
between  Gorbachev  and  Reagan  was  to  mark  the  ratification  of the  INF  Treaty, 
concluded in  Washington the previous year to reduce  and  eventually  eradicate their 
stocks of medium-range nuclear weapons.  The  next logical step was further progress 
in talks for a long-range, strategic arms treaty (START),  which, if agreed, would have 
profound implications for superpower relations and the entire basis of the Cold War. 
However,  the talks in Geneva had ground to a halt over America's refusal to include 
its sea-launched missiles in  the negotiations.  For the US,  talk about START was out. 
So  what  did  the  media  report?  At  events  like  superpower  summits,  disputes  over 
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complex issues  in  arms  control could  be  eclipsed  by  other  distracting  themes.  For 
example, the impasse over START at the Moscow Summit was explained with wider 
reference to human rights,  and to the future of  Gorbachev and his reform proposals. 
In advance of  the Moscow summit, the US news management strategy was to tap into 
the powerful ideological connotations that the  concept of human  rights  carried  and 
which easily filtered through to routine Cold War news. 54 Thus, Ronald Reagan set the 
US  agenda  for  the  meeting  when  he  stopped  over  in  Helsinki  to  give  a  speech 
commemorating  the  Helsinki  Accords  of 1975.  Although  human  rights  protocols 
formed  only  a  part  of the  Accords,  Reagan  focused  on  them  exclusively.  He 
condemned the critics and accused the Soviet Union of failing to live up to them since 
signing. 55  On the basis of his  speech,  and  his  plan  for  an  unofficial  meeting  with 
Soviet  dissidents  in  Moscow,  the western news  media  dubbed  the  occasion,  The 
Human Rights Summit,  before it had even started.  "Human rights is his theme", said 
the  BBC  headline56;  "President  Reagan  ... has  put  human  rights  at  the  top  of the 
agenda", announced ITN.57  Reagan was successful in framing the human rights theme 
with  wider  issues.  BBC  reported  his  view  that  "international  security  cannot  be 
separated from  human  rights". 58  In  contrast,  the  Soviet  position  was  reported  as  a 
negative,  ritual  response  to  the  preferred  US  agenda,  not  as  an  equally  valid 
contending viewpoint.  Channel Four News  stated that it  came as  "no  surprise to the 
Soviets that President Reagan should strike such a tough and  uncompromising note" 
on human rights, yet they could only "respond predictably" with "ritual denunciations 
of  the speech".  59 
Media coverage of the Summit showed that accounts of internal Soviet affairs  could 
be framed  in  a similar way.  For example,  some  reports on glasnost and perestroika 
focused on their destabilising influence over Soviet politics and their impact on western 
assumptions  about  Soviet  society.  This  in  turn  undermined  the  certainty  and 
predictability of East-West relations and the Cold War system. As one reporter put it, 
"It was simpler for NATO when the Bear was always growling.  The question now is 
how should the West react?".  60  Thus the  principle western justification for  its  non-
response  to  Soviet  initiatives  on  arms  contro1.61  Ever  alert  to  deception  from  any 
quarter, Western think-tanks and media pundits fulfilled their designated role as watch-
dogs for  national  security.  Zassoursky refers  to  timely  publications  like  The  Soviet 
Propaganda  Machine  and  Mesmerized  By  The  Bear:  The  Soviet  Strategy  of 
Deception.62  Caspar  Weinberger,  a  'Cold  Warrior'  with  regular  access  to  British 
television  news,  told  Channel Four News  that  the  Soviets  were  simply  using  new 
tactics,  public relations,  for their old unchanging strategy of "world domination"  and 
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that it was important for the West to "keep (its) guard  up" .  63  On a similar note,  the 
New York Times columnist,  A.M.  Rosentahl,  urged US leaders to be cautious about 
Gorbachev, "a man who is still the dictator of  the most powerful totalitarian nation in 
the world". 64 
Conclusion: The Paradigm Crisis 
The dominant news paradigm, then,  was as much an ideological construct as the Cold 
War  itself.  So  long  as  the  conduct  and  pattern  of international  relations  and 
international crises seemed to conform to the dominant assumptions underpinning the 
Cold war - on all fronts and in all battlegrounds - then the Cold War news  paradigm 
was a successful means of  puzzle-solving, of  making sense of  the Cold War. But when 
the Cold war system slid  into crisis  and collapsed,  so  did  its  explanatory paradigm. 
They were no longer adequate frameworks for intellectual analysis or for journalistic 
reportage. If  we are to use Kuhn's ideas to help explain how the crisis came about, and 
to consider its implications,  we again  have  to be careful  about  the  exact terms of 
reference. 
When explaining the dynamics of  paradigm revolutions in normal science, Kuhn drew a 
parallel with political revolutions which, he said, "are inaugurated by a growing sense, 
often restricted to a segment of  the political community, that existing institutions have 
ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part 
created" .  65  And,  as Harvey concludes, 
It is  an essential feature of (Kuhnian)  paradigms  that they are successive,  that 
each absorbs the preceding paradigm and provides a new conceptualisation that 
can take account of all  that the old  paradigm  could  and  resolve  some  of the 
anomalies that the preceding paradigm was unable to resolve.  Further,  the new 
paradigm provides a new basis for the refinement of  theory, a new set of puzzles 
to be solved, and consequently, anomalous situations to arise.66 
But  the  question  remains  whether  western  public  discourse  has  formulated  "new 
conceptualisations" for rationalising revolutionary change in Europe since  1989.  The 
East European revolutions in  1989 and  the end of the Soviet Union were dramatic 
developments that brought about the collapse of the Cold War.  Old  certainties and 
assumptions - economic, political or military - became null  and void.  Yet, conversely, 
the idea of 'revolution' seems  inappropriate to the West's response to the end of the 
Cold War. Many of  the institutions and organisations set up to manage the conflict are 
still in existence - the UN, NATO, the EC. It must be said, though, that at the time of 
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writing  these  institutions  are  under  considerable  strain  in  the  face  of continuing 
economic problems and an array of global crises.  To think of a 'paradigm revolution' 
leads us to ask, "So where is the new paradigm?". Four years after the fall of  the Berlin 
Wall there is still no answer to that among the western media: it is a puzzle in search of 
a paradigm.  Therefore a better way of thinking this out might be to use Kuhn's idea 
that "crisis alone  ... attenuates  ... the role of a paradigm".67  This best accommodates the 
proposition of  a paradigm collapse and the absence of a new paradigm with the power 
and persistence of  Cold  War news. 
My thesis then argues that the East European revolutions of 1989 and the end of the 
Cold war have resulted in a paradigm crisis rather than a revolutionary shift in  news 
frameworks.  I will examine the impact of the East European revolutions on the Cold 
War news paradigm at one of  the earliest moments of  crisis: the fall of  the Berlin Wall. 
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27 CHAPTER THREE 
The Cold War News Paradigm Under Pressure: History As News 
In 1986,  Michael Schudson argued that in dominant western journalism, history since 
world war two was simply assumed and  required no explanation: 
While a story on a development in science might  reach several millennia back or a 
controversy over  authenticating a poem by Shakespeare dig  back four centuries, 
only two time dimensions - the human  "lifetime"  and the "postwar world"  - are 
taken for  granted  and  require  no  explanation  in  reporting  on  political 
affairs. 1 
Furthermore,  he  predicted,  editors  who  learned  their  profession  reporting  the 
immediate "post-war" era  would  be succeeded by journalists who began their careers 
in  the 1960s and whose "  ... formative political experience was the hopefulness of the 
Kennedy administration, the civil rights movement, combat in Vietnam, or the  antiwar 
movement" .  2  As a result, the dominant interpretative framework  "  ... will  become less 
coherent  and  ideological  pre-suppositions  less  commanding,  because  no  consensus 
governs the understanding of  the sixties"  as one does the second world war. Schudson 
did,  however,  allow for a certain flexibility to this rule of thumb:  "There is  a history 
before  1929,  obviously,  but it  is  rarely  a part  of the  cultural  equipment  of today's 
reporters,  editors  and  publishers". 3  The  'post-war'  temporal  framework,  therefore, 
would only change through generations of  journalists. 
Schudson could not  have foreseen it  at the time but  history was to become part of 
this  "cultural equipment" within years rather than over generations. In 1986 the Cold 
War certainties were still in place.  Three years later they were gone and the fall of  the 
Berlin Wall seemed to symbolise their total collapse. In the first reports from the scene, 
journalists referred back to the origins of the Cold War and the Berlin Wall  to place 
present events in  some context.  Yet there were major differences among the British 
news media  in  the narrative frameworks they employed to do this.  Television news 
and the 'tabloid press' stayed within the cold war frame and they rarely ventured out of 
it to revise established perspectives. By contrast, the 'broadsheet' press embarked on a 
freer range.  They recovered strands that had been frozen  out of the dominant  'post-
war' version: images from 1945 of Germany as the enemy and the Soviet Union as the 
ally that would have been unthinkable in  Cold War propaganda.  Some items referred 
back to the  Versailles  Treaty  or to  the  Russian  Revolution.  Others  evoked  united 
Germany  under  Bismarck.  One  newspaper  went  as  far  back  as  the  Holy  Roman 
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Empire.  It seemed that history  was  being reported as  news on the night the Berlin 
Wall came down. This chapter is about how and why. 
In Section Two, I analyse the  temporal and thematic frameworks that the news media 
employed to retell the history of the Berlin Wall.  This depended on the context and 
purpose of  the news item and of  the medium in which it occurred, although my primary 
concern here is with television news on the evening of9 November 1989, immediately 
after the Berlin Wall was opened.4 
Section  Three  looks  at  the  use  of another,  more  fragmented  historical  narrative: 
popular  memory.  Simple  stories  and  memories  of ordinary  Berliners  - about  their 
response when the Berlin Wall was built, their attempts to escape, or the effects it had 
on their family  and working lives  - were mythologised  in  press  and  television  news 
coverage. They were at once individual and collective acts of  remembering. 
Temporal  and  thematic frameworks  for  reporting  the  history  of the  Berlin 
Wall 
Cormack (1992:50-52) looks at how the US  and British press reported the opening of 
the Berlin Wall and argues  that while American newspapers recounted the history of 
the Wall from the point of its construction in  1961,  British newspapers referred back 
to its  symbolic  origins:  Churchill's  Iron Curtain  speech,  in  Fulton,  Missouri,  1946. 
However, Cormack's purpose is  not  to carry out a detailed or systematic analysis.  He 
takes just four  broadsheet  dailies,  two  British  and  two  American  (The  Times,  The 
Independent,  The  New  York  Times,  and  The  Washington  Post)  from  9  and  10 
November, and points out the parameters of  their temporal  frameworks.  The analysis 
in  this  chapter  is  more  detailed  and  wide-ranging,  taking  in  television  news  and 
fourteen British newspapers from 9 to 14 November.  It reveals that while television 
news  and  the tabloid  press  operated within  a 'post-war'  framework,  the broadsheet 
newspapers delved far back into the history of  Europe  as a means of making sense of 
the complex questions which arose from the opening of the Wall.  The Times' leader 
on 11  November reached much further back than Churchill's Fulton speech to pinpoint 
when the Cold War started and who was to blame: 
Though the Iron Curtain did not drop across divided Germany until 1945,  and the 
Berlin  Wall  was not built until  1961, an Iron Curtain between  the Soviet Union 
and the rest of  Europe had existed since the Bolshevik Revolution of 191 7.  It was 
then that the Soviet State first began to wage the cold war  against  the West. 5 History As News  30 
When the Wall opened up,  the prospect of German unity became  a real  possibility. 
Some British newspapers explained that present-day fears of this had been influenced 
by the relatively recent experience of  Hitler's Third Reich rather than being informed by 
a  much longer and  more  complicated  historical  view.  Even before the Berlin Wall 
opened,  Conor Cruise 0' Brien  observed the crisis in the GDR and warned of the 
possibility of a  new German economic empire,  a 'Fourth Reich'  that would  stretch 
from the west of Ireland to Vladivostok (The  Times,  31.10.89).6 But after the Wall 
came  down  William  Deedes  argued  that  the  O'Brien  vista  was  based  on  an 
unreasonable  fear.  The  post-world  war  two  development  of West  Germany  was 
encouraged with the earlier lessons of  Versailles in mind: 
I have long believed that  the advent of  Hitler and the Germany of 1933-45 owed 
less to the nature of  the German people than to the Treaty of Versailles. Nobody 
reads much history now,  but people ought,  at  this most important hour for  the 
Germans,  to  remind  themselves  of what  we  did  at  Versailles  and  what  then 
happened in Germany (Daily  Telegraph,  13.11.89). 
Such a perspective implied that the 'history of Germany' was inextricably woven into 
the history of  Europe, its frontiers and rule constantly subject to upheaval and change. 
There was no deterministic impulse in the German psyche towards world domination. 
To illustrate this thesis,  various items traced  German history within a period ranging 
from  the  9th  Century  with  the  formation  of the  Holy  Roman  Empire  7  to  the 
Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna,  18158~ from Bismarck's Second Reich, 
1871,  to World  War  1  and  the  Treaty  of Versailles,  1919,  and  ending  with  the 
Potsdam conference in 1945.9  For these newspapers, the opening of  the Wall signified 
not the "end of history",  as Fukuyama inferred at  the time  but the  unfreezing of 
history.IO  The Guardian warned that, 
the removal of  threat does not mean the removal of peril.  And no one,  glancing 
back over the miserable,  milling history of Europe - through centuries - would, 
for a second, dream so (EMPHASIS IN THE ORIGINAL).  (11.11.89) 
The first  television news bulletin to present full  coverage of the opening of the Wall 
was the Nine O'Clock News (BBC 1).  In terms of structure and agenda,  the  dominant 
focus throughout was on the implications of the event for the two Germanies and the 
principal actors involved in the drama.  There was only a brief glance at world reaction 
because that was still rather muted and vague. I  I  The later bulletins, News At Ten (ITN) 
and  Newsnight  (BBC2),  were  able  to  present  more  organised  and  more  detailed 
coverage  of the  event  and  its  implications.  The  News  At  Ten  featured  items  on 
reaction from  Moscow and  Washington.  Newsnight  opted  for  detailed  interviews  -History As News  31 
with only minimal reporting from the scene - in an effort to get first impression as to 
how  the  event  would  affect  the  West's  historic  approach  to  "a  whole  range  of 
questions about the future of Germany and its relations with Eastern Europe  and the 
Soviet  Union". 
Television news recounted the Wall's history strictly within the post-1945, Cold War 
temporal  framework.  The  narratives  in  question  all  occurred  in  bulletins  on  9 
November.  The News at Ten  began with the foundations of the Wall  at  the end of 
Second World  War and the beginnings of the Cold War.  The Nine  O'Clock  News 
and Newsnight started with the construction of  the Wall in  1961. The most significant 
differences arise in the thematic frameworks they employed.  There were two distinct 
accounts.  One  worked  clearly  within  the  orthodox  Cold  War  paradigm:  the  Wall 
symbolising the East-West conflict  and  demarcating  superpower leadership  roles  in 
their spheres of  influence. This was used by the News at Ten and Newsnight.  The other 
complicated the  story with an  anomalous reference to the process of inter-German 
relations,  Ostpolitik,  that undermined the  leadership  roles of the superpowers.  This 
was used by the Nine O'Clock News.  The model of  narratives illustrated in Table 3.1, 
below,  highlights  thematic priorities:  thus,  Frameworks  1 and  2  are  not  mutually 
exclusive. 
The  News At Ten  narrative operates within the wider temporal framework of 1945-
1989 and  begins tracing the  symbolic origins of the Wall  to the end of the second 
world war: 
(BATTLE SCENES, BERLIN  1945) The foundations for the Communists' need for a 
wall were dug by  Soviet troops as  they overwhelmed the Nazis in  Berlin  m 
1945. 
This was a narrow version of  what happened in Berlin in  1945. It  omitted mention of 
the  creeping  distrust  between the US,  Britain  and  France  over policy  towards the 
Soviet  Union,  and  their  bitter  wrangling  over  terms  for  a  post-war  settlement. 
Instead, it presented  a simplistic picture of  the Soviets overwhelming the Germans and 
digging in for a permanent stay.  From then on,  it  appears the West can only defend 
itselffrom  further encroachment on its territories by this new enemy.  The reference to 
Churchill's  Iron Curtain speech starts  the history of  the Cold War: 
Reporter:  Within  a  year,  Churchill  was  putting  its  consequences  into  words 
(CHURCHILL, FULTON, 1946) 
Churchill: From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has 
descended across the  continent. 12 History As News  32 
Table 3.1 
Narratives  employed in news  items retelling the  history of the  Berlin  Wall,  with 
reference to temporal and thematic frameworks, and to principal 'actors' . 
Temporal Framework 
1.  1946-1989 
(196(-) 
2. 196' - 1989 
(1970 -) 
(1985-) 
Narrative Themes  Actors 
The  Iron  Curtain  and  the  Churchill's  'Iron  Curtain' 
beginnings of  Cold War  Speech, Fulton, Missouri 
Freedom and democracy 
Leadership in Europe 
The  Berlin  Wall  as  Cold 
War Symbol 
The US President = USA 
The leaders of  the West 
The Wall  as  monument  to  The  authoritarian  states  of 
failure of  Communism 
Inter-German relations, 
the Ostpolitik 
USSR. & E. Europe 
Willie Brandt,  the West 
German Chancellor 
Soviet  &  East  European  Mikhail Gorbachev, 
reform  the Soviet leader 
(BBe NEWS and  ITN bulletins, 9-13 November 1989) 
The narrative explains what the Iron Curtain represents and who is responsible for the 
post-war  division  of Europe  with  reference  eastwards  to  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
narrative moves from Fulton, Missouri 1946, to Berlin 1961,  and the  building of the 
Wall.  This is presented as the fulfilment of a prophecy,  cementing the symbols,  the 
myths and the images that nurtured western  propaganda  at  the height of the Cold 
War: History As News  33 
(CONSTRUCTION OF WALL) The concrete and  barbed-wire  wall sealed Germany's 
manifestation  of the  Iron  Curtain,  becoming  overnight  the  reference-point  of 
post-war history and the focus of both repression in the East  ... (pEOPLE ESCAPING 
THROUGH BARBED-WIRE FENCE) ... and escape  from it. 
(MAN LEAPS  FROM  THIRD-FLOOR OF BUILDING IN SOVIET SECTOR INTO SAFETY 
NET ON STREET  IN FRENCH  SECTOR,  BERLIN).  Time  after  time,  fleeing  East 
Germans broke through  ... 
(BORDER  GUARD  CARRIES  A BODY A  WAY) Time after  time,  they  were gunned 
down in the attempt, fuelling the West's conviction that  life  beyond  the  Wall 
was dark indeed. 
The journalist then evoked John F.  Kennedy's  speech to West Berliners on 26 June 
1963, one which was designed to counter  public belief there that the United States had 
abandoned the people: 
Reporter: It was to the Wall that western leaders rallied  in what they saw as the 
battle to contain communism. 
Kennedy:  Today,  in  the world of freedom,  the  proudest boast is,  Ich bin ein 
Berliner! 13 
Throughout the Cold War no Western leader seriously wanted the Wall to come down 
as long as it  helped buttress US  hegemony and  western solidarity.  The reference to 
Kennedy's speech therefore underlines the extent to which the Wall  served both the 
ideological  and  propagandist  needs  of the  western  alliance.  It  recalls  the  private 
western bluff  that the Soviet Union would never take down the Wall thus making it 
safe to score propaganda points on the issue of  its removal.  When the Berlin Wall was 
opened, there were few references to the utility of  the  Berlin Wall for the West as an 
"Anti-Communist Propaganda Barrier". Indeed,  ITN introduced its item thus: 
Newscaster:  For 28  years,  (The  Wall)  has  stood  as  a  symbol  of  the  East's 
determination  to  keep  its  people  tn,  and  the  West's  resolve  to  keep 
Communism  confined  behind it.  (ITN, 22.00, 9.11.89) 
Looking back on US foreign policy up to the declared "end of the Cold War", Noam 
Chomsky notes the ease with which the Reagan administration  revived the rhetoric of 
Kennedy for very  similar  ends at the height  of the  New Cold War:  to bolster US 
militarism  abroad  and  distract  from  chronic  socio-economic  ills  at  home. 14  Simon 
Tisdall also recalled Reagan's Berlin Wall  speech.  In a brief item for  The  Guardian, 
"America Loses One Of  Its Favourite Hate Symbols", he argued that  Reagan's rhetoric History As News  34 
was "familiar in  American politics as  apple pie" .IS Just as familiar was the relish with 
which most of  the western media swallowed the pie without pause for reflection. 
The  importance  attached  to  the  Kennedy  speech  also  underscores  the  hegemonic 
leadership role of the US  in  Europe.  The News At Ten  item cuts from  Kennedy to 
Ronald Reagan's visit to West Berlin in June 1987, a virtual re-enactment of  Kennedy's 
visit in which he,  "used it to make a prophetic challenge to the Soviets": 
Reagan: General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace and  prosperity for the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe  ... come here to this gate! Mr Gorbachev, open 
this gate! 
This  editorial  linkage  supports  the  "great  men  of history"  narrative  of dominant, 
western historiography. 16  It links past and present with images of  American presidents 
in  western Europe as  they pay  symbolic  homage to freedom  and  democracy at  the 
Berlin  Wall,  the Cold War frontline.  This  reinforces  the  dominant  Atlanticist  ideal 
underpinning NATO - the continuity of  US hegemony in Europe (see Photo Sequence 
1,  below).  Newsnight's  version follows  an  identical  path.  It,  too,  makes the strong 
visual link between Kennedy and Reagan (see Photo Sequence 2, below). 
The News At Ten  narrative then cuts to  the image of  the Berlin Wall being reinforced 
and then to a shot of  Erich Honecker taking the salute at a military parade. As  images 
of successive US Presidents at the Wall symbolise US leadership in Western Europe, 
this sequence links the image of an unyielding Wall  with that of the  unyielding East 
German leader flaunting military power and resisting calls for the Wall to come down. 
His fate,  therefore,  is  intertwined with that of the Wall  with an  allusion to Humpty 
Dumpty: 
Just  5  years  ago  they  were  still  renewing  it,  still  strengthening  it,  deaf to the 
possibility of it  ever opening.  It  was  Erich Honecker's Wall  and  his  eventual 
down-fall: the man and his Wall set to  decay  in  history  together. 
The film  ends with shots of the Berlin Wall  and  Checkpoint Charlie at  night,  quiet, 
almost deserted except for security presence: 
(CLOSE-UP  OF  GRAFFITI  ON  SECTION  OF  BERLIN  WALL)  Tonight,  the  Wall  is 
assuming  a  new  guise,  one  of  endings  and  beginnings,  (A  POLICE  VAN 
APPROACHES CHECKPOINT CHARLIE:) a guise that  promises  to  deny the  world 
an unpleasant certainty around which to plan the  future.  (lTN, 2200, 9.11.89) History As News  35 
In a  similar  vein,  the Newsnight  narrative  recognises that the  opening of the  Wall 
could be an 'historic  turning-point'  for Germans  reminds us nonetheless that: 
(SECTION OF WALL) However intense the pressure from the West  (GRAFFITI ON 
W  ALL) and  however  intense the emotion in  Germany,  (GDR CHECKPOINT) the 
Wall has always remained. (pEOPLE WALKING ALONG  THE  W  ALL ON WESTERN 
SIDE) Even  tonight,  it's  still  there  and  the East German  regime  says  it's  not 
coming down.  (Newsnight, BBC2, 9.11 .89) 
ITN's  version  of the  Wall's  history  follows  the  paradigm  logic  by  reinforcing  the 
dominant images and assumptions which have informed Western  propaganda during 
the  Cold  War. It traces  historical  progress  and  development  in  Europe  along  a 
continuous line of  US  hegemony (see Photo Sequence 1 below). 
Photo Sequence 1:  ITN, 22.00, 9.11.89 
The Berlin Wall asfoeus of Western leadership in the  Cold War 
"Within a year, Churchill was putting its consequences into words" History As News 
"It was to the Wall that western leaders rallied in what they saw as the battle to 
contain communism" 
"Reagan used it to make a prophetic challenge to the Soviets" 
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"It was Erich Honecker's Wall and  his eventual downfall: the man and his Wall 
set to  decay  in  history  together." 
37 History As News  38 
Photo Sequence 2: Newsnight, BBC2, 22.30, 9.11.89 
The Berlin Wall asfoeus of Western leadership in the  Cold War 
"For Western leaders from John Kennedy on the Wall has been a symbol of the 
ruthlessness and, at the same time, the failure of communism, and it's provoked a 
series of rallying cries" History As News 
"However intense the pressure from the West  ... the Wall has always remained. 
Even  tonight, it's  still  there  and the East German regime says it's not coming 
down" 
39 
The version  on the Nine  O'Clock News  featured  two troublesome  anomalies.  Like 
Newsnight, it opens within Framework 2 with the construction of the Wall.  It employs 
familiar  Cold  War  images  to  convey  the  meaning  of the  Wall  as  a  symbol  of 
Communist repression and the division of  Germany and Europe: 
(PHOTO,  EAST  GERMAN  SOLDIER  DEFECTS  BY  LEAPING  OVER  BARBED-WIRE 
BARRIER TO THE WEST) The Wall  became an  horrific symbol of the  division  of 
Europe.  In  the  years  that  followed,  (pHOTO,  TWO  PEOPLE  CLIMBING  OVER 
BARBED-WIRE FENCE) 175 East Germans died trying to  escape across  the Wall: 
(pHOTO, A BODY LIES IN TRENCH, TANGLED IN BARBED-WIRE) some were lOlled 
by  machine-gun, some by mines. 
It has already been shown how  ITN's version reinforces the theme of US leadership in 
Europe  by  making  a  link  between  Kennedy  and  Reagan  with  reference  to  their 
speeches at the Wall.  The Nine O'Clock News  also  refers  to Kennedy's speech and 
makes a similar link, in  this case  with George Bush's visit to West Germany  in  1989. History As News  40 
However this is  interrupted by  some troublesome  references.  The first  was to Willy 
Brandt and his role in encouraging inter-German dialogue through the Ostpolitik of  the 
early 1970s: 
Willy Brandt, who took over as the West German  Chancellor in the 1970s, tried a 
new tack.  He made friends  in the  Eastern bloc in  the hope  that that  would 
encourage freer movement for East  Germans. The policy worked to a degree. 
(BBCl, 2l.00, 9.1l.89) 
The treaties and agreements facilitated by the Ostpolitik received extensive publicity, 
not  least because they  culminated  with  the  Basic  Treaty of 1972  which  gave East 
Germany a level  of  recognition just short of official.  Important,  too,  was the wide 
range of  economic, political, and cultural links which they promised to forge with East 
Germany and other East European countries, especially the Soviet Union and Poland. 
In contrast with NATO's propaganda of resistance, the German Ostpolitik was a way 
round the Berlin Wall by other means than physical.  It marked the beginnings of more 
"normalised"  relations between the two  countries  and  a  degree  of independence  in 
foreign policy-making,  despite the misgivings of  their respective superpower allies. 17 
The narrative then cuts to images of Hungary opening its borders with the West: 
But it  was not until this year that things really changed when Hungary decided to 
cut down its own barrier against the West 
These references to the Ostpolitik  and to the unilateral move by Hungary mark an 
important  break  with  the  paradigm  logic  in  that  it  undermines  the  notion  of US 
hegemony in Europe.  The Ostpolitik presents a picture of German independence and 
initiative which  sits  in  awkward  juxtaposition with  the  mythic  image  of President 
Kennedy at the Wall,  boosting the morale of the dispirited and frightened  people of 
Berlin. The reference to Hungary's new openness also undermines the notion that  the 
changes  in  Eastern Europe were  entirely  influenced  by  the  West.  Therefore  they 
appear somewhat anomalous in juxtaposition with the next image:  shots of President 
George Bush in Bonn, 1989,  calling on Gorbachev to tear down the Wall (see Photo 
Sequence 3, below) 
President  Bush's  speech  followed  a  difficult  NATO  summit  in  May.  Opinion  was 
divided  over  West  Germany's  resistance  to  modernisation  of short-range  nuclear 
missiles  and  their  proposed  deployment  on  West  German  soil.  At  the  same  time, 
Mikhail  Gorbachev  announced  substantial  unilateral  cuts  in  conventional  forces  in 
Eastern Europe.  It was a perfectly timed  intervention for  it  undermined the NATO History As News  41 
argument  that  Soviet  superiority  in  this  area  could  only  be  compensated  for  by 
modernisation in  NATO's nuclear "battlefield"  weapons.  The official  response from 
the  Bush  administration  was  to  portray  Gorbachev's  diplomacy  as  propagand~ 
designed to divide the western alliance at a difficult time.  It is the same story.  A new 
US president and a new controversy,  perhaps, but the same rhetoric with the Wall as 
the symbolic backdrop: 
Reporter: President Bush welcomed the new liberalism [in Eastern Europe] but he 
insisted that the Wall itself  must come down. 
Bush: Nowhere is the division  between East and West seen more clearly than in 
Berlin.  There,  this  brutal  Wall  cuts  neighbour  from  neighbour,  brother  from 
brother  .... and stands as a monument to the failure of Communism.  It must come 
down! 
It is at this point in the narrative that the second anomaly occurs.  Whereas ITN cuts 
from Reagan at the Wall  to pictures of it  being strengthened,  this version cuts from 
Bush challenging Gorbachev to tear it down to Gorbachev hinting that it might not last 
much longer.  ITN  reinforced its juxtaposition with images of  a hardline East German 
leader reviewing a military parade. By contrast,  the BBC item preferred  an image of 
the Soviet leader on his  state visit to West Germany in  June  1989:  hugging a West 
German woman as she offers him a small gift (see Photo Sequence 3, below). 18 
The version of the Wall's history on the Nine  O'Clock News interrupts the paradigm 
logic with images of inter-German relations and independence from the superpowers. 
It also prefers the image of reform communism and  "New Thinking"  (Gorbachev) to 
that of "hardline" communist resistance (Honecker). Newsnight's version features only 
indirect  reference to the  role  of the  Soviet  leader  in  the  bringing  about the Wall's 
demise. A journalist from West Berlin, Jochen Werbke,  recalls the days when the Wall 
was built and contrasts the mood in Berlin then with that at present: 
Werbke:  Nobody had expected  that all these  developments are going on that fast 
but we  have  the feeling  that.. .  after Gorbachev was in West Germany,  after  he 
was in (GDR) at the time of the 40th anniversary,  that  there is  something going 
on  to heal the  division  of  Europe. 
This, however,  does not disrupt the paradigm in such a dramatic way as we have seen 
in  the Nine O'Clock News  because,  as with ITN, Newsnight  tells the  story of the 
Wall  through  the  images,  words,  and  actions  of successive  US  leaders  without 
contradiction. History As News 
Photo Sequence 3:  BBel, 21.00, 9.11.89 
The Berlin Wall as  focus of Western leadership in the  Cold War: interrupting the 
narrative 
"President Kennedy visited West Bertin  ...  to rally morale" 
"Willy Brandt  ... tried a new tack.  He made friend  in  the Ea  tern hi  c  ... " 
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"But it  was not until this year that things really changed when Hungary decided 
to cut down its own barrier against the West" 
"In June, President Bush welcomed the new liberalism  ... but he insisted that the 
Wall itself must come down". History As News 
"Just two weeks later, Mr Gorbachev himself was in Bonn and he, too, hinted 
that the Wall might not be eternal" 
44 
On  10  November,  the  One  O'Clock News  on BBC was  completely  dominated  by 
news  from  Berlin  and  it  closed  by  linking  past  and  present  with  an  extraordinary 
sequence of images.  The first  part consists of seven black and white photographs (or 
film  stills).  These visual slices of  the Wall's history are linked by the dissolve, a formal 
device which, in  conventional film  and television grammar, usually signifies continuity 
through  the  passing  of time.  Alternatively,  and  more  probably  in  the  context  of 
recounting history, it could be interpreted as signifying a selective memory. The second 
part of the sequence consists of colour news film  of the scenes of  jubilation in  Berlin 
the previous night.  In total the sequence lasts for one minute and fifteen seconds.  The 
following analysis will refer to the narrative model outlined in Table 3.1' above. 
The first  part of the sequence (Shots 1-4) works within  Framework 2. In  its  still 
black  and  white  photography,  it  represents  the  past.  The journalist-narrator  speaks 
slowly  and  gravely,  pausing  to  reflect  as  each  photograph  dissolves  into  another. 
This,  we are being told,  is  the human  cost of the  Wall: those  who  died  trying  to 
escape are all martyrs and witnesses to the "failure of  communism"19: History As News  45 
Photo Sequence 4:  BBC1, 13.00, 10.11.89 
"a symbol and a challenge to those who could not and would not accept that 
d·  . .  "  IVlslon ... 
" ...  one of the hundreds of thousands who made it to the other side  ...  If History As News 
"Many others died in the attempt. To the West, their deaths  represented  ... " 
" ... the ultimate failure and the ultimate condemnation of the Communist 
system" 
46 I1IStory AS News  47 
The  narrative  then  moves  into  Framework  1  (Shots  5-7)  and  defines  the  Wall's 
meaning  in  context  with  East-West  relations  - as  the  symbol  of the  division  and 
confrontation  of  the Cold War: 
"The Wall was the physical manifestation of what  Churchill had called,  more 
than 20 years earlier  ... " History As News 
" ... the Iron Curtain, descended across the continent" 
"The Brandenburg Gate became the crossing-point between East and West, a 
crossing which until last night was forbidden to so many millions" 
48 History As News  49 
The shot above is important in that it links these representations of past with images of 
the present.  The story is  thus brought to a  definitive  close by  way of a  'seamless', 
therefore  'unproblematic',  link  with  the  past.  The last  segment  moves  back  into 
Framework 2 with  images of the celebrations round the Berlin Wall just after it was 
opened. 
So  far,  I  have  illustrated  how  the  news  retold  the  Wall's  history  through  clearly 
discernible  narrative  passages. However this  was  not  the  whole  extent  of historical 
references.  As  I  will  show  in  the  next  section,  news  reports  featured  other  more 
fragmented historical references  to  make sense of  the incredible events taking place in 
Berlin, particularly the narratives  of  popular memory. 
The Wall in popular memory: remembering and remembrance 
On BBC Newsnight,  two politicians,  key political players in  Britain's role in  the old 
Cold War drama, recalled how  they came to be in Berlin at a previous, critical point in 
the city's history. They connect their memories of  Berlin in the past with their hopes for 
the future: 
Heath: I was here a fortnight before  the  war  broke out in  1939 ... 1 was here just 
after  the  Wall  was  built,  in  1962,  and  coming  back  now  it's  a  tremendous 
change  ...  But the problems are there and now  we  have  to start on the process of 
solving the problems. History As News  50 
Healey:  I, .. .like  Ted, ... was  here  before the war,  and  I  was  here  after  the  war 
during the first  blockade and then the second blockade, and to me it's the end of 
an epoch. It's the end of  the post-war age and the beginning of  a new age. 
Throughout  coverage,  there  were  many  examples  of politicians,  journalists  and 
'ordinary people'  standing  back from the Wall  and from  the party in  Berlin,  and 
remembering.  They relived the day the Wall went up  with memories of where they 
were, what they were doing,  and how they reacted.  These memories made for good 
stories but they should not be dismissed as trivial 'human interest'.  Instead, they form 
an integral part of  a meta-narrative, a particular story of  the Wall. 
Stories of personal recollection were more common in newspapers than on television 
news.  Some reveal how effective and deep-rooted Cold War ideology has been in the 
collective  memory,  shaping  our assumptions  about  the  divisions  between  East  and 
West, between Communism and Capitalism,  or persuading us that justice and right has 
always  dwelt  West  of the  Berlin  Wall.  Halliday  et al argue  that  these  personal 
testimonies have a mythological function, one of  ideological catharsis and edification.  20 
Reporting the beginnings of  the Wall:  journalists remember 
A common recollection among journalists who worked in  Berlin at the time was the 
prevailing  mood of fatalism  which followed  the decision  to build  the Wall.  Leslie 
Collit remarked on how the  act of standing  at the Wall amid the scenes of  jubilation 
made his  memories of the city in  1961  seem all  the more poignant. He described the 
experience as "like seeing a 28 year-old  film  run backwards".21  W.L.  Leutkens was 
Bonn correspondent for the FT from  1958  to 1969.  He remarked that  "The worst 
thing about the Berlin  Wall and all that went with it was how easy it was to accept, 
however reluctantly".  22  The Berlin correspondent for NDR,  West German radio,  told 
Newsnight  about  the  mood  in  the  city  when  the  Wall  went  up,  and  about  the 
widespread sense of  betrayal among the people: 
Werbke:  We thought, "This is the end of  it". We expected, of  course,  the Western 
allies to do  something about it but, for political or other reasons,  they didn't. .. but 
suddenly the city was divided...  (Newsnight, BBC2, 9.11.89) 
Adam Kellet-Long of Reuters, recalled how he reported the beginnings of the Berlin 
Wall in  1961. He described the first moments in the style ofa Cold War thriller: History As News  51 
A red torch flickered under the Brandenburg Gate  as  I drove down a deserted 
Unter den Linden  towards  the  main  crossing  point between East  and  West 
Berlin in the early hours of Aug 13,  1961. It was a border policeman waving me 
down.  He strolled casually  over and  declared  : "I'm  afraid  you  cannot go  any 
further. The border is closed". 
These were momentous words in Europe's post-war history.  [  ... J  I returned to the 
office  ... and  sat  down  at  the  teleprinter  to  file  a  message  to  head  office  10 
London : "The East-West Berlin border  was  closed  early  today". 
It was a world scoop by eight minutes.  23 
Breaking out: East German stories of  escape and freedom 
The effect of the sudden sealing of the border on the city and  its people is  a familiar 
theme in  Cold War folklore.  In the years since then,  the western news media have 
relished and recycled those stories of  families  separated, of love across the divide,  of 
alienation between West Berliners ("Wessies") and East Berliners ("Ossies"),  and of 
those heroic escapes and  tragic  near-escapes across the barbed wire  and  minefields. 
The act of recovering them  from  the  taken-for- granted  past  is  like  excavating  the 
collective memory : the impact lies in  the sudden surprise of  revelation. 
The  Daily Telegraph (11.11.89) told the 'fly-on-the-wall' story of  two East Berliners, 
Juergen Junike and his son AIf,  who visit West Berlin. It is a story of memory, ritual, 
and  recognition. Father and  son symbolise the two generations of Berliners affected 
by the divisions imposed by the Wall.  The narrative conveys some idea about the kind 
of  sacrifice the old was prepared to make for the new.  Juergen recalls, 
how the  birth  of his  first child stopped him  leaving in 1961.  The baby was due 
on  August 13,  the  day work began on the Wall.  But it was two days  late.  By 
then, the Wall was up. 
Through  the  words  and  actions  of the  two  characters,  the  narrative  constructs  a 
certain  picture  of East  Berliners  - thus,  by  extension,  East  Germans  or  all  East 
Europeans. They are seen as  people who have lived in fear,  over-awed  by authority, 
paranoid about security,  guilty about everything.  These are all  clues as to the long-
term effects of living for twenty-eight years behind the Wall.  As they move through 
the various barriers and passport control points, father and  son sit  nervously,  waiting 
to be caught for being in the West - somewhere they still think they should not be.  But 
like  all  East  Germans  that  day,  they get  through  with  little  problem.  The  son  is 
overcome  by  this  strange  new  sense  of freedom  - "I  can't  take  it.  We're  speeding 
through West Berlin now"  - and  he still checks his visa stamps to see if he is allowed History As News  52 
to be there in the first place.  When they cross into West Berlin and see what they only 
ever heard about, their reaction seems melodramatic: 
"So this is what West Berliners look like!"  called his  son,  as the Trabant  edged 
through the crowds. 
"It has been so long", Mr. Junike sighed. Tears rolled  from his eyes. 
"I can't take it in, it is driving me  mad,"  his son  cried out. 
The report leaves Juergen and  his  son as they drive round a suburb of West Berlin 
trying  to find  the home of a  relative.  All  along,  Juergen  swears to himself that  he 
recognises this place,  yet he gets hopelessly lost. These responses are presented as the 
emotions and confusion of long-term prisoners who are suddenly released.  They get 
over-emotional  and  excited  about  the  ordinary,  the  mundane.  Their  reactions 
accentuate everything that is different about 'them over there' from 'us over here'. Their 
story is  like that of thousands of other East  Europeans as they take up their new 
freedom to come to the West.  They are the strangers,  not us.  The Iron Curtain was 
coming down but the barriers it represented for over forty years remained. 
Stories by or about ordinary people who tried to escape over the Berlin Wall, and their 
fate in doing so,  have occupied an important place in the Wall's mythology and draw 
from a plentiful reserve of cultural themes.  The  Great Escape,  Colditz, Papil/on,  or 
The Birdman oj  Alcatraz,  are movies which work around very different themes from 
that of  the 'long-term prisoner released',  referred to above. They are about people who 
refuse to accept their imprisonment and plan their escape against the odds,  aware that 
'they might not get out alive'.  The excitement of  the story is provided by the ingenuity 
of 'the plan'  and the efforts to conceal it from the authorities - an essential focus of 
evil  in  the genre,  personified  by  'nasty  Nazis'  or 'evil  prison  governors'.  Our 
emotional  involvement  is  encouraged through identification  with the  hero  (rarely  a 
heroine).  Everyone can share in  his humanity,  his death-defying will  to be free and 
live 'happy ever-after'. Alternatively,  as in  The  Great Escape the escape movie might 
end  in  tragedy  with  the  death  or re-capture  of the  hero  just  minutes  away  from 
freedom,  so  highlighting  the  ultimate  evil  of the  regime.  But isn't  this  Hollywood 
entertainment rather than hard news values?  Maybe. But as told in the newspapers and 
on television news,  some of the 'true' escape stories from the days of the Berlin Wall 
echo similar universal themes and rely on the same set of  literary  values. 
The Sun saluted, 
THE  BRAVE  WHO  MADE  IT  - Great  escapes  by  balloon  and  high-wire 
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In  an  item  for  the  Daily  Telegraph,  Clive  Freeman  summoned  up  images  from 
Hollywood escape movies and  Olympic games  as he remembered how hundreds of 
people successfully made it across the Wall: 
Many have  reached  freedom  safely.  They  have  sprinted,  scrambled  and  swum 
across, often under fire. 
Some tunnelled their way out.  Others used trucks as battering rams to beat the 
Berlin Wall. 
Some made it out by light aircraft. 
Two enterprising  East Germans winched their way across the Wall  on  a cable 
slung between rooftops. (11.11.89) 
These images and themes are certainly evident from  a detailed reading of two news 
items.  Both occurred on 13  November - one on BBC News (Ben Brown) and the 
other in the Daily Mail (Anna Pukas). 
For BBC News,  Ben Brown  reported that, 
East Germans,  now free to cross the Berlin Wall,  are  also free to learn about its 
history for  the first time.  Many  head straight to the  Checkpoint Charlie Museum 
which chronicles  the  exploits  of those  who  risked everything to get to one side 
of this city  to  the other.  (BBCl,  13.00 &  18.00, 13.11.89) 
Once in  Checkpoint Charlie Museum,  visitors would  see  one of the most famous 
photographs from the days when the Wall was being built.  It is  of an East German 
border-guard leaping over a barbed-wire barricade to defect to the West.  The Daily 
Mail  told  the  story  behind  the  photograph.  The  reporter  identified  the  man  and 
returned with him to the spot where he made the fateful jump. The original photograph 
is printed alongside one showing  him  re-enact his escape. 
Conrad Schumann  had lived  the moment in  his  memory  again and again. It was 
an instant frozen, not only for him, but in the  mind of  every person with any shred 
of awareness  who  was alive 28 years and 90 days ago. 
The memory is  relived over and over and it  is  shared with "every person  ... who was 
alive". It is the exact memory of  people who literally count the days:  "28 years and 90 
days".  An  eye-witness,  Herr  Fritz  Busse,  watched  the  dramatic  escape  from  the 
balcony of his home on Bernauerstrasse. The Mail set up a meeting between the two 
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Mr Busse  ... clasped Schumann's hand and  said,  "I knew you were going to do it. 
You were nervous,  pacing up and down,  looking  very  agitated.  I  just  knew 
you  would jump and I willed you to have enough courage.  24 
However, the most pertinent question to arise from this story  is whether or not the 
Daily Mail journalist was simply  imposing her own rhetoric,  moulding Schumann's 
recollections to fit within her interpretative framework?  That is, was she using him to 
say something about the people of East Berlin?  The language she used suggest that 
she was. Take her view of  what the photograph of Schumann's escape symbolised and 
note the deliberate mythic dimension in her use of the capital 'M' for  'Man': 
The pictures of the momentous leap encapsulated for the free  world in  a  single 
action the determination of Man to be free. 
The story assumed  some  surreal  elements  when  Schumann  relived  the  moment  he 
jumped.  He  told  how  "  ... there was suddenly a police car waiting to take me away. I 
don't know how it got there. It had not been there a minute before.  Someone must 
have warned them". 
Then,  another  fortuitous  apparition  on the  scene.  Two  photographers  (and,  not 
mentioned  in  this  item,  a  film  cameraman),  vied  to  photograph  the  momentous 
moment in history they  weren't supposed to know would happen.  But they both took 
a photograph and ended up  fighting over the developing rights.  Amazingly, for a man 
who the reporter said  had  "just  seconds before being bundled  into  the police  car", 
Conrad Schumann answered their call to come and settle the dispute.  So it was that 
this "thin-faced Communist border guard, aged 19,  ... a shepherd's son from a village 
near  Dresden"  showed  vivid  awareness  of his  place  in  history  and  the  onerous 
responsibility attached to it: 
"But even  in  those confused  moments,  I  knew the  enormity of what  had just 
happened.  I told them,  'What you have just seen is  now  part of history and no 
individual has a  claim  on  history.  Such moments belong to everyone'. " 
It is  difficult  not to conclude that Schumann was used by the reporter as  a  ghost 
character to speak her words and to convey  her sentiments as a means of  constructing 
a universal story about escape across the Wall.  Otherwise, the amazing coincidences 
(the police car and the photographers arriving at the very moment Schumann jumps) 
and  the  incongruous  characterisation  (frightened  young  soldier  as  altruistic 
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The  BBC item also used one character to tell its escape story.  Domenico Sesta was 
introduced as an escapee who made it to West Berlin. He was at once depicted as a 
man to be trusted:  "a prosperous building consultant". Not only did he escape and lead 
a  successful  new life  but he  also  used  his  talent  and  ingenuity  to  help  others  do 
likewise: 
Twenty-seven years ago, he was building a tunnel underneath the Berlin Wall,  an 
extraordinary escape  route from East to West.  It took 5 months to dig it. It was 
140 yards long and it was ingenious.  Twenty-six refugees crawled  through  to 
emerge  into  a  new  life. 
In  both  language  and  plot,  the  story  holds  a  wider  significance  in  Cold  War 
mythology: 
But (Domenico) cannot forget that this Wall  has claimed its victims.  And those 
like (him) who risked  their lives and  survived will  always remember those who 
did  not.  (BBC 1,  13.00, 13.11.89) 
In  a  similar  way,  the  Daily Mairs  story  of Conrad  Schumann  moved  from  an 
individual act of  remembering towards a collective act of  remembrance : 
(Schumann) stopped to watch French troops sawing  down  an iron gate, the last 
obstacle in  clearing a 20ft gap in the Wall.  The gate was covered in crosses and 
black  wreaths, each commemorating someone who died trying to  make the same 
crossing. Schumann could watch only for a few minutes  before  tears again filled 
his eyes. He was thinking of how he could have been the one to pull the trigger 
on  those desperate souls. 
To honour those who died trying to cross the Wall is to remember not only who they 
were but what they died  for.  An  agency  story  about  one of these people,  Peter 
Fechter,  is taken up by the Glasgow Evening Times (13.11.89) and The Daily Mail 
(14.11.89). As in the story of Conrad Schumann, the over-arching symbolism is more 
apparent than biographical detail: 
Peter Fechter was  18  when he  was  gunned  down  by  East  German  border 
guards  ... and left to die ... 
His agonising ordeal was a symbolism of the cruelty of the Berlin Wall and  the 
people  who  guarded  the  sinister barrier. 
The Daily Mail  version gives the tragedy an added dimension, highlighting the hidden 
effects of  these deaths on the wider community: History As News  56 
His death broke his father's  heart,  and  seven  weeks  after burying  her  son, 
Frau  Fechter  attended  her  husband's funeral. 
Both versions of  the story put Fechter's death into context with all people killed trying 
to cross the Wall in its 28-year existence. The version in the Mail ends by noting that 
the last death occurred only seven months previously, in February 1989. By doing so, 
it brings the deadly legacy of  the Wall into the sharp focus of  recent memory amid the 
celebrations that weekend. Indeed, it was a weekend that coincided with Remembrance 
Sunday and this was by no means lost on newspaper and television journalists: 
The dramatic and historic events taking place in Germany and eastern Europe lent 
an added poignancy to the annual Remembrance Sunday service at  the  Cenotaph 
in  London yesterday (The Times,  13.1l.89). 
The  historic  events  in  Germany  gave  an  added  dimension  to  the  Service  of 
Remembrance at the Cenotaph (The Telegraph,  13.1l.89) 
John Young (The Times) and Maev Kennedy (The Guardian) canvassed the views of 
war veterans on what was happening in  East Germany.  Their items demonstrate the 
power of oral history as  a method of recovering aspects of the past which  in  some 
ways contradicts the accepted version.  What is  most apparent about the majority of 
views expressed in  these items is  not hatred and fear of the Soviet Union,  the Cold 
War enemy, or delight at seeing the Wall come down, but fear and apprehension about 
the re-emergence of  a united Germany: 
"I think everyone should be free,"  ... a veteran of the Italian campaign said.  " I 
don't think we will ever go back to the situation we  saw in  pre-war  Germany. I 
think Russia and the east European countries are  coming round to our way of 
thinking. " 
Mr Fred Whybrow,  .... who landed in Normandy  on D-Day,  said,  "I think it's 
good that the barriers  are  coming  down,  but  I  have  no  wish  to  see  a  united 
Germany with the same aspirations as it  had between the  two  wars.  We have 
seen it at first hand and I don't want to see  a repetition.  The whole idea of the 
division of  Germany was to prevent it ever happening again. " 
(The Times,  13.1l.89) 
The Amhem veteran saw no good news, only a threat to everything he had fought 
for, in the torrent of  people flowing through the Berlin Wall. 
"Half of  them are KGB,  and I wouldn't trust the other  half,"  he said bitterly. History As News  57 
"I was in the war,"  the poppy-seller said to explain why he  could not go along 
with the media insistence that this was a good news story. 
(The Guardian, 13.1l.89) 
This perspective was largely absent from television news references to Remembrance 
Sunday and the events in Berlin.  In Berlin or at the Cenotaph, in London, the events 
of the past week had  a highly  charged relevance.  ITN's lunchtime  bulletin  that  day 
(13.00,  12.1l.89) featured two items which made the ironic link between celebration 
of  the end of  the Cold War and remembrance of  the horrors of world war two. In the 
first item, the second world war is framed as the war that divided Germany and Berlin. 
With the opening of the Berlin Wall,  a symbol of that division,  the people can come 
together at last and remember those who died during the war.  By doing so,  they can 
begin to come to terms with a part of  their history which they have never been allowed 
to forget. The  report ends with pictures of  a service in  a Berlin church where, 
they also  remembered the dead of  the last war. The  war had left this city divided. 
Today, Berliners believe the old divisions can be forgotten. 
The next item  in the bulletin begins at the Cenotaph in London. Remembrance Day in 
Britain is marked by an annual ritual with a powerful ideological function:  it  reminds 
people of the freedoms they take for granted and  for which a "million Britons died". 
That it coincided in 1989 made it all the more poignant: 
After  a  week  when  the  world  has  been  talking  about  freedom,  here,  and 
throughout Britain, people remembered those who gave their  lives for  freedom. 
It's  75  years since the start of the Great War,  50 years since  the start of  World 
War Two.  A million Britons died.  (ITN, 13.00, 12.1l.89) 
Both items interpreted Remembrance as  a national rather than international  ritual of 
remembrance and reconciliation. There is no sense of connectedness between the two, 
rather an historical, ideological and cultural blindspot that avoids the history of enmity 
between the two countries. Awkward questions go begging:  'Who fought in the Great 
War?',  'Who fought in World War Two?',  'Who was the enemy in both conflicts?' 
BBC News appeared to get away from the problem by placing this nationalist ritual in 
context with similar rituals all over the world: History As News  58 
Newscaster:  Services of  Remembrance for those killed  in wars and conflicts since 
the first World  War  have  been held around the world. .. 
Reporter:  ... the act of Remembrance for  the nation's war dead went  ahead this 
year paralleled by the developments in Berlin that many hope may  close a  chapter 
in the history of  the great conflicts.  (BBCl, 18.25, 12.11.89 ) 
Reports also chose to draw an ironic contrast between Remembrance and celebration: 
At 11 minutes  past 11,  on the 11 th day of the  11 th  month,  when all of Europe 
remembers  this century's  wars,  Germans drink  champagne  on what was no-
man's  land as one of  the last legacies of  the  second  world  war is dismantled.  It's 
a day a  man can tell his son (FILM, MAN AND BOY),  "This was the Berlin Wall!" 
(BBCl, 21.00,11.11.89) 
The reference to father and son is a familiar  symbolic link,  the two representing  the 
old and new generations.  The old points to what is becoming history so that the new 
will remember. This construct is repeated the following day, Remembrance Sunday: 
There were those who'd  never  remember  a divided  city  (FILM,  CHILDREN)  and 
those who'd never forget (ELDERLY WOMAN). So, once again,  the centre of  Berlin 
has been reunited in a flood of people,  memones,  and  tears. 
(BBCl, 18.20, 12.11.89) 
Conclusion 
The fall of  the Berlin Wall marked a critical moment  when television news could have 
revised  the orthodox history  of the  events leading  to its  construction.  Instead,  they 
largely  reaffirmed  the orthodox account,  reinforcing  rather than  questioning the old 
assumptions and certainties of the Cold War.  A year after the Wall came down,  the 
Cold War was declared over and Germany was reunited yet the US leadership role in 
Europe persisted as a powerful theme. Ronald Reagan visited Berlin on  12 September 
1990, the same day the Four Plus Two  met in Moscow to sign the Treaty on Germany 
allowing German reunification.  For ITN,  his visit evoked his  1987 speech but it  also 
served as a symbolic seal on imminent German reunification: 
In Berlin today,  the former US  President Ronald Reagan who,  three years  ago, 
called on the Soviets to tear down the Wall returned to the place where he made 
that speech. He could not have known then that in  such a short space of time he 
would  be  walking  through  the  Brandenburg  Gate  in  what  will  be  a  united 
Germany.  (I  TN,  13.00, 12.9.90) History As News  59 
Less than four years later, the US leadership role was  under fire over indecision and 
bungling in crises such as Bosnia,  Somalia,  Rwanda and,  most immediately,  Haiti. 
President Bill Clinton paid a visit to Berlin and  played on the symbolism of the city's 
recent past to reassert his Kennedy heritage and the US's role in the world.  ITN linked 
his  visit  with  Kennedy  and  Reagan  before  him  within  an  explicit  US  leadership' 
framework: 
Reporter:  US-German relations  are  exceptionally  good.  President  Clinton  may 
hope his speech this morning may usurp Kennedy in the affections of  the German 
people. 
Kennedy:  In the world of  freedom, the proudest boast is fIlch bin ein Berliner!". 
Reporter: President Reagan stood on the west side of the Brandenburg Gate and 
called for German unity.  Today one of his  successors made  an  historic journey 
through that Gate from the old west side to the east. (ITN, 12.30, 12.7.94) 
The BBC reported on "a speech at the Brandenburg Gate that consciously echoed John 
Kennedy  at  the  height  of the  Cold  War",  in  which  Clinton  "spoke  in  German  to 
celebrate the collapse of the Berlin Wall  and the new relationship  between a united 
Germany and America". The reporter watched the President as he walked through the 
Brandenburg Gate with Chancellor Kohl: 
Reporter:  And  as  the historic  steps were taken,  memories  were evoked of Mr 
Clinton's young Democratic presidential predecessor who visited this divided city 
3 1 years ago: 
Kennedy:  As a free man, I take pride in the words fIlch bin ein Berliner!" 
Reporter: Speaking to 1994 Berliners,  President Clinton was able to pick up the 
linguistic lead  but put it in a modern context. 
Clinton: Berlin ist  /rei! Berlin is free!  (BBC1, 21.00, 12.7.94) 
However,  as  shown in  my  analysis of the British press and  the Nine  O'Clock News 
item,  the  framework  is  by  no  means  inviolable.  German  unity  and  the  continuing 
momentum towards some form  of economic and  political  union  in  Europe will  put 
under increasing pressure. Time will tell if and when the framework shifts to 'German 
leadership in Europe'. History As News  60 
In Chapter Four,  I analyse the reporting of  a 'typical' Cold War news story: the exodus 
of  East German 'refugees' to West Germany. I look at the story from its beginnings in 
the Summer of 1989, through the mounting crisis inside the GDR,  and to the critical 
moment on  9 November when the East German government took the shock decision 
to open the Wall.  I show how this one action and its consequences transforms a story 
that was good news for the West to one that is bad news. 
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balcony on Bernauerstrasse : 
Then, a  coincidence!  This man  had also watched  the  escape back  in  1961  from  the same 
balcony. (BUSSE  RUNS DOWN TO MEET SCHUMANN ON  THE STREET) It  was  a  joyful 
reunion. History As News  63 
In a world in which information is exchanged between different media, sometimes for very different 
purposes, it  may be no surprise to see the Schumann story being recycled this way.  But when the 
news - especially a major provider of "reliable and accurate news"  like ITN - recycles old stories and 
creates an illusion of originality, coincidence and newsworthiness,  can it be trusted to  report more 
serious events and issues? CHAPTER FOUR 
The Cold War News Framework Under Pressure: 
Reporting the GDR 'Refugee Exodus' 
This  chapter features  a  major  case  study  in  the  Cold  War  news  paradigm  under 
pressure.  It is based on the  premise that  the opening  of the  Berlin  Wall  forced  a 
radical shift  in  the interpretative  framework  for reporting  a 'Cold War news'  story 
- the  East German 'refugee exodus' to West Germany from  the  summer of 1989. 
The work is structured in two parts. 
Part  One begins with the problem of definition. Who  is a 'refugee'  and  who is not? 
By what criteria  is  refugee  status  determined  and  by  whom?  What  are  the 
implications  of  this  problem for  media representations of 'the refugee'?  Particular 
attention will  be  paid  to the  use of language  in  constructing the image  of the East 
German 'refugee'; and to how the  developing political  crisis  within  the  GDR was 
used as a  dramatic backdrop  against which  to explain the movement of people.  The 
analysis will draw from  news coverage of  a comparable 'refugee' story, that  involving 
the Vietnamese  'boat-people'.  I  will  argue  from  this  that  the  image  of  the East 
German 'refugee' in  the news was a rather fragile  construct based on contradictions 
and unquestioned assumptions. 
When the  Berlin  Wall collapsed,  so did the news story of  the 'refugee  exodus'.  Part 
Two shows how  the news defined  the  story as  one of political refugees before the 
Wall came down to one of 'immigrants' and 'economic  migrants' after the event; how 
reports doomed the  East German state to extinction before and then depicted it  as a 
place of  hope  for economic  and  political  reform after; and how the news presented 
West Germany as an Aladdin's  Cave  of  western capitalism before and then a place  of 
scarce economic resources after. 
Sample 
To  track this shift  in explanatory framework,  I  analysed  the patterns of coverage 
during  three  periods when the 'exodus'  was building  up - that is,  from September 
through to November 1989 (Sample Periods 1, 2 and 3).  These were then compared 
with the main sample of  coverage, Sample period 4, when the Wall opened. 
64 Reporting the Refugee Exodus  65 
I  also  analysed  the  language  and  images  used  in  the  news  to  describe  the 
Vietnamese  'boat people',  and the explanations given for their decision to  leave their 
homeland.  This  provided a useful  comparison and  contrast  with coverage of the 
East German 'exodus'.  Crisis stories about the 'boat people'  were  contextualised  with 
a focus on the long-term, everyday realities  of 'the refugee problem' in Hong Kong, 
especially  the living conditions  prevailing in the detention  camps. 1 Reporting the Refugee Exodus  66 
PART ONE 
Reporting the East German "refugee exodus":  A  problem of definition 
The  United  Nations and organisations such  as  the  British Refugee  Council  have 
found  it  difficult to  set  down  a universally  acceptable definition of 'refugee'.  2  As a 
label,  its use by the news media has been equally problematic. Joly identifies  a largely 
negative portrayal  that serves, 
to reinforce the underlying paradigm on which government policies on asylum are 
based:  refugees are first  and foremost  perceived and  presented as undesirables -
illegal immigrants,  potential  terrorists and drug dealers. 3 
However, this only  refers to the  mediation of restrictive,  official definitions.  Joly 
does not consider  the  possibility  that  even these  can  vary  according  to  the 
political  or ideological context.  For example, in contrast to the  precise criteria that 
inform legal and administrative definitions,  public understanding of  the word "refugee" 
has  been  influenced  by  wider  factors  such  as  historical  precedent  or cultural 
experience.  Religious and humanitarian principles of sanctuary or safe-haven embrace 
the needs of  the helpless victim of  events4 as much as the  political  asylee. 5  It has been 
argued,  therefore,  that between general and  specific definitions there is  room  for 
confusion  and  unsatisfactory  choices: 
This is still the emphasis  today,  as in press references  to the  victims of famine 
in Africa as 'refugees'. When conceptualised  in  this  manner,  the term  covers  a 
large and varied universe  of  oppressed, suppressed, malcontent, and poor persons 
whose movements can be attributed to conditions commonly  considered as  'push' 
factors that produce migrations. But a good indication of  why this definition is not 
satisfactory is  the  distinction in  the press  of  many  Western countries between 
'genuine' and  'false'refugees.6 
The process of  media definition, then,  needs to be explained not only  by considering 
professional routines,  but also  by taking  a  wider view of dominant ideological and 
international contexts  of the different  "Western media",  and  of  the  stories  they 
report.  The East German 'refugee exodus' to  the West  was hailed as  'testimony  to 
the  failure  of Communism'.7  In framework,  then,  it  was a Cold War story.  It also 
served  dominant  news  values  in  that  it  was  'unexpected'  and  'sensational',  and 
dramatic,  with  a  plentiful  stock  of 'good'  TV  images.  Thousands  of people  were 
leaving their homes and their friends and relatives in the GDR for 'a better life'  in the 
'free', 'democratic' and  'more prosperous' West Germany. The choice of label  'refugee' 
to describe the people appears  to have been informed by a combination of  ideologies -
political  (Cold  War)  and  professional  (news  values)  - rather  than  by  the  routine, Reporting the Refugee Exodus  67 
bureaucratic  criteria  used  by western immigration authorities.8 The use of the label 
'refugee'  was therefore  assumed  without  question  and  became  the  dominant 
definition.  Yet in  different  political and economic contexts the label 'refugee' can be 
contested. 
At the same time, more Vietnamese people were arriving by boat in  Hong Kong. They 
were labelled 'economic migrants',  more often 'boat people',  who  should be turned 
back home.  Theirs was a Cold War story, too, but for the media it was  neither new 
nor unexpected. It originated in a Cold War conflict  of the distant past, the facts  and 
consequences  of which  have  since  been  rewritten  or  absented  from  western 
discourse.9 The story of  the Vietnamese 'boat-people'  has thus been  depoliticised and 
explained as a 'humanitarian problem' - not for the people themselves but for the host 
country. With the passing  of time, their story has only been considered  'news-worthy' 
when they become a 'problem' for the authorities in Hong Kong or London. the crucial 
difference in this case was the lack of  consensus between the different interest groups. 
The  alternate use by the media of  the labels 'refugees',  'boat-people',  or  'economic 
migrants'  results from  a struggle for definition between public  spheres. to  The Hong 
Kong authorities represent the administrative-legal  sphere  that  makes  definitional 
choices  according  to  restrictive rather than universal criteria.  International  human 
rights organisations and refugee charities make their definitional  choices according to 
wider,  humanitarian  criteria. However,  the news media claim to operate according to 
the  professional  ideology  of objectivity  whereby  they  attempt  to balance  opposing 
definitions. In reporting the 'problem' of  the Vietnamese in Hong Kong, the news tried 
to 'balance'  definitions  such as  'refugees',  'emigrants'  and  'boat  people' with each 
other. This served to legitimise bureaucratic rather than cultural or humanitarian needs 
in that the refugee status of the Vietnamese boat people was always put in question. 
A look  at the words that the news used to describe  the East German and Vietnamese 
migrants  reveals significant definitional choices.  At its simplest, the Vietnamese were 
mostly  described by  journalists as "boat people" (Table 4.1, below),  while  the East 
Germans  are called "refugees"  (Table 4.2, below).  But  the comparison  also  shows 
that a wider lexicon of  words  was  drawn from  by  journalists  when  constructing 
the  image of the Vietnamese. The  language used to construct an image of the East 
Germans  carried  little  ambiguity.  The  label  "refugee"  was  almost  automatically 
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Table  4.1 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE VIETNAMESE "BOAT PEOPLE" STORY 
Language used to describe the Vietnamese 
Definition  Number 
Boat People  72 
Refugees  24 
Illegal immigrants  7 
Genuine refugees  3 
Political refugees  3 
Economic refugees  3 
Aristocrats  2 
Asylum-seekers  2 
Poor people  2 
Economic refugees  1 
Immigrants  1 
Total  120 
Sample:  Main BBC & ITN Bulletins on 
13 June 1989,  5-12 September 1989 
% 
60.0 
20.0 
5.8 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
0.8 
0.8. 
100 
(For  Full Details, see Supplementary Appendix, p.249) 
Table 4.2 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST GERMAN "REFUGEE EXODUS" 
Language  used to describe the East Germans BEFORE the  Berlin Wall opened 
Definition  Number 
Refugees  199 
Emigrants/immigrants  8 
Tourists  3 
Holiday-makers  2 
Newcomers  2 
Arrivals  1 
Economic refugees  1 
Economic migrants  1 
TOTAL  217 
Sample:  Main BBC & !TN Bulletins on 
10-12 September 1989,  5-8 October 1989, 
2-4  November 1989 
0/0 
91.7 
3.7 
1.4 
0.9 
0.9 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
100 
(For  Full Details, see Supplementary Appendix, p.249) Reporting the Refugee Exodus  69 
Images of  refugees 
When  we  match  these  definitions  with  the  reality  of each  situation,  even  as 
represented  by  the  news  media  themselves,  problems  begin  to  emerge.  Images  of 
thousands of happy East German holiday-campers heading not home again but to 'a 
better life'  in the West  made for  'good television'.  But they did not fit  in very  easily 
with the  image ofa 'refugee' by whatever criteria, whether those of  the United Nations 
or the British Council for Refugees. Yet  the news label "refugee" was simply assumed 
and it alternated with  the  tag  "tourist"  without apparent difficulty: 
Refugees are still coming  into (Hungary). Many fly in from East Berlin as tourists 
but head  straight from  the airport to the  camps ... They've  been well  looked 
after,  with lessons for  the  children  and  excursions to the zoo, for example, to 
keep up their  spirits.  (BBC 1,  18.25, 10.9.89) 
In the warm sunshine  here,  the atmosphere is  almost  like  a holiday  camp ... The 
refugees will only stay  .. .for two or three nights. Most are keen  to find  work and 
permanent homes as soon as  possible and the government is pledged to give them 
considerable financial and practical help in organising  their  new lives. 
(BBC 1,  13.00, 11.9.89) 
Reporter: (MAN HUGGING PEOPLE) We'd met this man in a  Budapest  camp, last 
week.  A ballroom-dancing teacher, an admirer of the English, and a man with a 
long held ambition that can  at last be fulfilled. 
Man:  We are going to Blackpool!  (ITN, 13.00, 1l.9.89) 
Rarely did  these sort of image prompt journalists to remark on how exceptional this 
was as a  'refugee story': 
This is a refugee camp unlike any other because it's a place of  hope, not of  despair 
it's a place where families dream of  reunion. (ITN, 22.00, 11.9.89) 
The  sense  of elation  and  hope felt by these East Germans was not misplaced. They 
were  availing  of the  new  opportunities  afforded  by  the  changes  affecting  most  of 
Eastern  Europe.  Yet,  quite  unlike  other  East  European  immigrants  to  West 
Germany,  they  were guaranteed  automatic  citizenship  under Basic  Law  and  given 
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In  sharp  contrast  to this  coverage,  the  news  represented  the  new  arrivals  of 
Vietnamese  'boat  people'  to  Hong  Kong  with  images  of crowded  camps  full  of 
miserable people. Even for those Vietnamese who did acquire official status, "the basic 
realities of life"  were somewhat different from the 'official' East German 'refugees'.  A 
BBC journalist describes one  official camp as "more relaxed",  with the refugees" free 
to come and go, and to find work in Hong Kong".  He concludes to camera: 
These  are the aristocrats of  Hong Kong's Vietnamese  refugees ... with  nothing 
left for them to do  now  except wait and wait.  Some have waited for  their new 
country for  more than  five  years,  reading  in  letters  from  friends  and 
relatives abroad  of a  brave  new  world which still lies just beyond their reach. 
(MY EMPHASIS)  (BBC 1,18.00, 11.9.89) 
Most of  the Vietnamese refugees were reported as people who presented  the British 
colony with  a serious  'problem'.  The  authorities claimed that  they  could  no longer 
cope  with  the  numbers  wanting  to  stay.  They  demanded  that  the  international 
community  accept  larger  quotas  of Vietnamese  'asylum-seekers'  or  agree  to  the 
necessity  of repatriation, forcible if  necessary. 
In  September 1989, BBC News carried a series of  reports on  Hong Kong as it moved 
closer to 1997 and  its transfer from  British  to Chinese rule.  Some reports focused 
solely on the  boat-people and the conditions they suffered in the detention camps: 
Cholera, the  deadly  companion  of dirt and  malnutrition, came to  ... the  latest of 
Hong  Kong's  growing  collection of refugee camps.  There's  no running  water 
here, no  sanitation, and several of  the policemen who run the camp are feared to 
have  contracted cholera  themselves.  (BBC 1,  13.00, 7.9.89 ) 
Cholera  has been  confirmed,  and  cases of malaria,  dysentery,  and  suspected 
meningitis  have  also  been  found.  (BBC1, 13.00, 10.9.89) 
Sympathy for the Vietnamese people in  these camps was by no  means  absent  in  the 
reports;  sometimes there were hints  of criticism  at  the way  the  problem  was  being 
approached: 
Hong Kong and other countries are threatening forcible  repatriation. Tough talk. 
But  in  reality,  such  measures would  have  devastating consequences for  all 
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However,  the reporter's concern here was broached outside  of a  wider,  political 
context. He rightly took account of the immediate suffering of  the Vietnamese 'boat-
people',  but not of  the inconsistency and injustice of  the official policy which put them 
in that position. 
The difficulty  here does not lie  in  the contrasting media  images of East German 
"refugees" and Vietnamese "boat-people" per se.  The problem is that those  images 
did not  appear  to inform the process of defining who were refugees and  who were 
not. One way of  illustrating this is to look at how the news explained  why such people 
- Vietnamese or East German  - felt compelled  to leave their country at all. 
Reasons for leaving 
Once  the political and economic  push factors  influencing  the East German 'refugee 
exodus'  were established in the news,  they were assumed, implied  or absented as the 
story became routine.  Evidence from the quantitative  analysis  shows  this  clearly. 
The summary of coverage  for  all  three pre-Wall  samples in  Table 4.3,  below, 
records  42 references to political motives and 15 references  to economic  motives,  a 
difference that suggests  the  degree of legitimacy attached to each when constructing 
the refugee  image. When  broken  down according to each sample period,  we  can 
see from Table 4.3  that these references  were  most  concentrated during  the  initial 
period of  coverage,  with  references  to economic motives dropping off to zero by 
Sample Period 2. 
Table 4.3 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST GERMAN REFUGEE EXODUS 
STORY 
Statements  in the news referring  to  motives of  East Germans  for leaving the 
GDR 
Number of  statements referring to  ...  Sample Periods 
1  2 
Political  motives  22  8 
Economic motives  15  0 
Sample:  Main BBC & ITN Bulletins on 
10-12 September 1989,  5-8 October 1989, 
2-4  November 1989 
3 
12 
0 
(For  Full Details, see Supplementary Appendix, p.249) 
TOT 
42 
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Economic motives 
Economic "pull factors"  in  the East German exodus were  reported only in  the first 
sample period, with  15  references compared with 22 references to political  motives. 
Indeed,  they are absented  altogether by  October when the  exodus  is  reported  as  a 
routine story (see Table 4.3, above). 
The  Hong Kong authorities accepted  as refugees only those who could prove their 
eligibility  under the United  Nations'  guidelines.  Those  who  failed  were  defined  as 
'illegal immigrants'  and faced forcible repatriation. The majority failed the test and the 
official reason why  was internalised  in a report from BBC news: 
Most of them now come from North Vietnam,  travelling in the simple hope of  a 
better life in  a country  richer than their own.  (MY EMPHASIS) 
(BBC 1,  18.00, 11.9.89) 
ITN  explained why  East  Germans were leaving their country in such numbers: 
F or the refugees at (this) camp, this morning,  the initial  euphoria  was over  and 
it was now  time to  face  the  basic realities of  life and get a job  ...  Wages can be 
four or five times higher than in East Germany~  the  prosperity  of  the  West has 
been, for many, a major factor in coming over.  (MY EMPHASIS) 
(ITN, 13.00, 12.9.89 ) 
Some of the few East German 'refugees' actually interviewed on TV news held high 
hopes for a better job and access to West Germany's more highly developed consumer 
market.  Material  considerations  were apparent  even among the very young.  Three 
children told ITN  why life in the West is better: 
1st Girl:  There are many shortages in  East  Germany.  You can queue for a long 
time and end  up with  three  bananas. 
Boy: Here in  West Germany,  you can buy a  car very  quickly.  In East Germany, 
you  have to wait  fifteen  years. 
2nd Girl:  Here,  I will  be able to play  tennis.  In  East Germany,  it is  very 
difficult because  there are  not enough courts.  (ITN, 13.00, 8.10.89 ) 
While  an  economic  and  social  'showpiece'  in  East  Europe,  certainly  a strong 
economy in  global terms,  the GDR was  always  unfavourably  compared  with  the 
stronger Federal Republic  of Germany. This was a routine comparison  in  Cold  War 
propaganda,  serving as a  metaphor  for  the wider  implications of  the East-West 
divide. 11  In this context it  was recalled to explain why West Germany was such a  big 
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(MAP,  FRG-GDR:  CAP.,  "HOW  THEY  COMPARE")  East  Germans  look  enviously 
towards their prosperous neighbour.  There  are  61 m West  Germans,  more  than 
three times the population of East Germany (17M) That's reflected in  the size of 
their Gross  National Products (FRG-$697 bn,  GDR-$168  bn.).  After tax,  a West 
German family  takes  home $24,000  per  year,  twice as  much in  wages as  a 
family  in  the East.  83% of families  in the West have a car;  in  the East, fewer 
than half do (8%). Nearly every family in the  West  has a phone (97%);  only 7% 
do in the East.  However, the mass exodus has been motivated by more  than  just 
material greed. 12  (Newsnight,  BBC2, 11.9.89 ) 
Political Motives 
It was of course important for the news to stress the point  that the  East Germans 
were political refugees first  and  naturalised West  German  consumers  much  later. 
Otherwise, the refugee  label would appear completely transparent and impossible to 
support.  Throughout news coverage of  East Germany's political crisis,  the exodus  of 
its  people was reported as  a  decisive  catalyst  in  forcing the Communist Party to 
making concession after concession  until  finally  opening  the country's  borders  with 
the  West,  including  the  Berlin  Wall.  References  to the  history  of the  Wall  were 
common-place in news reports. These were used to show  that escape  across the Wall 
had been a feature of East  German  life,  one  that undermined its credibility on the 
international  scene and led to the building of  the Berlin Wall in  1961. As discussed in 
more detail in  Chapter Three,  stories and  images of people risking  their  lives  for 
freedom were believable if  not universally acceptable accounts and were subsumed into 
western,  Cold War  propaganda.  For example,  one report linked  past with present 
with  black and white archive film: 
(FILM 1961: BUILDING OF BERLIN WALL) For 28  years, the Berlin Wall's kept most 
of  them in,  the  most  striking  image  of  repression  in  a regime  where there's 
no real vote,  (FILM,  1989:  SECURITY  POLICE  FILMING  BBC  NEWS  CREW)  and 
where the  secret  police  were  a worry even for East Germans under care in 
Hungary.  (BBC 1,  18.00, 11.9.89) 
Another news item featured clips from a  newsreel film  entitled, Berlin,  The  Prison 
Wall  showing  images  of concrete  and  barbed  wire  (Newsnight,  BBC2,  11.9.89). 
Elsewhere, the  prison image was brought up to date in an attempt to  explain why so 
many East Germans were leaving for West Germany: 
10chen  Kater, a musician,  says  East  Germany  is  a  gigantic prison from which 
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Apart from these explicit denunciations of  the GDR's political system (6 references out 
of a  total  of 42~ Table  4.3,  above),  all  other references  to political  motives  are 
general, sometimes vague allusions to 'freedom',  'freedom  to  travel',  'lack of political 
participation', or 'disillusionment  with promises of  reform': 
Gerhardt Meier says he wants to be free  to  live in the country of  his choice. 
(ITN, 13.00, 11.9.89 ) 
The exodus  ... can largely  be  interpreted  as  a rejection of the inflexible policies 
of  .. Erich  Honecker.  (Newsnight, BBC2, 11.9.89) 
(GROUP  OF EAST  GERMANS  SPEAKING  TO  CAMERA  IN  GERMAN)  These  East 
Germans can't wait for the  reforms at home. (FOCUS ON ONE MAN:) "Reforms will 
take  twenty to  thirty  years,"  he said,  "By that time  I'll  be forty or fifty years 
old. That's no good for me".  (ITN, 22.00, 2.11.89) 
However,  news narratives were not  limited  to  the personal testimonies of the  East 
German  emigrants,  or  even  statements  by  news  reporters;  such  inputs  were  not 
paramount to legitimising the motives of the refugees as being  primarily political and 
humanitarian.  Rather,  it  became evident  that  the legitimacy of the refugee  story 
was  being built within the wider framework of  reporting the developing crisis  in East 
Germany. This pattern of  coverage began to emerge during the second sample period, 
5-7 October 1989, when the GDR  marked  the  40th Anniversary  of  its  foundation as 
a state. The occasion had  many ingredients to make it a top news story in the  western 
media.  The Soviet President, Mikhail  Gorbachev,  was invited as  Guest of Honour. 
Mindful of  his presence, the government decided to  seal all its borders to prevent any 
more citizens departing.  It also knew  that  the  burgeoning  reform movement  would 
try  to  use Gorbachev as a powerful symbol of  reform, and  so  it attempted  to deter 
embarrassing street protests. On the  eve  of  his arrival, the BBC reported, 
a  warnIng  delivered  to  ... opposition  groups  that  they  face  a  Chinese-style 
crackdown  if they  continue  to  challenge  the  Communist  government.  (MY 
EMPHASIS)  (BBC1, 13.00, 5.10.89) 
The  image  of thousands  of East  Germans  fleeing  the  country  as  the  government 
contemplates a Tiananmen  Square  solution carried considerable potential as a means 
to legitimise their status as political refugees. The story was developed in a film  report 
from East  Berlin. Opening with shots of a  wreath-laying  ceremony attended by  "An 
honoured guest. .. , a member of  China's  inner leadership", the report suggested that the 
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The East German leaders strongly  supported  China's  ruthless crackdown on its 
opponents during and  after the Tiananmen massacre. 
The  reporter  interviewed the reform leader,  Werner  Kratschell,  who received the 
warning on the telephone from an unnamed government official: 
Kratschell:  He said  to  me,  'If the groups want to touch the  socialism  In our 
country,  please remember in China!' 
Reporter: Do you think it was a deliberate warning? 
Kratschell : It was, yes. 
Reporter: For you to pass on ? 
Kratschell : Yes.  And I  know that  there  are,  or  I feel that there are lot of  very 
military  steps  that  are prepared ... 
Reporter: To crush them? 
Kratschell : Yes. 
The allusion to Tiananmen Square was also  used  to  close  the report, with film  of 
Honecker  and  his  Chinese  guests  of honour  in  the  East  German  Volkskammer 
(parliament) : 
Honecker  is  an  elderly  man  who,  like  China's  leaders,  sees  his  life's  work 
threatened. But it's uncertain if he would take such extreme measures as they or if 
he could muster enough  support inside the Communist party to try. 
Despite  the  reporter's misgiving about the  likelihood  of the threat being carried out, 
the theme was developed throughout the day so that by late evening it was presented 
as  a direct cause of the  latest  "exodus"  of East German  citizens.  This  was  most 
evident in the development of headlines  from bulletin  to bulletin.  At lunchtime,  the 
headlines refer only to the exodus: 
More refugee trains have arrived in West Germany after forcing their way through 
crowds of  East Germans who tried to get abroad. There were screams and tears of 
joy as the trains reached journey's end.  (BBCl, 13.00,5.10.89) 
The headlines on the Six O'Clock News,  referred  to both stories but only implied a 
cause and effect relationship: 
Thousands more East German refugees arrive in the West. .. (FILM, GDR MILITARY 
PARADE)  and  the  East  German  government  warns  its  dissidents:  "Remember 
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By  nine o'clock, though, the relationship was fully developed  with  the headlines : 
Thousands more East Germans escape as  their government threatens a Chinese-
style crackdown.  (BBC1, 21.00, 5.10.89) 
Another  important  connection  was  not  reported  in  this  account:  with  all  borders 
sealed,  no  East  Germans  could have left the country,  crackdown or none.  Those 
headlines did not reveal that  the  East  Germans  seen arriving  in  the West by rail had 
left their country  before  the crackdown threat  was  issued. They had been waiting in 
the  West  German embassy in Prague for permission to go to West Germany.  When 
it  was  agreed  that they could go, it was to be  on  sealed  trains that  had to take a 
roundabout route back through the  GDR.  Had this  connection been made, of  course, 
it would have  undermined the notion that the Threat of a Crackdown  was triggering 
another 'mass exodus'. 
News reports referred to Gorbachev's state visit to China  in  May of  that year  to 
support the Threat of  Crackdown  theme.  This  was  principally  because  of  its 
coincidence  with  and symbolism for the 'pro-democracy'  protests: 
The  organisers  ... are  very  conscious  of the  parallels  with  China.  When  Mr 
Gorbachev went to Peking, this year,  the  communist authorities were at first too 
preoccupied to deal with the street  protests and then responded by gunning down 
thousands of  their own citizens.  Here in Berlin,  they  want to  keep protest off 
the streets  and channel it through a  political process.  (BBC 1, 21.00, 6.10.89 ) 
The  threat of  a  crackdown was  maintained  in  the  news  even  after the  forced 
resignation  of Honecker on 18  October.  His successor,  Egon Krenz, ruled out the 
possibility  of a  Tiananmen  solution  to  East  Germany's  upheavals,  and  promised 
reforms instead.  Nonetheless,  the biographical sketches of Krenz  in  news reports 
emphasise his  past  as  a  feared hardliner in the Ministry of  Interior : 
Emerging as the  new  head .. .is  Egon Krenz  ....  He looks affable  but is  deeply 
unpopular.  (He's) shown no sympathy for reform ... and now  controls the feared 
security forces. His  most  recent  task has been  congratulating  the  Chinese  on 
their handling of  dissent and his appointment will  be seen as an attempt by the 
conservatives  to put  a  man  in  Honecker's mould  in  charge of East  Germany. 
(MY EMPHASIS)  (BBC1, 21.00,18.10.89) 
What  emerged  from  the  coverage,  then,  was  a  powerful  dramatic  backdrop 
against which to situate and make sense of the story of the "exodus": a picture of  an 
increasingly  isolated  country,  its people  either  leaving  in  droves or taking to the Reporting the Refugee Exodus  77 
streets in  protest. In contrast, the background to and the motivating factors behind the 
movement of  'boat-people' from Vietnam to Hong Kong were almost absent from news 
accounts. 
Demotivating the Vietnamese refugee 
The story of the 'boat people' is  not so  recent as that of the East German  'refugees' . 
Having captured the attention of  the West at a critical juncture in Cold War  history  -
the  closing  stages  of the  Vietnam  War  in  1975  - the  'boat-people'  were  at  first 
welcomed to the West. 13  Fourteen years later,  in  1989,  they  were still  confined to 
detention camps,  mostly in Hong Kong, without legal rights or representation, and in 
conditions that breached recognised codes of international  human  rights law. 14  The 
authorities used a screening process to  determine  'refugee  status'.  It was  based  on 
restrictive political criteria according to how many people could be  accepted and  at 
what  rate.  Largely, this was the. framework within which the news reported the new 
arrivals: 
To the largely unsympathetic world,  people who escape  from  (Vietnam) aren't 
refugees or victims of  Communist repression  - they're economic  opportunists. 
(BBCI, 13.00, 5.9.89) 
They're  already  separating  those  they  consider  to be in  genuine  flight  from 
those who are simply in search of  a  more comfortable  life. 
(BBCl, 13.00, 10.9.89) 
However,  the news story of the  day was about the problems the immigrants had been 
causing for the Hong Kong authorities. It was within this interpretative framework that 
questions of  refugee  status were  worked  out  and  the  answers  legitimised.  In  the 
samples  used  for  this  study,  only  one  item  referred  to  the  original  causes  and 
consequences of  the Vietnamese migrations to the  West: 
(ARCHIVE NEWS FILM, SAIGON,  1975) It was the  fall  of  Saigon that started the 
exodus of  boat-people from  Vietnam  and  which  continued  as  the  Communists 
consolidated  power in  the  south  of  the country. 
(RECENT NEWS FILM, HANOI)  Now the exodus is from cities like Hanoi, in North 
Vietnam,  which  is suffering severe  economic  problems. The authorities see  the 
refugees as a convenient bargaining-point for  getting  badly needed Western aid. 
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Even  though Vietnam is now one country, the historical division between communist 
North and non-communist South was maintained in this  account.  The first migration 
was from the South, from  the effects  of war and the consolidation of  communist rule. 
It is  implied  that  the  push factors  were  humanitarian  and  political.  The  second 
migration  was  reported  as  being  from  the  north,  the  birthplace  of Vietnamese 
communism,  an  economic  backwater  and  another  example  of  'the  failure  of 
communism'.  It is implied that the  push factors influencing this latest movement are 
economic  opportunism and  political  manipulation.  By establishing  a  very  clear-cut 
temporal boundary between past and present, the item excluded some  rather awkward 
realities  of the interim period: for example, the total US economic blockade against 
Vietnam might help explain the reasons why the people so poor in the first place. 
The report did not account for the long-term negative effects  of  the  Vietnam war on 
the Vietnamese people  and on  the  country's once viable economic infrastructure. IS  In 
fact, at the time  of  the above report,  Vietnam was still classed as an official enemy of 
the US and  subject to comprehensive economic warfare.  Under 'Trading With The 
Enemy' legislation,  no country or international body within the American sphere of 
influence  could trade  with or assist Vietnam economically or otherwise  without itself 
suffering negative sanctions. An end to the US embargo is conditional upon the release 
of  American MIAs - troops Missing In Action - or positive confirmation of  their death. 
Most US allies, including Britain, regard that as an impossible condition  for Vietnam 
to  meet~ some question whether it  was ever expected by the US government in  the 
first  place.16  Without  such  vital  information,  news statements like  the following 
inferred that Vietnam's economic problems are  self- inflicted and depend on Western 
benevolence for a solution: 
some  observers  believe the  only  real  answer  is  for countries to work with 
Vietnam to persuade people not to leave home in the first place. 
(BBCI, 13.00, 22.6.89) 
Giving political asylum is one thing,  coping with Vietnam's poverty is altogether 
different.  That's  the  line  Britain  took at  a  conference  on  the  boat-people  at 
Geneva earlier this month.  (BBC 1,  18.00, 28.6.89) Reporting the Refugee Exodus  79 
An alternative view? 
Only one,  marginal  attempt was  made  to raise the contradictions in official  policy. 
The  British  Foreign  Secretary,  John Major,  was  interviewed  from Washington  by 
Channel  Four  News (11.9.89) about  the  exodus  of East Germans.  The journalist, 
Jon Snow,  asked him : 
Are  you  at  all  embarrassed  at  the  thought  that  Britain  is  involved  in  perhaps 
forcibly repatriating Vietnamese refugees- economic refugees - at  the same time 
that West Germany is accepting  refugees  from East Germany? 
Major  denied  a  connection  and  referred to  the  emergency  UN conference  In 
Geneva,  13  June 1989, as an example of how  the problem  was  being addressed at 
international level.  He  argued that  a screening process would help determine whether 
the  boat people were  "economic  migrants"  or "political  refugees" .17  The journalist 
pressed further: 
Snow:  Are you sure,  though, that their East German counterparts aren't simply 
'economic migrants'?  Aren't  the two very parallel? 
Major:  I don't think ... there is a direct  relationship between the two.  In  terms of 
the, ah, economic migrants in Hong Kong, (It) is internationally agreed ... that non-
refugees should return  to their country of origin.  That is not a  uniquely British 
position. (MY E~HASIS) 
The  problem  of course  is  with  the  definitions, 'economic migrants'  and  'refugees'. 
The journalist did  not  challenge  Major  on  how  he  arrived  at  this  distinction. 
Furthermore,  had Channel Four News researched  official  British statements on the 
Geneva conference on 13 June,  to which Major referred,  they  might have  discovered 
quite  a  glaring contradiction  in  policy.  Britain's Foreign Secretary  at  that time  was 
Geoffrey  Howe. He was reported by the  BBC  as having dismissed  the right of the 
'boat people'  to automatic  refugee status on the grounds that, 
many of those now fleeing  Vietnam are not  political  refugees at all  but  people 
seeking a  better standard of  living.  (MY  E~HASIS) 
(BBC 1, 21.00, 2.6.89) 
When expressing delight  in September about what was happening in Eastern  Europe, 
John  Major viewed  the  mass  exodus  of  East Germans  as  proof positive  of the 
failure of  Communism  and of the GDR  "to  provide a decent standard of living  for 
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Alternative views were available in the press. Bernard Levin pointed out the duplicity 
behind John Major's statement and included it in his "extensive collection of  politicians' 
weasel words" .18 Hugo Young  argued in  The  Guardian  that Britain's policy towards 
the Vietnamese had  a hidden  agenda.  It was  designed  to prepare  public  opinion  in 
Britain  for  the  future  policy  towards  those  in  Hong  Kong  who  carried  British 
passports: no entry.19 
Summary remarks 
There was,  then,  adequate  evidence  available to television news that would  have 
highlighted  the  parallels  between  the  two cases. Instead, the news accepted  highly 
questionable  official definitions. The term refugee was used with little  problem in  the 
news language when depicting East Germans  seeking a better  life in the West.  The 
term  used  to  describe  the Vietnamese seeking the same was economic migrant. The 
Vietnamese  could  also  have  fitted  the political and ideological criteria,  but  they 
posed  a threat to western (British) interests and,  to an  extent, occupied a peripheral 
position away  from  a  key  focal-point  of the  Cold  War:  Central  Europe.  Their 
propaganda value,  therefore, was minimised. 20 
Consider the implications of  a news report on the East Germans if  it  was  informed  by 
the  dominant  paradigm.  The following reconstruction  uses  phrases  taken  from  the 
reports  on  the Vietnamese boat-people: 
These  East Germans aren't refugees  or victims  of  Communist repression; they're 
economic opportunists travelling in the simple  hope of  a  better life  in a  country 
richer than their own. 
Such a movement from  one paradigm to another would undermine the interpretative 
framework,  'Communist  East Germany  in  crisis:  refugees'  flee  West',  as opposed 
to, 'West  faces  flood  of immigrants from East Germany'.  As I will be show in  Part 
Two,  the problem  became more than  just  an  abstract academic theory  when  the 
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PART  TWO 
Reporting the East German "refugee exodus": a  problem of framework 
The  migration  of East Germans  to the West  continued throughout  the  following 
months and contributed to the  internal  political crisis  in  their country.  When the 
Berlin  Wall  was  opened on Thursday,  9 November  1989,  an  estimated  'four 
million'  East  Germans  visited  West  Germany  during  the  first  weekend.21  The 
question  of how  many  would  seek  citizenship  of the  Federal  Republic  caused 
considerable unease, and political rhetoric in the West changed from  'The refugees are 
fleeing from a failed system'  to  'They  should  return  home  to  build democracy'.  I 
will  now show that the news  media  in  Britain followed this shift of  framework  with 
no  apparent  problem,  effectively  debunking  their  own  story  of the  East  German 
'refugee exodus'.  In many ways it shows how fragile the refugee construct was in the 
first place. 
The methodological approach here develops from that used in  Part One.  I  will  begin 
with a look at  the  language  and  images employed  by the news media to see first 
how their perception  of  this  movement of  people changed. For the most part,  I  will 
pay detailed attention to  how the shift in public discourse about West Germany was 
organised  and  mediated  through  television  news  and  the  press.  Statements  by 
journalists, official  sources,  and  interviewees were grouped according to  how they 
perceived the 'refugees', their motives  for  leaving,  and the  effects of  their movement 
on their own country and  on  West Germany. 
Until  this  period,  West  Germany  was  represented  in  the  news  as  an  efficient 
economic superpower that was well able to absorb thousands of refugees.  However, 
just as the  Berlin  Wall  was opened,  the  country  was reported to  be  experiencing 
chronic unemployment  and  housing  shortages. It not only had to accommodate its 
own people but  also  a  large pool of  immigrant 'guest workers'  from other  countries 
of  Eastern Europe, northern Africa, and from Turkey. Resentment was growing among 
those ethnic groups because the Federal government in  Bonn was  seen to be giving 
unfair  priority  to the East German  newcomers.  This  was  an  injustice  that,  many 
argued, was  being taken special advantage of by the Far-Right. It needed to be dealt 
with urgently.  The  'influx' of  East Germans was now a 'problem' and one that had to 
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Two  rhetorical 'voices'  dominated  public  debate on the issue:  an  ambiguous  voice 
from the centre (Federal government in Bonn), and a negative voice from the periphery 
(at local  government  level).  Essentially,  it  was  a  public  struggle  to redefine  "the 
exodus". The lines  of conflict  were  drawn between official government propaganda 
("No one will be turned away") and unofficial government pragmatism ("The cost can 
be sustained no  longer")~  and between official, central government propaganda (again, 
"These are our people") and local government panic  ("These people must go home"). 
That  there  was such a struggle was more  evident  from  press coverage  than on 
television news. The implications of  how  these statements  are  structured  in the news 
can  be  understood  by summarising  the  strands of  discourse  that  underpin each 
category.  They  were  grouped  under  general  thematic  headings  according  to  : 
perceptions  of the  East  German  migrants~ the  effects  of their  movement  on  the 
country they were leaving,  East Germany,  and on the host country,  West  Germany~ 
the  motives of East  German  migrants  for  leaving~  and  the  scale  and continuity 
of  the exodus. The details of  these  statements  and their principal sources are provided 
in Appendices  1 and  2 at the end  of  this chapter. 
The  shift  of emphasis  in  television  news  from  the great welcome given to the East 
Germans to a clamour for  their return  home  is highlighted below in Table 4.4 which 
covers samples of  television news taken before and after the Berlin Wall opened. 
This before and  after comparison shows  a decrease  in  the  number  of statements of 
welcome for  the East  Germans  (from  17  to  10),  and  an  inverse  increase  in  those 
statements suggesting that the  East Germans  should  return or stay at home (from 12 
to  23).  More dramatic  was  the emergence  of  the idea that the  exodus might have 
negative effects on West Germany  from none in samples before  the Wall opened to 
29 in the "post-Wall" period  (Fig. 3.4). Overall,  40%  of statements in  the  "post-
Wall"  period focused  on  negative  aspects  of the  exodus for  both East  and  West 
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Table 4.4 
NEWS  CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  EAST  GERMAN  "REFUGEE 
EXODUS"  STORY 
Comparative  analysis  of statements in British TV  news  referring  to exodus 
BEFORE and  AFIER the opening of  the Berlin Wall. 
Number of statements referrin2 to  ...  Before 
1. The need  for E.Germans to return/stay at 
home  12 
2. The need to welcome E.Germans  17 
3. Negative effects of  exodus on GDR  33 
4. Positive effects of  exodus on GDR  0 
5. Negative effects of  exodus on FRG  0 
6. Positive effects of  exodus on FRG  15 
TOTALS:  77 
Sample:  Main BBC & ITN Bulletins on 
10-12 September 1989,  5-8 October 1989, 
2-4 & 9-13 November 1989 
After 
23 
10 
10 
0 
29 
2 
74 
(For  Full Details, see Supplementary Appendix, p.249) 
These patterns of coverage are not  particular  to television  news.  A  summary of 
press coverage of the 'problem'  in  the 'post-Wall' period (Table 4.5,  below)  shows 
similar  patterns.  Of  a total of 154 statements counted,  81  statements referred  to the 
negative impact of  the exodus on West Germany (52.6%),  while another  29  stressed 
the need for East Germans to  stay  at  or return  home  (18.8%);  15 statements  noted 
the negative effects  of  the exodus  on the GDR's economy and  society (9.7%).  In 
short,  125  statements (81. 1  %) suggested that the exodus wasn't  such  a good thing 
after all. 
Here  again,  a  qualitative  analysis  of this  coverage  revealed  important  differences 
between press and television. Television news  reported public opinion about the influx 
of  East Germans  within the restrictive time  frame  of the  present.  This  excluded 
awareness of a qualitative shift  in  opinion  since  the  period before the Berlin Wall 
opened.  That  examples  of this  were  found  in  the  sample  of press  in  this  period 
suggests that this  was not  beyond  the  bounds  of  possibility  for  television news 
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Table 4.5 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST GERMAN  REFUGEE EXODUS 
STORY 
Analysis of  statements in the British press referring to exodus AFTER the opening 
of  the Berlin Wall 
Statements referring to  ...  Number  0/0 
l. The need  for  E.  Germans  to return/stay  at 
home  29  18.8 
2.  The need to welcome E. Germans  15  9.7 
3. Negative effects of  exodus on GDR  15  9.7 
4. Positive effects of  exodus on GDR  0  0 
5. Negative effects of  exodus on FRG  81  52.6 
6. Positive effects of  exodus on FRG  14  9.1 
TOTAL:  154  100 
Sample: 13 British daily newspapers on 10,  11,  13 &  14 November 1989 
8 British Sunday newspapers on 12 November 1989 
(For  Full Details, see Supplementary Appendix, p.249) 
This  quantitative  summary  has  outlined  the  prevailing  pattern  of coverage.  The 
remainder of  this chapter is  taken up  by  a  detailed qualitative analysis of  this shift  in 
news framework,  although other  quantitative  patterns  will  be highlighted where 
appropriate.  The analysis of the changing perception of the 'refugee  exodus' by  the 
news  media is kept in context with  how  they  reported related  events  in the GDR 
and  West Germany, and on the wider international  scene. 
From Exodus to Flood 
Before the  Wall opened,  the dominant  perception of the migration of  East Germans 
was  of  mass 'exodus'  from imprisonment.  Table 4.6 lists the words used  in  the 
news to describe the movement West during this period. It provides an  indication of 
how embedded the  image of "the  exodus" became in relation to  alternatives such as 
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Table 4.6 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST GERMAN  REFUGEE EXODUS 
STORY 
Words used to define  the movement of  East Germans to  the  West  BEFORE the 
Berlin Wall opened 
Word  Number 
Exodus  85 
Flood (and synonyms)  35 
Flee  22 
Escape  19 
Emigration/Immigration  10 
Refuge  2 
Haemorrhage  1 
Dash  1 
Bolt  I 
TOTALS  176 
Sample:  Main BBC & ITN Bulletins on 
10-12 September 1989,  5-8 October 1989, 
2-4 November  1989 
(For  Full Details, see Supplementary Appendix, p.249) 
Right from the beginning,  the exodus was reported as  great news for the West and 
bad  news for the East,  a feature  of coverage  that was  most  evident  in  the way  it 
reported 'the facts and  figures'  about the extent of the phenomenon.  Here are some 
headlines  examples  from  the  main  sample  periods.  They  reveal  a  consistency  of 
language and image,  and  show how routine reporting of the extent of the  'exodus' 
emphasised the theme of  crisis in the GDR from its beginnings in September: 
Thousands of refugees have been  arriving  in  the West.  It's the biggest  exodus 
from the Eastern  bloc for more than 30 years.  (BBCl, 18.00, 11.9.89) 
Through to October : 
Jubilation on the border as  thousands  of refugees ride into freedom ... 
(ITN, 17.40,5.10.89) 
President Gorbachev has arrived in  Berlin  as thousands  of  East German refugees 
flee  the  country's communist regime...  (BBCl, 13.00, 6.10.89) Reporting the Refugee Exodus  86 
And up to November, just before the Berlin Wall was opened: 
Up  to  a  million  demonstrate  in  East  Berlin  for  reform.  Special  trains  bring 
thousands more refugees to the West.  (lTN, 22.00, 4.1l.89) 
The  benefits  of the exodus for the West in  general  were  also explained within an 
explicit propaganda frame : 
it means jubilation for these refugees but more humiliation  for  the East German 
government  and for the hard-line regime of  Erich Honecker.  (FILM, "REFUGEE" 
CARRYING CHILD WRAPPED IN BLANKEn Pictures like these are as embarrassing 
for  the government  in  East Berlin  as  they  are  heartening  for  Bonn.  (MY 
EMPHASIS).  (BBCl, 13.00, 5.10.89 ) 
By  November, the framework for reporting the  'exodus' began  to show  signs  of 
strain.  For example, a degree of variability entered the language used to describe the 
East German migrants : 
The first of thousands of  East  German immigrants have arrived in Bavaria from 
Prague.  (MY EMPHASIS)  (The World This Week,  Channel Four, 4.1l.89) 
The  statistics used to  underline the extent of their movement,  and thus  the  extent 
of the  crisis  for  the  GDR,  were  also inconsistent.  In a  lunchtime bulletin on 4 
November,  a  BBC journalist reported that, 
Thousands of would-be emigrants ... are taking advantage of what's being termed 
metaphorically as  a  gaping  hole in the Berlin Wall.  (BBCl, 13.00, 4.11.89 ) 
By late afternoon, she revised this to, 
hundreds  are taking advantage of. .. a gaping  hole in the Berlin Wall. 
(BBCl, 17.00, 4.11.89) 
Such strains  in  the interpretative  framework  became  unsustainable when metaphor 
became  reality.  The terms  of reference  had  changed  and  a new  framework  was 
constructed  to accommodate  them.  After  the  Wall  opened,  the  natural  disaster 
metaphor of 'the flood',  replaced that of  'the exodus'. A survey of  press coverage over 
this  five-day  period  reveals  the  prevalence  of this  perception  across  all  media 
perspectives  and  formats:  conservative  and  liberal,  'broadsheet'  and  'tabloid'.  The 
Independent reports  on  how  local  authorities  in  West  Germany  "Prepare For New 
Torrent Of  Refugees" (10.1l.89).  Glasgow's Evening Times used the flood metaphor 
in the most positive  sense when it  reported how  "Floodgates open on a tide of  joy" 
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The  shift  of framework  on  television  news  is  summarised quantitatively in Table 
4.7,  below.  In  the  'pre-Wall  periods',  the  news  legitimised  the  label  "refugee"  to 
describe East  Germans migrants in context  with coverage of the  mounting political 
crisis in  the GDR.  This  was most evident during  Sample Period 2 as  the  GDR 
marked its 40th Anniversary.  The words "flee"  and  "escape" were most  frequent in 
this period, peaking at 19 and 10 occurrences respectively. Reports  from Dresden told 
how, 
riot  police were stoned by angry crowds as the railway station was sealed off to 
prevent any  further  people escaping to the West.  (MY EMPHASIS) 
(BBCl, 13.00, 5.10.89) 
The  themes of escape and flight framed  this item from ITN  which began by saying 
that the country's, 
fortieth anniversary celebrations have been overshadowed by  the flight of  East 
German refugees to the West. (MY EMPHASIS) 
Within such a framework, the Guest of  Honour, Mikhail Gorbachev was arriving amid 
a, 
political crisis that's led to thousands of  young East Germansfleeing this country. 
(lTN, 13.00, 7.10.89) 
As the Wall opened, the language changed dramatically.  Only 24% of words counted 
in  this  period  connoted  escape  and  refuge.  Instead,  the  dominant  image  was  of a 
natural disaster. The people became a living flood that threatened to "swamp" the West 
and so it had to be "stemmed" by closing the "floodgates".22 This flood metaphor  was 
sustained throughout reports with related words like  "wave",  "torrent",  "tide",  "tidal 
wave", "surge", "pour", and "stream": 
Thousands of  East Berliners are still pouring  across the border  ...  streaming back 
and forth.  (They) flocked into the West. .. surged through the open gates.  (They) 
are pouring through to take a look at the West. (MY EMPHASIS) 
(BBCl, 13.00, 10.1l.89) 
Just 30 hours ago, East Germany threw open her borders and a  cautious  trickle 
of people  soon turned into a flood.  (MY EMPHASIS)  (I  TN, 22.00, 10.11.89) Reporting the Refugee Exodus  88 
They've opened the floodgates and  here, at Checkpoint  Charlie  ... , a great human 
tide  is  flowing out.  They're  pouring  out of here  by  car and  on foot.  (MY 
EMPHASIS)  (Newsnight, BBC2, 10.11.89 ) 
Other  words were less common  or had never been used to report the  'exodus'  before 
the Berlin Wall opened. Their  occurrence, therefore,  was  significant  for  that.  For 
example,  "flock" connotes the idea of a movement motivated by instinct rather than 
by political considerations. Thus, BBC reported on how, 
the stream turned into a flood wave as more than 50,000 East Germans  flocked 
through Czechoslovakia. (MY EMPHASIS)  (BBCl, 2l.00, 9.1l.89) 
Table 4.7 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST GERMAN  REFUGEE EXODUS 
STORY 
Shift in perceptions of  the movement of  East Germans from periods BEFORE AND 
AFTER the Berlin Wall opened 
Words  Before  After 
Exodus  85 
Flood  35 
Flee  22 
Escape  19 
EmigrationlImmigration  10 
Flock  0 
Influx  0 
Invasion  0 
Haemorrhage  1 
Refuge  2 
Dash  1 
Bolt  1 
TOTALS  176 
Sample:  Main BBC & ITN Bulletins on 
10-12 September 1989,  5-8 October 1989, 
2-4  & 9-13 November 1989 
15 
61 
7 
5 
6 
7 
6 
4 
2 
0 
0 
0 
113 
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The word "invasion"  carries more ominous connotations and  implies  the need  for  a 
defensive response. It is something to be controlled  if it is friendly,  repelled if  it  is 
hostile  or threatening. In the first days after the Wall opened, it was the former: 
Two million East Germans crossed onto Western soiL.over the last 3 days ... And 
Berlin is bracing itself for a similar invasion next weekend. (MY EMPHASIS) 
(ITN, 13.00, 13.11.89 ) 
It also  occurred in another context. During the Cold  War,  the border between East 
and  West Germany was  seen by  both superpowers  to  be  the first  line  of defence 
against mass invasion  by  enemy forces. For a BBC reporter, the present  situation  is 
ironic indeed : 
Americans, posted to guard the frontline of the West, can only watch the strange 
invasion from the East.  (MY EMPHASIS)  (BBC1, 13.00, 13.1l.89) 
The word "haemorrhage"  occurred in reports on the effects of the "exodus" on East 
Germany.  Again,  it implies the need for  urgent action  to halt the process.  In this 
example from BBC News,  the opening of  the Wall is explained as, 
a  desperate  measure  by  (the)  communist  government  to  try  and  stop  the 
haemorrhage  of people to the West.  (MY EMPHASIS)  (BBC1, 2l.00, 10.11.89) 
Overall,  the language of crisis  or disaster  in  this  context  depersonalised  the East 
Germans as an anonymous mass to be directed  and  controlled.  As  such it became 
central to the shift in the news towards a negative framework for  understanding  the 
phenomenon.  The  change  of public  opinion  in  West  Germany  was  explained  as  a 
response  to an urgent 'problem',  not as a desire to  repatriate  the very people whom 
the country welcomed with open arms only a week before.  Suddenly, the 'good news' 
about East Germans  deserting  communist  tyranny  for  democratic  freedom  became 
'bad  news'.  The  warm  and  unreserved  West  German  welcome  was  replaced  with 
'squabbling' and  'panic' at  state and  local government levels.  There appeared to be a 
dramatic  collapse  of  the  national  consensus. 
The  'disaster'/'crisis'  framework  also  accommodated the  theme of abnormality  and 
helped reporters explain why a mass return was essential for a return to normality. The 
superpowers and  their allies  were  worried.  They  liked  'stability'  and  'normality'  on 
agreed terms.  In  this  respect,  the disaster framework  was not just specific  to the 
issue of  the 'refugees' - it  framed  the entire coverage of the events  in  Berlin  that 
weekend.  The 'before-and-after' model of analysis highlights the problem this created 
for reporting. It also demonstrates considerable differences of  emphasis and framework Reporting the Refugee Exodus  90 
between television  news  and  some  sections  of the  press,  particularly  the  'quality 
broadsheets' . 
The great welcome 
Stories  about the great welcome given to the first East  Germans to  arrive in West 
Germany reinforced the most  positive features of western societies - 'freedom'  and 
'democracy'.  A  BBC reporter enthused about  the efficiency  of  the West  German 
welcome.  The  East  Germans  were  given  a  warm  welcome,  put  in  temporary 
accommodation,  and  provided  with  a  job  and  a  new  place  to  stay.  Unlike 
notorious  Stalinist  bureaucracy,  western  organisation  moved  along  with  smooth 
efficiency,  not in the least intrusive or overburdened with red-tape: 
(RECEPTION  CAMP,  WEST  GERMANY)  It  has  to  be  a  tribute  both  to  the 
authorities  and the local people here that within the last 24 hours some  10,000 
East Germans have been absorbed into this corner of Bavaria with no  apparent 
hint of  discord or chaos. And they're ready and willing to receive many thousands 
more.  (BBCl, 13.00, 12.9.89) 
At  first,  it  was thought that the new citizens  would  fit  in  easily,  that  they  had so 
much in  common  with  their  western compatriots  there was little to be concerned 
about. Dr. Adrian Hyde-Price,  an 'expert' on East European  affairs, told the BBC that 
the East Germans would have fewer problems  settling down  than  ethnic  Germans 
from other East  European  countries because they were German speaking and, 
Hyde-Price:  often very hard working. A lot of them are quite  well trained,  and 
they have a commitment to try to  form a new life in West Germany. 
(BBCl, 13.00, 11.9.89) 
It  was  also  reported  that  the  exodus  was  proving  quite providential  for  West 
German employers. The Prime  Minister of  Bavaria, Max Streibel, declared that West 
Germany needed  the  East  German 'refugees' and that there  were  up  to 400,000 
jobs  on offer (Channel Four News,  11.9.89).  And, according to a  BBC  report, the 
Federal Republic was suffering a shortage  in skilled labour, even in the most advanced 
'hi-tech' industries: 
(FILM, BMW ASSEMBLY LINE,  MUNICH) The vast BMW  factory  ... employs about 
250  former  East  Germans.  The  technology  is  vastly  different  from  anything 
they're  used to but like many other industries here,  the company is  desperately 
short of  engineering and electrical staff. It has begun courses to help workers from 
the  Eastern bloc adapt to the latest technology. 
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Newsnight  highlighted  the  central,  historical  role  of the  industrious  East  German 
worker in having  built  the GDR  into the most successful East European  economy. 
But  while these skills  are  "desperately  short" in  the  West,  they  are "harnessed"  in 
the East: 
There are no  queues in East Germany.  Unlike  in  other Warsaw Pact countries, 
there's plenty to buy despite centralised control.  The great German work ethic has 
been harnessed by the state.  (Newsnight,  BBC2, 
11.9.89) 
Other  reports implied that the general  lack of the  advanced skills  among the new 
arrivals from the GDR was no object: 
Most of  them are young, some are unskilled for Western technology, but many are 
being recruited for jobs after weeks of  anxious waiting  (ITN, 22.00, 11.9.89) 
Their  youth,  their  German  qualities  of hard  work  and  commitment,  and  their 
enthusiasms were enough.  Indeed,  a BBC  News item  reported  that  work  was 
being  found  for  East  German  'refugees'  even  when  their  skill  is  surplus  to 
requirements: 
West  Germany  has a  surplus of  teachers. This week,  the  government  started a 
new  training course to help teachers from  East  Germany  learn  to  work in 
Computers or Commerce. 
It soon became apparent from  the report that  this was  as  much  about  'them' being 
taught to live  as to work  according to  'our'  way: 
Reporter:  The first  lesson?  How to manage their  own  financial  and  domestic 
affairs.  (CUT TO COURSE ORGANISER:) 
Course Organiser: They came from a country where they  do not have to decide 
a lot of  things in their lives ... Most of  the things ... are decided by ... government  or 
the Party.  And  they come to West Germany and have to decide,  "Do I take this 
appointment?", "Do I buy  a car or a bike?", "How do I behave?" 
(BBC1, 13.00, 12.9.89) 
A  few  days  after the  Wall  opened,  the  Sunday Express reported  that  West 
Germany was reluctant  to accept teachers and academics at all,  never  mind  retrain 
them  for business: "Educationalists point out that the last  thing West German parents 
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Reporting negative  aspects  of  the  "exodus"  for  West  German economy and society 
Although the exodus continued throughout September and October, the news did  not 
report it to the same extent.  There was a decline in the number of references  to the 
positive aspects of  the  exodus  for  West Germany's  economy  and society (from 12 
references  in Sample Period 1 to none at all in Sample Period 3); and to the welcome 
given  to the East  German "refugees"  (from 13 references to 2). However,  this  does 
not  necessarily  indicate  a  significant  shift  towards  more  negative  coverage.  The 
routinisation of  the story over a period of eight weeks - a very long span in news-time 
- saw  a  decline  in  the  depth  and  breadth  of coverage.  Routine  news  items  were 
shorter,  reporting only the 'facts and  figures'  about the extent and  continuity of the 
exodus.  Special focus items on  the  story were  restricted  to Newsnight  (BBC) and 
Channel Four  News (lTN). 
A qualitative  shift  towards negative  coverage  did  not  become  evident  until  just 
before  the  Wall  opened.  The  Independent  conjured  up  images  of  panic  as 
"beleaguered" officials struggled to cope with what they described as  "a national state 
of  emergency" (10.11.89). It reported Allied plans for a dramatic airlift of  East German 
refugees from West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany should the numbers of 
people  wanting  to  stay  increase.  The  Independent  also  quoted  a  West  German 
newspaper,  the General Anzeige, warning East Germans that,  "West Germany is  no 
economic paradise"  (11.11.89).  By the beginning of the new week,  television news 
stated that, 
The street parties are  old  news.  For  refugees  and 
today. 
their hosts,  reality struck 
(lTN, 22.00, 13.1l.89) 
Television news referred to popular anxieties about the 'exodus'  almost  immediately 
after the Berlin Wall  was opened  up.  The  BBC noted that, 
some West  Berliners  have  warned  that  already  there are shortages of  jobs and 
housing. What's welcomed internationally may not be so popular locally. 
(BBC1, 2l.00, 9.1l.89) 
Television news reported  the  West  German  government's  official  and  unofficial 
reactions but did not remark on  their contradictions.  For example The  News  At  Ten 
led with the headlines, 
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It then reported Chancellor Kohl's statement that, 
it was in the interests of both Germanys for  East  German  citizens  to feel  free 
enough  to want to stay  at home  (lTN, 22.00, 9.11.89) 
The  press were more sensitive to the ambiguous 'push  and  pull'  rhetoric of both 
government and  opposition.  The  Telegraph  reported on how,  "West  Germans Fall 
Out  Amid  Calls  To  Halt  Influx"  (l0.I1.89),  and  described  the  situation  as  an 
embarrassing "dilemma"  for government rather than a contradiction in  policy.  The 
German  journalist  Josef  Joffe  remarked  in  The  Times  on  "the  ponderous 
circumlocutions" of  politicians at federal level as they tried to reconcile  the "dilemma" 
(9.11.89). 
By  13  November, the  story of how the country was barely  able to  cope  with the 
numbers coming across had  become  prominent.  Both  The  Times (l3.11.89) and ITN 
were framing the story as "The Refugee Problem".  ITN went so far as to suggest  that 
West Germany's economic problems  were  caused  by the influx of  refugees rather 
than complicated  by  it.  It reported that  the  federal and  local authorities, 
are wrestling with the problems of unemployment and  housing that that  influx 
has brought about.  (MY EMPHASIS) 
The  federal  government  was  beginning  to  count  the  cost  of its  widely  praised 
generosity: 
Every East German is  given 35  Deutsch Marks.  The West German government 
has given away 130 million  in  three  days.  (CONSTRUCTION OF PREFAB HUTS) 
They're preparing  for the next  wave  but hoping  it won't  happen,  and  they're 
reassessing  their  costly dreams  of reunification.  (MY EMPHASIS) 
( ITN, 22.00, 13.11.89 ) 
Two local government officials in Berlin appeared in items on all 4 main ITN bulletins, 
and on BBC Newsnight, to say that the  city could no longer cope with the numbers of 
East Germans who wanted to stay in the Federal Republic. One claimed that: 
Manager, Refugee Reception Centre : There are too many  people in a very short 
time.  That's  a  problem.  And  they  all  want  to  be  registered,  they  all  need 
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The  press  focused  more  on  long-term  negative  aspects,  mainly  the  problems  of 
assimilating  the East German  "refugees".  Of particular concern were the  political 
divisions  and  social tensions that the influx of  people was causing,  including  the fear 
of a backlash  from the Far Right. The press also provided a wider impression of how 
public opinion in West Germany was changing  against the East German "refugees". 
This was widely reported in the  'broadsheets'  and  two of the 'tabloids' (Daily Mail, 
Daily  Express).  The  high  circulation  'tabloids'  (The  Sun,  the  Mirror)  confined 
themselves to a routine  reporting of  the  'facts  and  figures'  of the movement  of 
people;  their coverage  focused more on positive human interest angles on the opening 
of  the Wall. 
The East Germans took on a new guise in the Financial Times (Fl) when it reported 
that  "West  German  Parties  Continue  To  Squabble"  over how  best  to  achieve  "the 
integration of  East German emigrants into West German  society".  Elsewhere in  the 
same edition, concerns  are  voiced  on  both  sides  of the  Berlin Wall as "Immigrants 
and Hosts Ponder the Economic Fall-out"  (13.11.89).  The Daily Telegraph turned a 
well-tuned ear to a philosophy familiar to British  politics  when  it  quoted  a  Bavarian 
politician complaining that "West German labour exchanges were too ready to hand 
out unemployment  benefit  to  the  newcomers  instead  of encouraging  them  to look 
actively for work. The East Germans should be told that they  had  duties  as well as 
rights in their new home country" (10.11.89). 
A less subtle undercurrent of opinion came to the surface when  the press sought out 
the  views  of West  German  citizens.  The  Sunday  Express  (12.11.89)  cited  the 
Minister  for  Intra-German Relations,  Dorothy Wilms,  who claimed that 50% West 
Germans feared a  national crisis  because  of the continuing influx of East  Germans. 
To illustrate  the  nature and extent of  that  fear,  it reported that: 
Elderly and middle-aged people top the list of the unwanted.  "We don't want all 
these  old  folks  coming here  to  scrounge on us," said bank clerk Ossie Zommer, 
"East Germany keeps the money they've paid into  their pensions and we have to 
support them." 
A  university  research  fellow  in  Bonn  told  The Guardian  that  she would never 
marry "one of them",  an  East German.  She  said that,  "The people over there have 
been brought up in  a  completely different culture and I've more in  common with the 
French and other West Europeans, even you British!"  Another student saw events in 
East Germany as  "a revolution of selfishness".  He said that the people were  "more 
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Popular resentment about the continuing migration of East Germans appeared to be 
linked to the fear that the Far Right would benefit.  A housing official told the BBC 
about a shortage of  housing stock in West Berlin and warned that, 
There is  a  fear that. .. when more people are  coming that this  could give  more 
votes  to  the  right-wing  parties.  (Newsnight, BBC2, 13.11.89) 
Indeed, in an earlier bulletin, the BBC reported that  this is more than just a possibility: 
The  Far-Right have  made gains  because  of  the  flood  from  the East.  (MY 
EMPHASIS).  (BBC 1, 
21.00, 10.11.89) 
On both BBC and ITN, the Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock warned in general terms 
about  the  destabilising  effects  of mass  movements  of people  on  the  European 
Community.  BBC  News reported that, 
These problems will affect Britain- the refugees are now Common Market citizens 
and could come to Britain.  (BBCl, 13.00, 10.1l.89) 
A  Labour foreign  policy  spokesperson was more  specific  about  its  short  - term 
impact on West Germany.  In an article for Scotland's Sunday Mail, George Robertson 
asserted that, "The refugee flood to West Germany is producing a right-wing backlash" 
(12.11.89). According to The  Times, the Fascist threat was being used by Egon Krenz 
to destabilise  West German  society.  This  would,  "  .. so  worry  NATO  that  German 
reunification could be  shelved .... clearly  a factor in Herr Krenz's thinking" (1l.11.89). 
Yet,  other news sources suggested that the "right-wing  backlash"  thesis  was being 
overstated.  Newsnight, for  example,  reported from West Berlin that, 
It's  not  the  right-wing  extremists  who  are  worrying  the  coalition  of Social 
Democrats and Greens running West Berlin's city government.  They're far  more 
upset by the reference to German reunification  made  right  here  ... by  Chancellor 
Kohl himself 
(Newsnight, BBC2, 13.11.89) 
The Daily Telegraph reported that  the  extreme  right-wing Republican Party was just 
as  aware as  any  other party that  this  was  no  ordinary  "refugee  problem".  It was 
therefore trying to "reconcile its policy of 'Germany for the  Germans'  with the  influx 
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In  many  respects,  public  debate  in  West  Germany  was  following  the  same 
discursive  patterns  as  that  in  Hong  Kong  about  the  Vietnamese  boat-people. 
Distinctions were being made between "refugees"  and  "immigrants",  "Germans"  and 
"ethnic Germans",  "Germans"  and  "non-Germans".  And just as  in  Hong  Kong, 
these  distinctions  were  largely  accepted  by  the  British  news  media  without 
question. ITN,  for example, reported that: 
(FILM,  PROTEST  BY  TURKISH  WORKERS)  West  Berlin  still  has  problems 
integrating  its  Turkish immigrants, and the Turks showed today they won't give 
up anything for the East German refugees.  (MY EMPHASES) 
(ITN, 22.00, 13.1l.89) 
The Times reported the controversy surrounding the views of  Herbert Schmalsteig.  He 
was Social Democrat Mayor  of  Hanover and vice-president of  the Federation of West 
German Towns and thus spoke for  the peripheral view that was upsetting the party 
atmosphere and 'good news'  theme of  the events in Berlin. He appealed  for an end to 
the influx  of "refugees"  and  made  a clear distinction  between  "Germans"  from  the 
GDR and  "ethnic  Germans"  from  Poland  and  the USSR.  The  reporter  summed  up 
Schmalsteig's argument that  "the mass  exodus of ethnic  Germans was  provoking a 
malaise  among  West  Germans,  who  were  becoming  jealous,  aggressive  and 
antipathetic towards  the new arrivals".  It may be argued that the reporter was  simply 
quoting a point of  view but, later in his report, he reproduced the same fine distinctions 
between  Germans.  He remarked that the  problem with "these people" from Poland 
and the Soviet Union was that they did not speak German, whereas Germans from the 
GDR did.  They  "often have no comparable skills  to enable them to find a good job" 
and  "are used to a  low living standard and a  way  of life which does not fit  in with 
the  more  prosperous  West  German  standards"  (11.1l.89).  The  focus  on  the 
negative aspects  of  the  exodus  for  West Germany's  economy and  society  was 
central to how the news framed the  story  of  the Great Return. However, this does not 
imply  a complete  absence  in news accounts  of contradictory  messages. 
Reporting positive aspects of  the "exodus" for the West German economy and society 
There  were,  for  example,  predictions that  the  intake  of  East  Germans  would 
trigger a great consumer boom and stimulate further growth  in the country's economy. 
These were most  evident  from  press  coverage,  in which  14  references appeared 
over the  six-day  sample (Table 4.5, above).  Some newspapers resolved the apparent 
contradiction  by  interpreting  talk  of economic  bonuses as long-term  prospects that 
should be balanced against  the  short-term crisis.  For example,  the Daily Telegraph 
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Germans could actually have a positive effect on the economy  ... its immediate negative 
social consequences are already being felt"  (11.11.89). While reporting that  "Exodus 
Fuels West German Shares Boom",  The  Times warned that "in the short term,  it  is 
widely acknowledged that  the immigrant  masses will put a huge financial burden on 
the government, increase  unemployment and  cause some turbulence in the smoothly-
running, low-inflation economy" (11.11.89; MY EMPHASES). 
Other  accounts  were  less equivocal in  their  forecasts,  and appeared  10  the  same 
newspaper  as  those  advising  a  cautious  outlook.  For  example,  The  Independent 
reported how,  "The wave of emotion  ... struggled in the hearts of the politicians with 
the  fear  that  an  already  hard-pressed  West  Germany  cannot  cope  with  a  massive 
increase  in  the flow of refugees" (11.11.89). However, on page 12,  we find  an item 
headed  "Influx  Promises Economic  Boom For Bonn",  in which Peter Torday,  the 
Economics Correspondent,  explained "why East Germany's loss should tum out to be 
West  Germany's  demographic  gain".  He  argued  that  the  cautious  forecasts  of 
"reasonable growth, moderate inflation and continuing record trade surpluses" would 
have  to undergo  some  radical  adjustments  in  light  of events  in  Berlin.  "Literally 
overnight",  he said,  "the outlook has been altered  - possibly for years  to come - to 
encompass booming growth, rekindled inflation,  and  a considerable  and  permanent 
reduction in the country's trade surpluses".  The  reporter was  remarkably  confident 
as  he  wrote  out  his  prescription  for  an  economic  boom,  making  only  slight 
allowances for  the patient's  circumstances.  He reckoned that since "the East German 
refugees will have to find  jobs  ... a  construction booms to house them is set to ensue, 
fuelled  in  part by an DM 8bn  (£2.6bn) housing  investment  programme".  The long-
term prognosis? "The resulting upsurge in consumer demand and  in construction will 
probably  ensure  that the West German economy expands by  more  than 4  per cent 
next year  - perhaps the fastest growth rate  in Europe". 
So what  of the many reports that the East Germans  immigrants were adding  to  the 
worsening unemployment situation? Torday had  all  angles covered.  He revealed that 
there was no  real  unemployment  problem  as  such,  rather  a  series  of  bottlenecks 
in  various sectors of  the economy.  The  jobs  were always there, he said,  but no one 
to take them.  But now  "the arrival of 200,000  immigrants  is likely  to break down 
the  bottlenecks  ... in the  labour  market; although there are two million people out of 
work  in  West Germany, there are hundreds of thousands  of  jobs available.  And  the 
chief obstacles to falling  unemployment are mobility and skills, qualities which the new 
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However, the item offered another reason why these jobs were not  filled before  the 
East German "refugees" arrived:  they were relatively low paid jobs that a majority of 
West  German  citizens  were  unwilling  to  take  up.  The  opening  of  the  Wall,  it 
emerged,  was  seen  by  many  industrialists  as  marking  the  beginnings  of a  neo-
colonialist golden age.  A  senior economist from West Germany's powerful Deutsche 
Bank,  argued  that  the  opening  up  of Eastern  Europe  was  "the  equivalent  of the 
discovery by Europe of Latin America,  exploiting cheap labour and  cheap  supplies". 
The Independent journalist closed with the prediction that  the rest of western  Europe 
would benefit from the off-shoots of  the boom. Europe could rest easy.  "Expectations 
of ebbing  economic growth  or  even  recession  probably  have  been banished  for 
years" . 
A closer look at other media reveals underlying contradictions in and qualifications to 
this  theme.  On 13  November,  two days after Torday's item,  Newsnight  reported 
that, 
the  Deutsch  Mark  continues  to  be  weak.  Dealers  are  nervous  about  the 
implications of the events in Berlin for the German  economy.  The  pound  rose 
at 2.94(25)DM, up by three quarters of a pfennig.  The pound has made  steady 
gains  against  the  German  currency  as  recent  events  have  unfolded.  (MY 
EMPHASES). 
(Newsnight, BBC2, 13.11.89) 
The  next  morning,  the FT featured  a  report  headlined,  "Euphoria  Spreads  To  The 
Stock Markets".  The item suggested that such euphoria would  soon wear off but "for 
the moment, television pictures of eager  East German visitors snapping up  goods in 
the shops gave many shares a new impetus" (14.11.89). 
The  spectacle  of consumerism among the  newly  converted  East Germans seemed 
to fascinate  many  journalists  and  commentators.  It was easy to find  examples of 
how the news celebrated this as a vindication of  western capitalism. Yet when working 
according to the new rubric, The Great Return, the news also reported that  the  prices 
in West Berlin/German shops were too  high  for most  East  Germans to afford.  On 
10 November, BBC News reported how the scenes  in  West  Berlin highlighted  the 
economic distortions of  a  western  capitalist  enclave  in  the  heart of a Communist 
state.  The people roamed the city's finest  shopping streets, and were given directions 
to  the best  stores offering the best deals: 
The problem is,  they can look  but  they  can't buy. 
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However,  in a report the next day he relayed a very different impression: 
The  first big queue is for West German money, a free gift  to all East Germans of 
100 Marks,  about £35.  In the  end,  the banks  ran  out and  had  to borrow from 
department stores. Those wanting to spend money today besieged western  shops. 
There  are goods  they have never seen before, except on television, and  ways of 
paying for them unheard of  under Communism. And give-away  gimmicks from a 
supermarket chain! Bags of  chocolate  and coffee! 
(BBC1, 17.00, 11.11.89) 
The  ITN journalist, John Suchet, followed a "typical" East German family "From  East 
To West"  for a day-trip to the shops.  He continually stressed that they could  "only 
look and dream",  before returning to their homes and work in the GDR: 
To  the  Kurfurstendam  now,  West  Berlin's  most  famous  shopping  street  that 
Simone has seen on TV, read about  in the papers, and dreamed of  And  dream 
was all  she  could do.  (MY EMPHASES) 
The  reporter  followed  the family  around  the  fashionable  and expensive  Ku'damm 
stores.  The clothes and the  'trainers' were reportedly beyond their budget but they 
eventually found a 'pound-stretcher' store and  something they  could  afford for their 
son: 
But  sweatshirts  at  £5.50  are  still  too  much.  Braces  at  £1.50,  though  - that's 
perfect!  In fact,  they'll buy him two! 
The reporter maintained the up-beat, good-news theme,  throughout.  Looking  down 
from a balcony  on a crowded street,  he  reflected on how incredible it all was : 
It's extraordinary! This is probably the busiest shopping day that West Berlin has 
ever known!  Just look at the crowds down there!  The  irony  of it is  most  of 
them are East Berliners and they simply aren't buying anything! For East Germans, 
West Berlin is a city to look at and dream. (REPORTER'S EMPHASIS) 
Finally, we heard what the East German family thought of  it all : 
Would  they like to come and live in the West? "No!  The people aren't as friendly 
here  as in  the  East." And how on earth  would  they  find  a  job?  They're happy 
for life  in  the West  to remain  (ZOOM,  CLOSE-UP,  CHILD  SLEEPING)  - a dream. 
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According  to the FT,  however,  the  "Shopping  bag  becomes  flag  of freedom  for 
visiting  East  Germans".  John  Lloyd  reported  "on  a  tide  of consumption  as  East 
Germans  celebrated  ... by  shopping  until  they  were  broke  on  their  forays  into  the 
capitalist West".  In contrast to John Suchet, Lloyd implied that  money was no object 
for East Germans with  a nose for  a bargain.  Their  shopping  bags  were from  West 
Berlin's most famous stores and  they  were loaded with  "Sonys and Panasonics and 
Phillips:  home computers and audio tape-recorders and  CD-players and toys for the 
kids ... Oh what joy, to shop until you're broke!"  (11.11.89) 
The  Independent  must  have  sent  its  reporters  to  a  very  different  Berlin  for  they 
presented  a  different  and  rather more  drab  version  of reality  for  the  East  German 
consumers who visited the city that weekend. They didn't 'shop until they were broke'. 
Far from being  loaded with hi-tech booty, they returned home at the  end  of the day 
carrying "plastic bags containing their modest  purchases - cheap  Western  products, 
small  electronic  gadgets, special offers put on  by  shops - for their  money would not 
run to expensive goods"  (13.1l.89).  Even  though  the West German government 
gave  each  East  German 100DMs (£35) to spend,  it is  difficult  to accept that they 
could afford  to  buy expensive goods as those mentioned  in  Lloyd's report. Unless, 
that is,  they met up with the same  West  German business man whom the Daily Mail 
saw  "  .. handing  out sheaves of 50-Mark notes to the  crowds of  sight-seeing  East 
Germans in (a) hotel lobby.  'I just wanted them to have some hard currency  so  they 
can enjoy the  city while they are  here,'  he  explained"  (11.11.89 ).23 
Reporting negative aspects of  exodus for the GDR's economy and society 
As  shown,  there  was  a  considerable  shift  of attention from  the positive to the 
negative effects of  the exodus on  West German society when the Berlin Wall  opened. 
A  similar pattern  of  coverage  emerges  if  we  look  at  how the  news  media 
reported the impact of  the 'exodus' on East Germany.  There was a shift in focus here 
from  concern with how the exodus was paralysing a moribund  political apparatus to 
how it  was hurting the East German people who had  chosen to stay  at  home.  This 
shift of  focus originated  in the  news  during Sample Period 3 - just  before the  Berlin 
Wall opened. 
At the height of the 'exodus' in  September 1989,  television news examined the likely 
impact  it  would  have  on  the government.  In  Part  One,  I  showed  how  the  media 
portrayed the GDR as a hardline Stalinist state that was resistant  to  perestroika-style 
reform  and isolated within the Warsaw Pact.  As its people left for the West in  their 
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it to continue in the hope that it would be temporary: 
The only way to stop the flow is for  the  ... government  to  close  its  borders with 
its East bloc neighbours,  but that might be seen as  the ultimate sign of political 
failure.  (ITN, 13.00, 11.9.89) 
The question is whether Mr Honecker will  now  have to  give in  to Soviet and 
West German persuasion or continue to resist change and  so  risk a further drain 
on his population?  (BBCl, 18.00, 11.9.89) 
When  the  GDR celebrated its 40th Anniversary in October,  the news reported it as 
being a mere side-show, 
as long as the real news ... continues to  be  dominated by the flight of refugees to 
the West  (REPORTER'S EMPHASIS).  (ITN, 22.00, 5.10.89) 
By  the  beginning of  November, however,  reports from  the  GDR began  to  look at 
the human cost of  the  'exodus': 
East  Germany's  health  service  is  facing  a  crisis  because  more  than  a  thousand 
doctors and nurses have joined the exodus of refugees.  The authorities have been 
forced to set up an emergency system of medical aid ... 
The refugees are  young,  many are skilled.  East Germany is losing the people it 
needs most.  (ITN, 17.40, 3.11.89) 
One  week  later,  hours after the  Wall  opened,  ITN  featured similar,  more detailed 
reports from  Leipzig on the detrimental  effects of the exodus not only on the city's 
health service  but also on industry and education: 
All  the hospitals here are having to cope with chronic staff shortages, as  doctors 
and nurses join the exodus  to the West.  It's  the patients who are suffering  as 
wards are closed, operations cancelled.  (ITN, 20.45, 12.11.89) 
Although  East  Germany's  in  the  top-twenty  league  of  industrialised  nations, 
without its  skilled workers  the economy is set to slide. (ITN, 13.00, 13.11.89) 
Reporter:  Those (East Germans)  like  this  teacher who  did  return  were  anxious 
about what they would find  at work, this morning. 
Teacher:  We've got lots of problems at school.  A  lot of children are not  coming 
back,  at  least  five  in  every  class,  because  their  parents  have  gone  to  ... West 
Germany. On Monday  .. .! expect a lot more won't come ... 
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The Daily Mail also  took up  the  story  as  it  revealed  "The  Sad  Truth About  This 
Exodus" for those in East Germany who decided to remain (14.1l.89). 
The 'refugees' return 
With  East Germany suffering from a drain of  its skilled  workers and  West  Germany 
no longer coping with  so  many,  the return  home of the people became good news. 
Although  most  East  Germans  went  back  without  persuasion  or force,  there  were 
several problems  with the way in which their return was constructed as a news  story. 
Some  of these  arise  out  of the  use  that  the  news  made  of official  statistics.  The 
certainty with which pre-packaged reports managed official  and  unofficial  statistics 
belied the  uncertainty and confusion of the  real situation. Reports obscured the fact 
that significant  numbers of East Germans were still crossing over  to stay  in  the 
West.  Another problem was the sudden legitimacy of the East German state.  West 
German officials,  including  Chancellor Kohl,  and  western leaders  such  as  Bush and 
Thatcher, implored the East Germans to return home and rebuild their country. No one 
including  the  news  media  seemed  to  acknowledge  that  this  represented  quite  a 
remarkable U-turn. Up until the Wall came down the GDR was the 'bankrupt' state that 
could not exist outwith the prevailing socialist system of economy and  politics.  This 
section will examine these aspects of  coverage in some detail. 
Statistics 
My  principal  concern  was  with  the  use  of statistics  and  numerical  expreSSIOns  In 
reporting  the  numbers  of East  Germans  crossing  over  to  the  West  and  then 
returning,  and  the  numbers  of those  preferring  to  stay  on  a  permanent  basis.  I 
systematically  listed  every  reference  to  these  statistics  and  discovered  serious 
confusion  and  mis-reporting  of official  and  unofficial  estimates.  I  argue  that  this 
feature  of  coverage was central to the construction of  the 'refugee crisis' story and its 
subsequent  normalisation  in  the news. 
Most  of the statistics were derived from  official  West  German estimates and East 
German statements about applications for  exit-visas and  travel  visas. 24  These were 
constantly confused  and resulted  in  some glaring inconsistencies between and  within 
news reports.  Some items took the total of applications  for  travel and  exit  visas 
and  implied  that that  was  the  number  of  East  Germans  crossing  into  the  West. 
However, not all  East  Germans were  granted  such visas  and  not  all  those  who 
received  them actually used them.  Some people applied  for  exit  visas  but  changed 
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figures  for people crossing over  to West Berlin and  those for people crossing into 
West Germany along the  main  frontier.  As a result,  we  were  variably informed  that 
four million or  two  million or l.5 million,  or even  as few as 800,000 East Germans 
had crossed or were crossing over.  The figure for  people  wanting  to live  in  the 
West  ranged  from  30,000,  downwards to 8,000 (or "a few thousand").  This  is  a 
recurring problem with the way the news media construct a certain version of 'reality'. 
It raises  the  question  of how  statistics  are  used  and  represented  in  any  social 
discourse  for  a  particular  purpose,  be  it  figures  for  mass  migration,  industrial 
disputes,  the  economy or health. 
Potter  et  al  (1991)  examine  the  problem  with  reference  to  how  television 
documentary and current  affairs in  Britain handled a debate (in 1988) about the actual 
extent of success and  advancement  in  cancer  research.  The  core  arguments  in  this 
debate  depended  a  great  deal  on  statistics  and  how  these  were  expressed  and 
presented to the public.  Thus,  Potter  et  al were concerned with  "quantification  as 
rhetoric",  that is  "how practices of  quantification  and  the construction of numerical 
versions  are marshalled in the course of  arguments". 25 
The Glasgow University Media Group (1985), and McNair (1988),  have  shown how 
the distortion of  statistics by sources and the news media themselves entered reporting 
of  the Zero Option/START talks between the superpowers during the New Cold War, 
1981-84. However,  McNair also offers instances when  journalists  challenged  these 
statistics  and,  therefore,  the claims  for  which  they  were  used  to  support.  The 
GUMG identifies a similar use/misuse of statistics  in  the  reporting of  the  miner's 
strike in Britain,  1984-85,  to  support  the British Coal Board's claim that there was a 
"Drift  Back"  to work by  miners.26  The  tendency  for  the  news  media  to  report 
official or uncorroborated  information during post-disaster  situations  has been  noted 
in  several  studies.  27  Kitzinger  and  Miller  found  serious  exaggerations  and 
inconsistencies  in media estimates for the numbers of people  in Africa  infected  with 
HIV or suffering from  AIDS;  these,  they argue,  suggest  "a cavalier approach"  by 
journalists  to  the  story  which  serves  to  reinforce  underlying  cultural  assumptions 
about the origins and spread ofHIV.28 
Following are some  examples of  how the  mis-reporting  of  statistics affected the story 
of  the return home of  most East Germans.  There was a considerable disparity between 
the  confusion  among journalists in  Berlin  and  the  empirical  certainties  of packaged 
news  accounts.  Take,  for  example,  the  following  edited  extract  from  a  live 
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the scene, in West  Berlin: 
Newscaster: And presumably, we have no clear  idea of how many people in the 
last  24  hours  have  come  across  with the  intention  of staying?  It must  be 
dreadfully  confused? 
Reporter:  It is  a very confused,  very chaotic situation  .. .it's  hard  to know how 
many  are coming  to  stay  and how many  are going back,  but certainly there 
are dozens and dozens coming in every hour. (MY EMPHASES) 
(BBCl, 13.00, 10.11.89) 
In  a  live  conversation  between  journalists,  such  confusion  might  be  expected. 
Indeed, it  could  be accepted  as  an  accurate  representation of  the  prevailing 
situation in Berlin. However most television news  coverage of  the events in Berlin was 
composed  of scripted  studio  links  and  pre-recorded,  structured  film  reports.  The 
formal,  professional  and ideological  constraints which package news so tightly came 
into play  to  construct  a  less fallible  version  of an  uncertain reality.  The  situation 
is  reported in  terms  of "facts  and figures".  Absent is the confusion about who was 
coming  and  who was  going back. The following statements come from pre-recorded 
film  reports and  show the news to be  more  definite  about  the  figures  for  those 
staying in  the  West  and those going home: 
Only  a thousand of  the masses  who've crossed  so far have failed to return. 
(lTN, 22.00, 10.11.89 ) 
Headline:  More than  a  million  cross  to  the  West  but  almost  all  go  home  at 
nightfall  (lTN, 21.50, 11.11.89) 
While reporting that "the West German authorities stopped  counting"  after the first 
10,000  East Germans  crossed into  the West (BBCl,  13.00,  10.11.89),  the news 
maintained  the exercise.  The  reporting of figures in the news texts  in  this sample 
became so routine that inconsistencies and  exaggerations  can not be written off as 
insignificant,  as  mere narrative  'colour'.  They conveyed  a  certain meaning about 
what was happening. At  the  beginning of  the weekend these statistics were  used  to 
convey  the magnitude of  the crowds in West Berlin and also the extent to which the 
events there were "abnormal".  Television news reported  on the basis of  estimates and 
predictions  for  overall numbers.  The general extent of  the influx was conveyed using 
terms  such  as  "thousands  upon  thousand"  of East Germans, "millions  of'  people, 
with  qualifiers  such  as  "may  have",  "could",  "more  than"  or "up to".  Used in 
context  with  the "flood" metaphor, the end result is quite effective in  conveying the 
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Thousands of East Berliners are still pouring  across the border  ... West  Germany 
may have to accommodate  up  to a  million more refugees 
(BBCl, 13.00, 10.11.89) 
As  literally hundreds of thousands of East  Germans  arrive  over the next  few 
days,  this  is  potentially almost as  big  a  crisis  for  Bonn  as  it  is  for  East 
Berlin.  (ITN, 13.00, 10.11.89) 
The  tabloid press went further by expressing the flow of people as  a rate : the Mirror 
put this at  "400 young refugees an  hour" (9.11.89),  while  The Sun settled for "300 
emigrants an  hour"  (9.11.89).  This  had  the effect of  stressing  the  extent  and 
urgency of  the "problem". 
By  Monday,  the  reporting of figures  focused  on  the  trends towards  a general 
return of  East Germans  to their own  country. This tied in with the way in which the 
news 'wrapped-up'  coverage of  events in Berlin. Reports were  presenting a picture of 
another sort of return: to near-normality, calm and order.  Statistics were expressed in 
percentages or fractions  with the effect of  minimising the scale of the problem: 
Reporter:  Very few of the  thousands  who  have  crossed,  so  far,  have  failed  to 
return. 
Newscaster: ... more than 2 million East Germans crossed onto Western  soil. .. and, 
remarkably,  at least  99%  of  them  came  back  here  to  East  Berlin.  (MY 
EMPHASES)  (ITN 13.00, 13.11.89) 
It's  estimated  that  only  2%  (of East  Germans)  do  not  plan  to  return.  (MY 
EMPHASIS)  (Channel Four News, ITN, 13.11.89) 
News accounts also referred to these figures when  calculating  the likely  cost of the 
general welcome to the West German authorities.  On  that basis,  it  was implied that 
such  cost  was  so great  that  it  could not be  sustained in  the  present  economic 
circumstances.  An ITN reporter calculated that, 
The cost for the West German government is  enormous.  East Germans get £35 
when they cross: 4 million  have done so.  That's about (£)130 million given  away 
in  the past three days.  At  the British (Army)  refugee centre,  they're  preparing 
for the next wave.  The  West  Germans are now hoping that these family  rooms 
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But how does that calculation stand against a later remark by the newscaster that, 
Two million East Germans crossed onto West German soil for the first time over 
the last three  days. (MY EMPHASIS)  (ITN, 13.00, 13.11.89) 
Similar disparities occurred on  Channel  Four News and Newsnight that evening.  The 
Channel  Four newscaster opened with a West Berlin government estimate that, 
a  quarter  of the entire population of East Germany have now crossed into the 
city:  that's four million people, of  whom 8,000  have actually stayed. 
This  was followed by a film report which undercut the newscaster's figure by half: 
Of  the 2 million  people  who  crossed  the border in Berlin, this weekend, only a 
few thousand stayed. (MY EMPHASES)  (Channel Four News,  13.11.89) 
Later that evening, Newsnight opened with the news that "a million and a half'  East 
Germans visited West  Berlin over the weekend: 
By far the majority of people have  gone  home  but 30,000 have stayed in  the 
West. 
A news item then reported that: 
six thousand of  those who've arrived  since last  Thursday have decided to make 
the  break.  (13.11.89) 
That the great majority  of East Germans were returning could not be disputed,  but 
many still chose to live in the West and their  numbers were  significant.  On the basis 
of  the news' own logic,  the  problems they  were 'causing'  remained and the situation 
was far from  'normal'.  For  example,  on Newsnight,  the journalist Julian O'Haloran 
reported  from  a  refugee  reception  camp  in  West  Berlin,  four  days  after  the  Wall 
opened.  He dismissed  the Great  Return thesis as an illusion: 
Because the vast majority of  East Germans who came  to West Berlin in the last 
five  days were day-trippers or weekenders,  the impression's being  created  that 
the flow of  real, permanent refugees to West Germany  has  dried up.  But  what's 
going on here  proves  that  is  either an optical illusion or  wishful thinking.  The 
hundreds of East Germans in  this building  came  within  the  last  52  hours  and 
they're  now filling  in  forms  to  settle  here,  with  no  intention  whatsoever  of 
going  back East.  (Newsnight, BBC2, 13. 11.89) Reporting the Refugee Exodus  107 
This  was  supported in  an  item from  the Daily  Mail (14.11.89) which argued that 
"The Great Return"  story  did  not  alter the fact  that  over 200,000  people  left  East 
Germany since the beginning of 1989 and were causing problems for the host  country. 
The Times reported that the Federal Republic had to assimilate 900,000 immigrants in 
nine months (13.11.89). However, while Julian  OHalloran was  right  to call  it  "an 
optical illusion",  it was one that was in part created  by  the  news media and which 
could have been avoided. 
These  were just some of  the most glaring variants concerning the reporting of  figures, 
their accuracy and their sources. This served to obscure the true scale of movement to 
the West and back again. Far from being a petty issue, the mis-reporting of statistics -
whether  official  or estimated  - determined  how  the  overall  story  was  understood. 
While on a very basic level,  reports  of four million East  Germans  receiving  visas 
failed  to distinguish  between who was staying in the  West  and  who  was  returning 
to the GDR.  However, in context with the wider issue of 'the refugee problem',  these 
same statistics  supported the crisis theme, justified the use of disaster metaphors  like 
"the flood",  and  legitimated the calls  for  urgent  action  to persuade  most  East 
Germans to return.  There was,  however,  the question of what exactly they were to 
return to. 
The GDR is dead. Long Live the GDR 
Just  before the Wall opened,  the German journalist Josef  Joffe wrote in  The  Times, 
that the reforms already underway in the GDR were  not stemming the exodus, rather 
encouraging more people  to leave (9.11.89).  The Daily Mail looked at the exodus 
from  the East  German  side  of the Berlin Wall  and  featured  a  brief item  headed, 
"Reforms,  But  They  Still  Pour Out".  However,  this  idea  was  soon jettisoned  by 
commentators  when  the  implications  of events  for  the  West  became  apparent:  a 
possible  mass  exodus  far  exceeding  anything  seen  so  far.  Suddenly,  the  idea  that 
reforms in  the GDR might  keep  people at  home began to gain currency.  Two days 
after  the  Wall opened,  the Daily Express reported how Krenz's "Promises Of  Reform 
Stem The Human Torrent" (11.11.89). 
It was now a viable proposition to encourage reform if it would keep the East  German 
people at home.  A survey of the  press  shows  a clear  emphasis  on  the  need for 
return, with  a  total  of 29 statements  as  against  15 statements of  welcome  for  the 
East Germans (Table 4.5,  above).  We  can  see  how the emphasis  on  a return to the 
GDR represents  a shift  in  theme by  looking at  television news  across  our  four 
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number of statements welcoming the East Germans (from  17  to  10  statements) and 
those hoping for a general  return home (from 12 to 23). 
During  the  early  stages of the "exodus",  in  September,  any  anxieties  that  may 
have  existed  were  cast  aside.  The  prevailing  mood  was  one  of euphoria  and 
welcome. In Sample Period 1, only two voices suggested that it might be preferable for 
the people  to stay  at  home:  the Prime Minister of Bavaria  (Channel Four News, 
11.9.89)  and  the  British  Foreign  Office  (BBCl,  13.00,  12.9.89).  In  both  cases, 
however, this was qualified by a call to the GDR to introduce the type of reforms that 
would  encourage its  young  people  to  stay.  In coverage of  the  GDR's  40th 
Anniversary (7 October),  the  news  reported  only  two statements  urging  East 
Germans to return to or  stay  at  home.  Both  were  attributed to Mikhail Gorbachev. 
But this has  to  be considered  in context with the assumption in the news  that  the 
Soviet  leader  was going through the motions of  giving  public support to his East 
German counterpart,  Erich Honecker. 
During  Sample  Period  3 (2-4  November),  the  news  reported  a  new  "wave"  of 
refugees heading west via Prague and Warsaw.  They were portrayed as mostly young 
people who had run out of patience for reform.  There were 8 statements in the news 
favouring a return to East Germany  in  this period.  However,  these  all  originated 
with East German leaders anxious to halt  the  exodus by  showing  how serious they 
were about reforms.  Over  this  eight-week period, therefore,  any  western anxieties 
that  may have existed about a continuing influx of East Germans were certainly  not 
apparent  from  British  television  news coverage.  This of  course needs to be taken in 
context  with  the general  scepticism  in  the media that East  Germany  could  be 
reformed.  'What  were  the people to go back to?',  was  a  common refrain. 
The  return of  East Germans to their own  country,  to what  they  regard  as home, 
was not a new  phenomenon.  When  the exodus  was at its height in  September, the 
news  reported  that many  East German holiday-makers in Hungary were not joining 
the exodus but going back home.  Their numbers however were  reported as  having 
little significance: 
Newscaster:  The Hungarians say  a further  16,  000 East Germans have  crossed 
the  border  from  Czechoslovakia and many continue onto West  Germany. But at 
the  same  time,  it  said,  26,  000  East  German tourists have decided to 
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Reporter: Not all East Germans are taking  advantage of  Hungary's open border. 
Thousands of those  who've  flocked  to the  holiday  camps  every  year  are 
going back as  normal,  although  that will probably be  of  little comfort to  the 
government in East Berlin.  (MYEMPHASES)  (BBCl, 13.00, 12.9.89) 
It seems  odd  that 26, 000 people  returning  home  should  be regarded  as offering 
"little comfort" to their government.  This is  a very presumptuous statement to make 
in the absence  of any understanding  why  those people wanted to return and  what 
they thought of  those who were leaving for West Germany.  A week before the Wall 
opened,  ITN reported  on latest  movement of East Germans, this time through the 
newly opened  Czech-West German border.  The journalist  was  sceptical about an 
example of glasnost  in East German news coverage of  the  exodus,  reporting that, 
television wasn't showing its viewers refugees heading West,  rather model  East 
Germans  enjoying  the  new  travel  rights  (INTERPRETS  INTERVIEW  WITH 
WOMAN ON GDR TV) "We just want to go  shopping,  have a good cup of coffee, 
and have a  look round. That will be marvellous for us!"  (MY EMPHASIS) 
(lTN, 13.00,  2.1l.89) 
After  the Berlin Wall was opened, and everyone was granted  free travel to the West, 
some journalists seemed  surprised  that  most  East  Germans  were  "model  citizens" 
returning home after a day out in the West. This was derived from an assumption that 
most East Germans would leave the country given the first free opportunity: 
I think it's pretty clear many are going to come back. And they see East Germany 
as  their  home  and they want to help rebuild it.  (Channel Four News,  10.1l.89) 
But these were not people  abandoning  their country.  Most  were simply heading 
for the night-out of their lives.  (BBC 1, all bulletins, 1  0. 11.89) 
After the weekend party in the  West,  it's back to work for the East Berliners. 
(I  TN, 17.40, 13.1l.89) 
Headline: East Germans are still coming west - most think home's best. 
(lTN, 22.00, 13.1l.89) 
Those East Germans who wanted to stay in the West, no  matter what  reforms were 
passed in their country, were warned about the hazards and pitfalls of  life in  the West. 
A local  government official  in  West  Berlin  appeared  on  four  ITN bulletins  on  13 
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What  we think is that people  will  prefer  their nice houses in East Berlin to a bed 
in  one  of our gymnastic halls 
The  Glasgow  Herald reported a warning from  the West German Interior Minister, 
Wolfgang Schaeuble, who "warned that every refugee must realise  that he will have to 
live in inadequate housing for a fairly long time, in conditions probably worse than he 
had at  home. In other words,  the green  grass  on  the  other side of  the fence may 
well  prove  less  attractive  than  the red grass back home" (11.11.89; MY EMPHASIS). 
This was the same man who welcomed East Germans with open arms hours after the 
Wall opened, promising that "No one will be turned away!". 
Throughout the Cold War, the western news media played  on distorted  compansons 
between life  in  the  West  and  in  the  East,  using  the  two  Berlins  as  convenient 
metaphors.  Not  only  were these  images  presented  to people  in  the  West  but 
transmitted across the Wall into many East German households as truthful  and reliable 
representations of  reality East and West.29 Now, they were being asked to look at the 
western media another way: 
(They)  know  that their western  magazines only tell  part of the story.  A new 
generation must now  make up its own mind.  (lTN, 17.40, 13.11.89) 
Conclusion 
It may be possible to argue that the patterns of  coverage I  have analysed so far simply 
represent an inevitable media response  to an emerging problem. In fact,  the 'problem' 
of'ethnic-' and  'non-German'  immigrants, and the debate over West  Germany's 'open-
door'  immigration policy,  became news not because of its sudden  occurrence  but 
because of  its  renewed  relevance.  Consideration  should  be given to some news 
items on  the  East German  "refugees"  from the summer of 1989,  before  the  exodus 
reached  its  peak.  Their recovery serves to  remove  the  last sinews of legitimacy 
from  the  whole  story  of  East  German  "refugee"  exodus  and  support  the 
argument  that  those  people should never have been labelled  "refugees"  in the first 
place. 
When  Hungary  opened its border with Austria in  May  1989,  its Warsaw Pact allies 
protested about the lack of consultation.  The official  Western  response was one of 
approval  but  in  a  brief reference  to the  affair,  The  Times  noted  an  underlying 
unease about  its future implications. Western euphoria about "a huge exodus" of East 
Europeans from a "crisis-ridden" Communist system was  tempered with caution as  it 
became obvious that  the  West's long-term interests were under threat  It seemed that Reporting the Refugee Exodus  III 
the "twitchy Austrians, already faced with thousands of  refugees in overflowing camps, 
(were)  privately grumbling that  the  removal of the fences (would)  cost them more 
for stepped-up patrols" ( 3.5.89). 
Given  the  extent  of  publicity  surrounding  the  East  German exodus, it would have 
been  difficult  for  West  Germany  to  enforce  restrictions.  The  story  had  great 
propaganda value but it  bore little  relation  to public opinion in West  Germany  about 
"the immigrant  problem"  there.  In August  1989,  ITN  qualified  West Germany's 
'traditional' open-arms policy: 
West Germans have worked hard to rebuild their country in  the years  since  the 
war. This year alone,  they're being asked to share that wealth with over 400,000 
refugees  from  Eastern  Europe.  According  to  political  observers  here,  the 
immigrant issue remains the single most important challenge to Chancellor Kohl's 
political future.  All the refugees will  have to be found employment and  housing. 
And,  for  the first  time  since  the Berlin  Wall  went  up ... , the  people of west 
Germany are beginning  to ask themselves just  how  long  this open-door  policy 
can be sustained.  (ITN, 13.00, 25.8.89) 
Even during  Sample Period I, when coverage was at  its  most up-beat,  there was a 
note offoreboding of  things to come: 
East  European  Expert:  It's  much  easier  ... for  the  Federal  Republic  to  absorb 
refugees  from  East  Germany  than  it is for ethnic  Germans from  other parts of 
the  Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  (BBCI, 13.00, 11.9.89) 
More than 75,000 refugees have  already arrived ... this year  and ... many of them 
will find  it difficult to adapt  to  such  a  completely  different  society. 
(BBCI, 13.00, 12.9.89) 
So,  in  a similar logic to the  'disaster story' rubric  on  the news,  appeals  for urgent 
action to  solve  immediate  problems depend to some extent on doom-laden warnings 
of  worse problems to come if nothing is done. Reporting the Refugee Exodus  112 
The  way  this  shift  in  political  rhetoric  was  reported  reveals  some  senous 
inconsistencies  and  confusion  in  news  media accounts.  If  the story had been 
reported as  one  of economic migration  in  the  first place, there  would  have  been 
little problem.  But it was not.  On the whole,  the news media  followed the dominant 
rhetoric  about  the  East  German  exodus from  the  very  beginning  and  accepted  its 
turnabout without serious inquiry.  In doing so,  they inadvertently gave lie  to their 
original premise:  that  this  was  a "refugee" story and,  as  such,  that  the "refugees" 
were "fleeing" a country without hope for reform. Reporting the Refugee Exodus  113 
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The News After The Wall: Options for Change 
Introduction 
George  Kennan  was  one  of the  pnmary  definers  of the  Cold  War  paradigm  of 
understanding the world  after the  second world war.  In  an  article  published  in  the 
Guardian, he conceded that the paradigm was rapidly collapsing. He advised against a 
rush to German unity  because of two problems with the "world order" as he  saw it: 
one  short-ter~ the  other long-term.  In  the  short  te~ there  was  the  problem  of 
preserving stability in Europe. If  this could be achieved, people could then address the 
long-term problem of  building completely new security structures for the whole of the 
continent of Europe,  "to replace the old one so  deeply impregnated with Cold War 
assumptions  that  are  no  longer  applicable".  He  concludes  by  offering  a  blue-print 
paradigm  for  a  new  world  order:  "We  must  prepare  instead  for  a  searching 
examination of  the ways in which Europe's security is to be achieved in  an age where 
the great enemy is not the Soviet Union, but the rapid deterioration of our planet as a 
supporting structure for civilised  life". 1 
Most people, however, did not look that far ahead. It seemed a difficult enough task to 
prescribe  immediate  remedies.  Just  after  the  Berlin  Wall  opened,  Jeremy  Paxman 
remarked  that it took, 
something of a  leap  of imagination  to  realise  that  there  are  some  people  -
politicians,  industrialists  and,  above  all,  generals  - who've  been  watching  the 
scenes in  Berlin  with  a  feeling  other than joy in their hearts because the events 
of the last few days raise enormous potential questions. 
(BBC2 Newsnight,  10.11.89) 
He might have had in mind Cold War strategists like Admiral William Crowe,  a former 
chairman  of the  US  Joint  Chiefs  of Staff,  who  summed  up  the  loss  of Cold  War 
certainty for western security interests in  a submission to the US Congressional Joint 
Economic Committee. "This", he said,  "is a time of very uncertain strategic transition. 
The future ain't what it used to be". 2  But Paxman might also have added "journalists" 
to his list of suspects. Amid such uncertainty, they reported public opinion in East and 
West about the way forward for both Germanys after the Wall.  This was in  context 
with  two  concurrent  key  developments:  the  reforms  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  the 
political and economic integration of the European Community.  In this chapter, I will 
look at how the news  filtered competing visions of  a 'New Germany' and what it might 
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mean  for  East and  West.  Some reference to relevant  press  output will  help  set  a 
standard of  comparison. 
Three options for change dominated the news discourse in this initial period.  These set 
out what might, could, or should happen in the two Germanys 5 to 10 years after the 
Wall opened, and are quantified in Table 5.1, below. 
Option One was that East Germany should press ahead with reforms and hold 'free 
elections'  as  soon  as  possible.  Option  Two  was  that,  for  the  sake  of stability  in 
Europe, German reunification could only come about in  the distant future.  A whole 
range of  questions had to be addressed first. In the meantime the two Germanys should 
remain  within their existing 'spheres of influence'.  These two options were favoured 
by  diverse interest groups,  for their own particular reasons:  the governments of the 
GDR,  the Soviet  Union and  Britain,  the East  German  reform  movement,  and  anti-
European federalists.  Option Three was for German unity but only  within Western 
economic  and  security  structures.  Its  proponents  were  the  governments  of West 
Germany, the US, and France, and pro-European federalists. Apart from those sources 
which actively proposed one or other of these Options, there were others that were 
more ambiguous or circumspect.  So while a British politician might talk in  terms of 
German unity in  an article  in  the press or on television news,  he  or she  might  not 
actually favour it as an option. Yet his or her input could not be ignored on that basis: 
it is part of  the discourse and is treated  as such in this analysis. 
Method 
The principle aim of my analysis is to provide quantitative and qualitative profiles of 
official and elite opinion in the immediate aftermath of  the Wall's collapse. 
The first task was to check each reported statement in every bulletin in the sample for 
relevant references to the options outlined above (506 statements in 39 bulletins). It is 
important here to make a clear distinction between reported statement and reference. 
For example,  in  a statement to the media,  a foreign minister might  refer to Option 
One, the need for reform in the GDR,  and then to Option Two,  the view that the 
two Germanys should remain separate countries. These were sometimes but not always 
interdependent therefore I  counted them as two separate references. In my qualitative 
analysis, I ensured that they were kept in their proper political context and in  context, 
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The  second  task  was  to  categorise  sources  according  to  a)  government  or  non-
government representatives,  and to b) country of  origin.  So, for example,  we can see 
from Table 5.1, below, that  there were 66 references from all  East German (GDR) 
sources to the need for reform in the GDR.  Furthermore, Table 5.2,  gives a break 
down of this figure  to show that of  these 66,  23  originated in  statements by East 
German government sources. 
Preliminary results 
Table 5.1,  below,  summarises  the  quantitative  profile  of references  by  sources  to 
particular options.  We can see at  once that in  these terms,  the  news  reported  the 
general  weight of opinion  at  the time  to have  been  in  favour  of a  slow,  cautious 
response to the 'German Question'. What we cannot see from the table is how the news 
reported the merits  and  demerits of each  option,  and  whether there  was  a  definite 
preference for one in particular. 
Table 5.1: Visions of a new Germany 
Short-medium term optionsfor the two Germanys  after fall of  the Berlin Wall as 
debated on BBe  News and  1TN,  9-13 November 1989 (References from reported 
statements,  direct statements, and interview responses) 
OPTION 1: Radical reform in GDR 
OPTION 2: Two Germanys should remain separate 
OPTION 3:  German unity within  existing western  economic  and security 
structures 
Governments,  non-government officials, political commentators and experts, 
British news media 
OPT  GDR  FRG  US  USSR  FRA  GB  NATO  EC  TOT 
1  66  13  2  10  - 18  - - 109 
2  10  4  6  12  3  9  1  - 45 
3  - 16  2  - 3  14  2  I  38 News after the Wall  119 
As a quantitative summary, it  hides significant qualitative differences.  If we break the 
profile  down  according  to  statements  by  government,  non-government,  and  media 
sources,  and look at their specific frames of meaning, a different picture emerges.  So 
while  Table 5.1  might tell us that the GDR was the greatest source of references in 
favour of  reform, and against German unity,  it does not reveal how this breaks down 
according to government, reform, and other non-government sources. How differently 
did the news report the government's position on reforms from  that of the reform 
movement?  I will now present an  analysis of how TV news dealt with each of these 
options and the degree of legitimacy afforded the various arguments for and  against 
them. 
Option One:  Reforms in the GDR 
When the Wall came down, officials East and West wished for a cautious, step-by-step 
approach to the way ahead.  Governments, reformers,  and experts advocated reforms 
and free elections in an independent East German state as the prerogative.  Table 5.1, 
above, shows that it was the most predominant option reported in the news at the time, 
with  109  references  in  statements  by  governments,  opposition  politicians,  and 
specialists.  Each interest group had  its own very specific reasons for its choice and so 
it  is  the purpose of this  section of the analysis to show how each was  reported and 
explained by the news media. 
As with the refugee exodus story, TV news coverage of the reform debate in the GDR 
marked  a  complete turnabout from  the framework  adopted  up  until  the  Wall  came 
down.  Then,  reform was reported as  all  but futile  in  a  state that was  in  terminal 
decline. 
Before the Wall:  the 'end-of-the-GDR' theme 
The assumption that East Germany could not survive without socialism was  consistent 
throughout  the  three  sample periods taken for this section of  the analysis: 
The  exodus  ... could  put  into  question  the  entire  future  of a  state  and  its 
government.  (BBCI, 21.00, 11.9.89) 
The exodus and the pressure for reform are undermining the Communist  regime 
and,  by implication,  the very reason for East Germany's existence. 
(Newsnight, BBC2, 11.9.89) 
(THE  EAST  GERMAN)  state  has  only  its hard-line  ideology and the Berlin Wall 
to keep it from  the other  Germany in the West.  (ITN, 13.00,6.10.89) News after the Wall  120 
This state  .. .is an historical accident trying  still to convince itself and the world of 
its legitimacy.  (Newsnight,  BBC2, 6.10.89 ) 
While  questioning the legitimacy of the East German  state,  and throwing its future 
into doubt, the news reported the reform movement as  a well-intentioned,  admirable, 
but ultimately transient expression of  popular discontent. Routine news  items reported 
the aims of  the  reform  groups  in general terms: "greater  democracy",  "real reform", 
"political  freedom",  or "political participation". These, of course, are open to a wide 
interpretation.  The  minority  audience  news  programmes  - Newsnight  (BBC)  and 
Channel Four News (lTN) - pointed out that the reform movement was one of diverse 
groups that proposed radical reform within existing state structures. This broad agenda 
sat awkwardly with the assumptions  underpinning the 'collapse of the state'  thesis. 
The dissolution of  the  state and  unification with  West  Germany were part of  an 
agenda essentially set by West German sources. 
Newsnight and Channel Four News featured four special  reports  on the  nature and 
extent of  the reform movement,  one  each  during two of the three sample periods : 
the GDR's 40th Anniversary,  and  Honecker's  resignation.  The first Newsnight item 
(6.10.89)  reported  on  the  continuing  crisis  of government  in  East  Germany.  The 
newscaster  introduced  it  directly  after  referring  to  the  rapid  reforms  that  were 
transforming government in  Hungary: 
Well,  clearly, that kind of progress towards Western-style democracy  will  be  a 
long  time coming in East Germany. At  a time  when so many have been  fleeing 
that  country, David  Sells has  been meeting  some  of those who  want to  stay 
behind  and reform their system from within. 
One of those people was  Wolfing  Ullman,  a Protestant theologian,  and  member of 
reform group Democracy  Now!  He told Sells that  for  his group and others,  Mikhail 
Gorbachev  was a symbol  of the fact  that: 
Ullman:  Socialism  and Marxism  is  still  a  movement and alive,  not  only  that 
structure  of power,  of using power, and of  despotism. 
Nonetheless, the journalist placed more emphasis on the  negative version of socialism 
as  being  a  structured  system  of repression.  He conceded  that  the  GDR had  its 
economic successes but that these were nothing when its people were being  "treated 
like  puppets  in  a  pageant, forced to  act  out  a  vision  of socialism  dreamed long 
ago by  the  old  men  who  now rule  this  land".  He  then turned to the dissident News after the Wall  121 
writer Stefan Heym  who offered ways  in  which the present situation differed  from 
that  of the past: 
Heym:  And  now I  think the government  would  have  had  a  chance  to  change 
things,  to make  here a  socialism that people would like, ... that would  be  part of 
their own course  instead  of  a  socialism you would like to run away from. 
The  report went on  to look at the street protests for  reform,  which were growing 
throughout the country,  and  identified in  this  a shift  of the public mood away from 
wanting to leave to wanting to stay and change society: 
Sells: Why do you stick to socialism? 
Heym:  I  think  because  we  haven't  really  tried  it  yet.  What  we've  had  in 
practice  ... was  Stalinism,  Stalinist  structures  of government, ... of dealing  with 
people.  So,  I feel  that as  I set out in  my  life to help  make  socialism,  I should 
continue now. It's not socialism that's failed!  It's  that  particular  form - Stalinism 
- that is  bankrupt now. 
Channel Four's The  World This Week marked East Germany's  40th Anniversary  with 
a special focus on the continuing crisis.  This was how the programme was introduced: 
Today is  the 40th Anniversary of the founding  of  East  Germany,  and  what 
should have  been  a  celebration for  its  ageing  leaders  has  turned  into  a  major 
crisis. For  as thousands  of its  citizens  struggle to  leave,  East  Germany faces 
possibly the greatest ever threat to  its  existence.  We'll be asking  Germans  from 
both  East and  West the question,  "One Germany or two? " 
(The World This Week,  Channel Four, 19.00,7.10.89) 
After  headlines on the latest situation in the country the newscaster introduced  the 
special report  with these remarks: 
It's no  longer clear that the East German  state can  continue  In  its  present 
Stalinist form. As this becomes ever more evident, voices calling  for  reunification 
are  getting  louder,  and  the  time-table shorter. 
This  qualitative leap  from  questioning the future  of the state in  its  present form  to 
suggesting  German  unity  excluded  alternative  possibilities  such  as  East  Germany 
continuing as an independent  entity. The subsequent film report reinforced the view: 
East Germany is  not a nation-state.  Its only raison d'etre  is  its ideology and,  as 
this looks increasingly under threat,  the question of reunification  is  increasingly 
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The item ended with a prediction that, 
Whatever their fears, both East and West may be forced  to  address the question 
of German  reunification sooner  than they would like to. 
The  newscaster then  interviewed  Franz Loeser,  East  German  dissident  and  former 
Party (SED) member. She asked him if German unity  was a good idea? 
Loeser:  Well,  it  may be a good idea but an illusion because reunification won't 
stand at the  beginning of social change in East Germany. If  at all,  it  will be  the 
result of a rather long process of social change  ... and the most important...is the 
democratisation of  East Germany. 
Loeser  argued  that  there  was  a struggle  within the Party between hard-liners and 
reformers,  which was more important than that between  the  government  and  the 
popular  reform  movement.  He  estimated  that  the  pro-reform  faction  would  win 
through  within  the  next  two  years.  Asked  what  reforms  such  a  faction  would 
contemplate, he thought that democratisation would be the most likely  route.  If the 
Honecker group could be ousted quickly,  then  East Germany had a good chance of 
becoming a 'Western-style' socialist democracy.  If,  however,  the hard-liners survived 
too long,  a  reactionary and  more radical  shift  to capitalist democracy would take 
place. 
The newscaster  finally asked him: 
After reunification, I'm jumping a  long  way ahead. You  said  it might come. Do 
you think it  will come, actually? 
Loeser: Well,  I think if  you have a capitalist  form of  democracy,  then  there's no 
justification for two Germanys. If you have a socialist democracy,  then  there is 
justification. 
Nonetheless,  it  was difficult  to tell  from  most  reports  that  such  a  power-struggle 
existed within the communist party,  or that  the reform movement wanted to build a 
'western-style' socialist democracy,  not to scrap their own country.  We were led  to 
believe that the party and government was one and the same,  an unyielding  monolith 
sliding to destruction.  The media worked on the 'end of the GDR'  thesis  right  up 
until  the Wall  was opened when the government's reform proposals were still  being 
reported in a very sceptical light: 
The Communist authorities know if  they're to survive, the exodus must be stopped 
but for that the  elections must be free and the chances then can't be high. 
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Mr Krenz  and  his  new  colleagues  have  been  forced  to  accept  a  taste  of 
democracy - swallowing it whole is another matter.  (ITN, 13.00, 9.11.89) 
The East German government position 
The  decision  to  open  the  Wall  made  little  difference  to  the  media  VIew  of the 
government.  It was reported  as  a  gesture of abject  surrender  rather  than  serious 
progress with reforms: 
East Germany has finally given up trying to control its people. 
(BBC1, 21.00, 9.11.89) 
It almost seems the last throes of  the East German leadership. 
(BBC2, Newsnight,  10.11.89) 
News bulletins routinely reported government statements and announcements  ..  -rh~re 
u.ere 23 references to reforms (see Table 5.2, below): free travel for all,  free elections 
within a year, an emergency  Communist Party conference to debate the Party's leading 
role,  and  an  investigation  into  the  activities  of the  ST  ASI,  or  security  services. 
However, both their viability and  credibility were kept in question and real analysis of 
what they might mean for the population was exceptional. 
Table 5.2: Visions of a new Germany 
Short-medium term optionsfor the two Germanys  after fall of  the Berlin Wall as 
debated  on BBe News  and ITN,  9  - 13  November  1989  (References from 
reported statements,  direct statements, and interview responses) 
OPTION 1: Radical reform in GDR 
Governments 
OPT  GDR  FRG  US  USSR 
1  23  7  1  7 
FRA  GB  TOT 
- 8  46 
The government proposals  were mainly reported in  two ways.  They were sometimes 
portrayed as desperate moves by a desperate leadership: 
The Party's central Committee men arrive to examine the wreckage  of what  had 
been  an  unshakeable power  structure.  (ITN, 13.00,9.11.89) News after the Wall 
(The) exhausted and discredited leadership has given up to the inevitable. 
(BBC2, Newsnight, 9.11.89) 
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This  did  not  look  like  a planned  move  by  the Communist authorities but 
rather  another panic response by a government  giving way to the parliament of 
the streets.  (BBCl, 21.00, 10.11.89) 
Or they were seen as part of  a daring gamble in a high-stakes game of  chance: 
F  or the new East German leadership, this represents a new high-risk strategy that 
will lose them some people.  (ITN, Channel Four News,  10.11.89) 
No socialist government has ever before gambled its future quite like this. 
(BBC2, Newsnight,  10.11.89) 
On Monday  13  November,  the Party elected  a new  government  and  a  new  Prime 
minister with a proven track record of  reform. The tone in news reports changed  from 
one of pessimism and cynicism to that of optimism and caution about the reforms and 
their chances of success.  Suddenly, the East German  parliament,  the Volkskammer, 
was coming to life as a democratic forum to elect a Gorbachev-style prime minister: 
The East German parliament is making historic, democratic changes tonight.  It's 
had an unprecedented secret ballot and for the first time elected a non-communist 
Speaker.  (ITN, 17.40, 13.11.89) 
parl.~Ill-
For the BBC reporter, Brian Hanrahan,  the developments in "were cause for  surprise 
and  some incredulity: 
Until now, the  ... parliament simply reflected the views of  the Communist Party but, 
today,  its members arrived to find  that their opinions were being eagerly sought 
and  they began talking  as  though they  might  insist  on  having  them  taken  into 
account! ....  Inside, there was an outburst of  democracy! 
(BBCl, 13.00, 13.11.89) 
However, ITN's reporter remained unconvinced, pointing out that: 
The vote was by secret ballot in a transparent box 
(ITN, 17.40, 13.11.89) 
The  prime-minister  elect  was  Hans  Modrow,  leader  of the  Communist  party  In 
Dresden. He had a record of  reform that won him considerable credibility in the eyes of 
the western media.  His image as a senior East German  communist was certainly more News after the Wall  125 
positive than that of  his colleagues in the Politburo. The press portrayed him as "one of 
the most progressive figures in the leadership"\ and a "pragmatist".4 The Times ran a 
lengthy profile on Modrow,  "the man West German feels it can do business with  .... the 
Gorbachev (sic) of his  country  .... respected as  a trained economist".  He was also  "a 
man who,  privately,  is  witty,  irreverent and charming"  behind the public mask of an 
"apparatchik".5  A similar image of  Modrow  can be gleaned from television news: 
(The) charismatic Mr Modrow  ... the only senior Communist with sufficient public 
support to carry off  the job.  (ITN, 13.00, 13.11.89) 
(A) leading reformer  ... often at odds with the centralleadership  ... he's encouraged 
the pro-reform demonstrations.  (BBCl, 13.00, 13.11.89) 
(A) leading reformer  ... who has genuine public support. 
(ITN, 17.40, 13.11.89) 
Modrow's expected to want to take his country down the road of  reform. 
(BBCl, 18.00, 13.11.89) 
(The) only  Communist  politician with the  charisma  and  the  popular  support to 
capture the confidence of  restless East Germans.  (ITN, 22.00, 13.11.89) 
It was  exceptional,  though,  to find  extended  analysis  of what  government  reforms 
actually entailed even when initiated by  the  "charismatic"  Hans Modrow.  Only three 
reports from the mainstream bulletins in this sample took the Party up on its rhetoric to 
see  what  it  meant  in  practice.  One  was  by  Nik  Gowing  (Channel  Four  News, 
13.11.89), and the other two were by Olenka Frenkiel (Newsnight,  10 and  13.11.89). 
In  addition,  there  were  three  extended  interviews  with  East  German  government 
officials.  In their tone and the extent to which they accessed voices supportive of the 
leadership, they were less dismissive and more positive than most. 
Nik Gowing reported on the proceedings in parliament on 13 November and saw some 
signs of hope in  Egon Krenz's address to MPs urging them to vote on behalf of  their 
constituencies, not according to the Party line: 
Those words  ... have never before  been heard from  an  East German leader.  They 
are  a  beacon  for  the  future,  although  no  one  yet  knows  whether  a  genuine 
pluralism will  be permitted between any  political groups who choose to stand  in 
elections. But the first signs, from what's only the second-ever live transmission of 
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MP: Let's look truth in the eye!  Our country, the GDR, is in  crisis! 
MP:  We have no time!  The new beginning must start now!  And we must  all  be 
ready to serve with humanity and tolerance  ... (Channel Four News,  13.11.89) 
Most notable in this context were Olenka Frenkiel's feature reports. The first  sounded 
out reaction at Party grass-roots to the government's decisions (10.11.89).  She found 
confusion and scepticism about the exact intentions of  the government and  its chances 
of success.  They  thought  that  the  government  needed  to  go  much  further  by 
constructing a legal, constitutional basis for reforms: 
Reporter:  The Politburo's answer to these  sceptics  came  this  afternoon  when  ... 
they made it very clear that many more radical measures were still to come. 
Krenz:  (ADDRESSING  PARTY  RALLY  NEAR  THE  WALL)  We're  promising  a 
revolution - economically effective, democratic, morally clean, and for everyone  .... 
Reporter: And ... the extent of  that revolution has been presented to an incredulous 
nation  - a  pledge  of free,  democratic,  universal  elections  by  secret  ballot;  an 
enquiry into corruption among senior bureaucrats; and a redeployment of 1200 of 
the hated security police ... down the mines.  (BBC2, Newsnight,  10.11.89) 
Frenkiel's other report was from Dresden, the political constituency of Hans Modrow 
(13.11.89).  At an early point in the film,  we see Modrow at a public rally,  sharing a 
political platform with the city's mayor, Wolfgang Berghofer. Frenkiel describes them 
as "two handsome communists"  with a "vision of  the new socialism, to bring back the 
masses to the Party".  The Mayor is  said to be "hugely popular with the young,  even 
those who reject what the Party saw as its divine right to rule". A young woman invites 
the journalist into her home and, with her two friends,  explains why this is so.  Mayor 
Berghofer, they say,  represents their best hope for positive reform  in  their city  and 
country: 
Inviting  a  Western  television  crew into  your  own  front  room  without  official 
permission would,  a month ago,  have  been unthinkable but now the rules  have 
changed. 
The journalist then  put  the interview  in  context with wider political  and  economic 
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(FILM,  ill-TECH FACTORY FLOOR)  As  the country embarks on its own economic 
perestroika, free debate is  not just permissible,  it's de  rigeur.  Here,  in  Dresden's 
PENT  ACON camera factory,  in  what on  day  may  be  East  Germany's  Silicon 
Valley, upwardly mobile factory managers beg to be allowed to develop their own 
marketing strategies instead of  slavishly following a central plan. 
(BBC2, Newsnight, 13.1l.89) 
Note how the language of  glasnost and perestroika - "the rules have changed",  "free 
debate" - is therefore tied to the language of western social and economic progress -
"silicon valley", "marketing strategies", "upwardly mobile managers". But the journalist 
points out other significant sign-posts that suggest that reform has a long and difficult 
route to follow.  She explains that the regional Communist newspaper  "struggles to 
explain such new heresies to its readers"  but  is  "much more confident to quote a 
clear warning from ... Hans Modrow: (HEADLINE) 'Reformen, Ja! Chaos,  Nein!' ".  In 
otherwords, reform yes but on government terms. Frenkiel also raised the question of 
the  STASI,  the security police,  "whose brutality  and  denunciations  have  ruined  the 
lives of thousands".  She interviewed two such people, a father and son,  both of them 
scientists.  But instead of recalling their past experiences at  the hands of the  STASI, 
they talk about what they want for the GDR in  the future.  Significantly,  their views 
closed the report, without the conventional concluding piece by the journalist: 
Father:  There must  not  be a mixture  but  a certain type  of unification  between 
socialistic, basic rules and what Western people call  democracy and freedom.  And 
this I think is a very new feature in the political field ... 
Son:  The people must demonstrate their opinions, their power, their strength, to 
fight for a better country.  (BBC2,  Newsnight, 13.1l.89) 
The report was followed by an extended interview with Hans Modrow who expanded 
on  the  government's  reform  plans  for  the  future.  Clips  or  "soundbites"  from  the 
interview were featured on the early evening bulletins on BBC 1.  It is only one of  three 
examples  of extended  access  to  an  East  German  government  voice,  the  others 
occurring on Channel Four News  when the newscaster, Jon Snow,  talked at length to 
an economic adviser to the Politburo (1 0.1l.89 and 13.1l.89). 
In  his  special reports for Channel Four News,  Nik Gowing spoke to 9 East German 
workers  (only  one  of them  a  woman)  about  what  they  thought  about  the  whole 
situation and  the government's  proposals for  reform.  These were the people who 
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Some had not even tried to go to the West. ... Others,  at  (an) electro-mechanical 
factory,  had  been  across.  There  were  no  second  thoughts  about  returning  to 
work, today.  They had not even considered staying in  the West.. .. The workers, 
who have long been the bedrock of this socialist state, are now prepared to give 
the new leadership  time  to prove they  really  are  reformers.  They  say  the  final 
proof of  that will  be when the  Communist Party actually  produces  a  genuine 
political pluralism.  (Channel Four News,  13.11.89) 
Their appearance in this context was significant for another reason:  most appearances 
of  'ordinary' East and West Germans  in the news were  'vox pops',  simple expressions 
of  joy and wonderment at what was happening. 
In  summary, then,  these examples are exceptional,  most  of them coming from the 
extended news programmes which allow space much deeper analysis  and discussion, 
and  offer access to oppositional  or alternative  viewpoints  (Schlesinger et ai,  1983  ~ 
McNair 1988).  The general and overwhelming framework was that reform proposals 
from  the  leadership  were  dubious  since  they  came  from  "hardliners"  who  were 
"desperate", "calculating" or just gambling away their positions of  authority. What then 
of  the reform movement's image in the news? How were they viewed as political actors 
and how were their proposals explained within  the prevailing framework? 
The reform movement view 
We  have  already  seen  how  the  reform  movement  was  represented  before  the  Wall 
came down: as a group of naive professional people who believed  they could build a 
'new socialism' in an independent East Germany. The problem remained after the Wall 
was opened.  The opposition was largely  seen  as  one group, Neues Forum,  whose 
representatives played a peripheral role in the drama.  By Monday 13  September, they 
had all  but disappeared from the scene.  This was in  spite of a promising start.  The 
Neues Forum held its first  press conference in  a small  artist's studio in  East Berlin a 
few hours before the Wall opened. The scene was presented as one of spontaneity and 
chaos, an event that signified the startling pace of change underway in East Germany, 
and all over  Eastern Europe: 
(NEUES FORUM PRESS  CONFERENCE)  But most  remarkable  were  the  shambolic 
events which took  in this apartment block in a run-down part of  East Berlin ... The 
small  artist's  studio was bursting with  television  crews  ... so  this  cutting-edge of 
democracy was forced to decamp in pandemonium to a backyard for the very first 
news conference by New Forum (MY EMPHASIS). 
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(NEW FORUM PRESS CONFERENCE) And today  has seen the beginnings of  normal 
politics here.  Members  of the New Forum opposition  group  ... stepped  out  in 
public. No matter that  it was a shabby,  suburban backyard,  they were out in the 
open,  setting out an alternative policy.  (BBC1, 21.00, 9.11.89) 
In some respects,  this image of  the reformers fulfilled their own stated aims.  They saw 
themselves  as  facilitators  (rather  than  agents)  for  change.  One  of Neues  Forum's 
spokespersons told Channel Four News: 
Michael Goebal:  We  don't want to  be  a party.  We think  now we  have  a good 
chance to change something in the GDR....  (Channel Four News, 9.11.89) 
But  their provisional agenda backfired days later when the government announced its 
intention to hold multi-party elections in  1990. Neues Forum balked at the prospect of 
an  imminent  election  campaign.  The  group  had  none  of the  financial  resources  or 
organisational  structure of the Communist  Party.  They  wanted  more  time  and  they 
made their feelings known through the news media.  The response on British television 
news was to pick up on the irony of  their position: 
Suddenly, it's the reformers who want to slow the pace of  reform. 
(BBCl, 18.00, 13.11.89) 
The news media therefore did not see reform as a long-term proposition in the GDR, 
either before or after the Wall  was opened.  The government was not to be trusted and 
the Communist  system was reported to be at an  end.  As for the reform groups, they 
brought  the  crisis  to  a  head  with  their  street  demonstrations  and  were  well-
intentioned,  but  they  were  ultimately  unorganised  by  the  standards  of western 
parliamentary democracy. 
In contrast to the situation before the Wall opened, pressure for reform also came from 
sources  outside  the  GDR.  The  principal  advocates were  the  governments  of West 
Germany,  the  Soviet  Union  and  Britain.  This  though  did  not  represent  a  real 
consensus.  The motives  and  the way  in  which  the media  reported them  were quite 
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The West German government view (FRG) 
As shown above in Table 5.3, there were 7 references in statements by West German 
government sources that advocated reform for the GDR.  These were viewed only as 
short term, transitory measures to stem the refugee exodus and clear the way for unity 
in the near future. For example, Chancellor Kohl promised substantial economic aid on 
condition that Krenz push ahead with a reform programme. BBC reported this  on its 
three evening bulletins on 11  November. Throughout the same sample period, though, 
the news also reported nine statements by the West German leader  about the historical 
inevitability of  German unity.  From this perspective, reform was never seen as an end 
in itself: 
Kohl is sticking by his five conditions for a better relationship  with East Germany: 
a free press, free elections, and so on.  A better relationship is a long way short of 
reunification, of  course, but it would be an important start. 
(BBCl,  17.00, 11.11.89) 
Non-government sources,  of course,  could  put the case  much  more  explicitly.  The 
journalist Thomas Kielinger told Newsnight that reform would hasten the inevitable: 
Kielinger:  We need to liberalise East Germany first. ... but. .. at the same time the 
reunification  process  will  also  develop  further  momentum  and  develop  rather 
quickly!  (BBC2,  9.11.89) 
Of all  official  sources outside the GDR,  the governments of Britain and  the  Soviet 
Union were the most emphatic proponents of the reform option:  but they saw it only 
as a means of keeping German unity at arm's length. Within the prevailing news media 
framework, there the similarity ended. 
The same but different: the British and Soviet view 
Both  Britain  and  the  Soviet  Union  stressed  the  importance  of allowing  the  East 
German people to decide for themselves. The British government spoke about freedom 
and democracy on the march in East Germany and  throughout  Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union praised the East German government for taking the road of  perestroika. 
Despite these similarities, the news reported the two sources  within  different frames 
of reference:  the  British government was pronouncing from  a position of  principle 
and  strength (eight references),  the  Soviets from  a  position of  fear  and  insecurity 
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On the evening of 13 November, Mrs Thatcher made a scheduled foreign policy speech 
at  the Guildhall  in  London  that  was widely  reported by  the news  media.  It was 
previewed on all  ITN and  BBC News bulletins  and  then analysed  and  commented 
upon afterwards.  The essence of her speech was the need for caution in the West to 
events in Eastern Europe. With a touch of  doublespeak,  she told her audience that, 
"The speed of  reform could put the goal of  democracy in danger".  She urged that 'free 
elections' should take place in the GDR first and that East Germans should build their 
own  democracy  with  Western  economic  aid.  The  impulse  behind  this  stance  was 
reported as constructive diplomacy rather than national insecurity.  Eleanor Goodman, 
the political editor for Channel Four News,  thought it was 'obvious' to see what Mrs 
Thatcher was getting at: 
Mrs  Thatcher obViOUSly  doesn't  want  to  do  anything  to  undennine  .... President 
Gorbachev and, indeed, she's been in contact with him ... and reassured him that she 
isn't trying to court Germany.  (Channel 4 News,  13.11.89) 
For some,  the idea that Mrs Thatcher could break up the Warsaw Pact and  "court" 
Germany was "daft".6 There were certainly other ways of looking at Britain's attitude. 
Many  press  accounts  suggested that  Thatcher's  public  rhetoric  belied  Britain's  own 
fears and insecurities about what was happening in Eastern Europe. The Guardian, for 
example,  reported that the government had  "diverted  extra intelligence  resources to 
watch  developments  in  Europe  as  the  pace  of  change  overturns  traditional 
assumptions,  depriving  Whitehall  of a  coherent  response".  What  really  worried 
"officials" was that "Mrs Thatcher is unprepared and unsure about how to react".1 A 
Sunday Times item suggested that the events in  Berlin helped  deflect  public  opinion 
away from a turbulent  period in  Thatcher's premiership. 8 
In  contrast  to  their  view  of British  policy,  the  news  media  reported  the  Soviet 
government's position as being insecure and in need of  assurances. On the surface, the 
Soviets were reported to be quite relaxed and open about the dramatic events in East 
Berlin: 
In Moscow, there's no sense of crisis or crisis management...because at this stage 
the Soviet leadership believes the shake-up in East Berlin is a much needed change 
for the better.  (Channel Four News, 9.11.89) 
The  official  line  today  was  that  while  the  speed  of developments  came  as  a 
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Yet these same reports interpreted this as the Soviets putting a brave face  on a very 
bad  situation.  Unlike the Prime Minister, they were running scared: 
Events in East Germany are being viewed with more alarm (in Moscow) than the 
changes in any other Warsaw Pact ally.  (lTN, 22.00, 9.1l.89) 
But the fear in the Kremlin must be that events may be running out of  control and 
military loyalty may be endangered.  (BBCl, 18.00, 10.11.89) 
Furthermore,  reports  framed  the  Soviet  Union's  position  on  the  GDR  against  the 
background of current unrest in  some of its republics, especially in Moldavia where 
Soviet troops were deployed to quell 'nationalist unrest'.  News bulletins kept a close 
watch on developments there throughout the period and in  one instance a newscaster 
made a  more explicit link  between  Moscow's attitudes to events in  Berlin and  the 
military intervention in Moldavia: 
The Soviet news agency, TASS, has welcomed the dismantling of  the Berlin Wall 
as positive and important.  But as  they welcomed the reforms in  East Germany, 
more nationalist unrest was reported in one of  their own republics: 
(BBC1, 17.00, 1l.11.89) 
The  implication  here  was  that  it  could  not  afford  be  too liberal  in  its  attitude to 
Eastern Europe because this would set a bad example to those republics  - the BaItics, 
Armenia, Georgia  - wanting more independence.  Channel Four News  broached the 
problem quite explicitly: 
The other imponderable for Mr Gorbachev is what effect this will have on his own 
people.  Today,  as  always,  they  are  queuing  up  at  the  American  embassy  in 
Moscow for visas to emigrate.  They want out of the Soviet Union.  So, too, do 
the people of  the Baltics, of  Azerbijan and Armenia: for them, the Berlin Wall  is a 
powerful  symbol.  "It  would  be  good if it  could  happen  here",  one  man  said 
(10.1l.89). 
The Nine O'Clock News reported that such sentiments would meet with a less liberal 
response from the Kremlin than that afforded to Eastern Europe: 
The Soviet Union has taken a benign view of the changes so far  but,  tonight,  it 
warned  that  it  would  take  a  different  attitude  to  similar  moves  inside  its  own 
borders.  The Kremlin  ordered  the  republics  of Latvia,  Lithuania,  Estonia,  and 
Azerbijan  to  drop  the  new  laws  they  passed  to  give  themselves  greater 
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The item  drew very clear and definite conclusions from this,  suggesting that,  in  the 
final analysis, the official Soviet attitude could not be taken at face value: 
The contrast between Mr Gorbachev's laissez-faire attitude in Eastern Europe and 
his hard  line at home will  increase the discontent that's been building up  here  [in 
Moscow], and an explosion of  unrest within the Soviet Union, or a loss of control 
in  Eastern Europe,  could  give  Kremlin  conservatives  the  excuse  they've  been 
seeking to jettison perestroika (lO.11.89) 
Option Two:  The two Germanys should remain separate 
The German Question and the Fear of  Germany 
The  German  Question  - 'Should  Germany  be  reunited?'  - was  one  of the  major 
unresolved issues of the post-war period.  Yet while  it  informed  much of East-West 
relations during the Cold War, both sides preferred to leave it unanswered, paying lip-
service to the ideal of unity some time  in  the distant future.  The US  current affairs 
magazine,  Newsweek,  devoted  a  seven-page  cover story to a  re-examination of the 
German  Question:  "The  Two  Germanys:  When  will  the  Wall  come  down?".9  The 
journalist, Michael Meyer said that to visit the Wall was  "to witness not only the cold 
war past, but also  to see a symbol of  the future.  Everywhere there are signs of a new 
realism,  as  if to  say:  this  is  the way  it  is  and  this  is  the  way  it  will  be  ... The  two 
Germanys will  never again be one".  Meyer concluded with an  emphatic declaration: 
"The German Question is dead". 
The  framework  of the  item  reveals  much  about  why  it  appeared.  West  Germany's 
NATO allies were in a panic about its unilateral policies towards the East, particularly 
the  Soviet Union.  Anglo-German relations were becoming particularly  strained  over 
the proposed modernisation of  short range nuclear missiles. Worse still, it seemed that 
public opinion in  West Germany was clearly supportive of the government line.  The 
country could no  longer serve as  a site  for NATO's nuclear missiles,  as  the West's 
frontline in  a future war with the Soviet Union.  The question on western minds was 
what would happen to NATO and the EC if West Germany should drift away towards 
neutrality,  even unification with  the GDR?  Meyer argued that no one really wanted 
German unity or neutrality: it would be a complete disaster for the East  as well as the 
West.  To reinforce his  argument, he  highlighted the controversial views of the West 
German historian, Arnulf Baring.  Baring had just published a book called Unser neuer 
Groessenwahn (or Our New Megalomania) which argued that Germany needed to stay 
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leadership. Meyer selected a certain strand in Baring's argument which is couched in a 
very confessional third person plural. For example, Baring thought the idea that there 
could  be a  new,  united  and  neutral  Germany  was  symptomatic  of the  old  German 
megalomania,  a  dangerous  confusion  of superiority  and  inferiority  complexes.  "We 
Germans", he wrote, "are developing an  exaggerated image of ourselves  .... There is  a 
powerful urge to overestimate ourselves, to rationally believe we Germans can move 
mountains". Within the interpretative framework of  Meyer's article, Baring's reflections 
take on a somewhat different meaning from that intended:  if the Germans can't trust 
themselves, then the West can't trust them.  Meyer concluded that although they "no 
longer have the power to plunge the world into misery", they "do retain the ability to 
hurt (themselves) - and the (Atlantic) alliance".  He admitted that Baring's views were 
rather extreme yet he still gave it prominence over mainstream German opinion which -
from  a  US  perspective  - dared  to  challenge  the  idea  that  the  West  needed  to 
'modernise' nuclear defence at all costs. 
The new Bush administration moved to solve the crisis with its own public relations 
campaign. It aimed to put the case for 'modernisation' in  a way palatable for German 
tastes.  Rather  than  bully  and  cajole  the  Germans  into  conforming  - which  was 
Margaret  Thatcher's strategy - Bush played the 'good cop' role, playing-up Germany's 
economic prowess and leadership potential.  Germany would  become greatest among 
equals in Europe and the United States' most important European ally.  This campaign 
was  readily  apparent  at  the  divisive  NATO  summit  in  Bonn,  in  May  1989,  and 
contrasts with Thatcher's strained  photo-sessions with the West German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl.  Thatcher's relationship with Ronald Reagan personified the myth of the 
'Special  Relationship'  between Britain  and  the  US.  It was  not  quite  the  same  with 
George Bush. 
Just nine days before the opening of the Berlin Wall,  Conor Cruise O'Brien published 
an  article  in  The  Times  with  the  rather  alarming  title:  "Beware,  The  Reich  Is 
Reviving" .  10 It began with reference to a speech by the US President George Bush in 
which he "affirmed"  a new American relationship with the Federal Republic based on 
equality rather than dominance. This, thought 0' Brien,  was quite a significant foreign 
policy  shift  given the  rapid  changes taking  place  in  Eastern Europe.  It was only  a 
matter  of time  before  the  Soviet  empire  disintegrated  completely  and  the  two 
Germanys  reunified  with  full  American  endorsement.  A  new  German  Reich  would 
establish economic hegemony "  ... extending from the Aran islands off the West coast of 
Ireland  to Vladivostock".  With great nationalist  fervour,  the  united  Germany  would 
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recover the past glories of  the Third Reich. A statue of  Adolf Hitler would be erected 
in  every town. Nazi ideas of racial purity would revive to regain respectability among 
and through the scientific community. German history and thus the people of  the new 
empire would be purged of  the burden of  guilt over the Holocaust. 
The benefit of hindsight allows us to see that some of O'Brien's vision seems to have 
come true.  German reunification has taken place.  The  Soviet  Union has collapsed. 
Neo-Nazi  attacks on immigrants  and  ethnic  minorities  are  on the increase  allover 
Europe. Only time will tell about the rest. When he wrote his article, though,  O'Brien 
gave voice to the hitherto unspeakable. His nightmare vision of  a new, united Germany 
was  by  no  means  exceptional  or  eccentric.  It  fitted  easily  into  a  pre-existing 
propaganda framework about Germany and the Germans that had deep historical roots 
but which the West conveniently put to bed at the onset of  the Cold War. 
Indeed,  since the Wall  opened,  talk  about  German  reunification  and  what  it  might 
entail for Europe and the world over the next few decades was conducted in  a verbal 
minefield.  Public figures tread an indeterminate and hazardous line between what was 
thinkable in  private and sayable in  public.  For example,  Timothy Garton Ash called 
articles like  O'Brien's  "wild  and  offensive"  and  not  at  all  conducive to constructive 
debate.ll Yet, the editor of  New European, John Coleman, referred to it  in  a letter to 
the  Times to sound  a  warning  against  European federalism;  the  idea  being  that  a 
united Germany would become an  overwhelming economic and  political force rather 
than an asset in  a federal  Europe. I2  Across the Atlantic, New  York Times columnist, 
A.M. Rosentahl, called on the West to come to terms with the unpleasant realities of 
German history: 
I search through the endless newspaper columns about the German wave rolling 
towards unification, but I cannot find any of the  words I am looking for. 
I cannot hear them in the drone of experts mustered up for TV nor in the Sunday 
talk shows about how unification is all just a matter of  time, now very little time. 
And when the leaders of so many nations issue their carefully crafted statements 
about how the will of the German people must be honoured (sic), the words are 
not there either. 
These are some of  the words: Jew, Auschwitz, Rotterdam, Polish untermenschen, 
Leningrad, slave labour (sic),  crematorium, Holocaust, Nazi. 
Strange how even speaking the words, which after all  are at least as much a part 
of German history as of Jewish, Polish, Dutch, or Soviet,  is  already considered 
inappropriate, vulgar, emotional, not really fit  for decent political discussion about 
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In Britain,  the domestic  rows in July 1990 over the 'Chequers  Memorandum' and the 
Ridley Affair'  followed the same line of debate.  However, Giuliano Ferrara suggests 
that ambiguities such as these may have had a negative impact on public understanding 
of  the new, emerging Germany: 
In  Europe,  there  is  a  new  party:  the  fear  of Germany.  Perhaps  anti-German 
feelings ... concerns  (sic)  primarily  the  chancelleries,  the  ruling  classes,  the 
intellectuals, the journalists, the historians, the churches and other mediators of  the 
public  conscience  .... (who)  are  competing  to  fan  the  flames  of the  mistrust, 
suspicion and questioning of  German intentions. 14 
In the following sections,  I will  show how a certain negative vision of a new united 
Germany  emerges  from  press  coverage  in  Britain  in  the  first  days  after  the  Wall 
opened.  This  contrasted with  television  news  discourse  which  appeared  to cohere 
around the centrist, pro-European federalist position in public debate. 
The Press 
As I have indicated in earlier chapters, the popular tabloids took a largely, upbeat and 
positive  approach to what  was  happening  in  Berlin.  For them,  this  was  a  very  big 
human interest story and they did not devote much space to  the long-term political or 
economic implications.  Their attitude to the prospect of German unity was to accept 
its  inevitability  but  in  some  cases  with  large  doses  of fear  and  loathing.  The 
broadsheets were rather more circumspect in their views.  Whether in leader comment 
or op-ed pieces,  journalists took the cautious stance of the politicians  and  experts. 
Nonetheless,  it is possible to glean fragments of  doubt and anxiety from their writing. 
Some writers argued that Cold War fears about the strategic implications of a united 
Germany  were somewhat out  of  date. A loose confederation of German states rather 
than a united  Germany would, said the Scotsman,  "calm the fears of  those worried by 
the possible re-emergence of a monolithic  Germany dominating Europe"  .15  The  real 
concern lay in  the new Germany's ability  to establish  hegemony throughout Europe 
without military force.  "What should worry the West", warned The Daily Mail,  "is the 
possibility that this  Greater Germany,  possessing the most  powerful  economy in  all 
Europe, will - prompted by ancestral voices - leave its Western moorings and tum its 
mighty energies and ambitions towards the Danube and beyond". 16  The Sunday Times 
thought that the events in Berlin marked "the first step towards the creation of  an 80m-
strong Fourth German Reich".  Like the Daily Mail,  it envisaged this as  an economic 
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Minister  Genscher's  thinking  on  "the  benign  nature  of  Germany's  ambitions". 
According to Ellis,  "Genscher is  a long term advocate of the democratic  efficacy of 
trade. He recognises that industrial imperialism is an honourable alternative to war" .18 
Indeed, had A.M. Rosentahl browsed through the British press, he would have found 
them full  of the words that,  in  his  view,  western leaders found  too "inappropriate, 
vulgar, emotional" for their "carefully crafted statements".  The Sun 'spoke its mind' on 
the question of a united Germany and offered several reasons  "Why It Won't Be All 
Reich  On The Night"  for the West.  It noted the  readiness  of some  in  the West to 
welcome and even hasten the prospect of German reunification.  Yet,  it  complained, 
"no  one has really explained just why a greater Germany would be  so  desirable for 
Britain or the rest of the world".  The past record wasn't encouraging:  "Twice in  this 
century,  Germany dominated Europe.  Twice she plunged the world into war  ... Twice 
German ambitions had  to be frustrated  at  an  enormous cost in  misery  and  blood". 
Now that the prospect of one Germany was  again in  view,  The  Sun concluded that 
given  the  chance,  the  Germans  might  do  it  again:  "Unshackled  once  more,  the 
Germans might well decide to seek, in that time-worn phrase of  their rulers for the past 
century, 'a place in the sun'  ".  The worst aspect would be the guessing.  What would 
they look for next?  "More captive markets? More living space?"  The only certainty 
was that whatever the Germans do,  "they will  not  set  out to spread joy and  benefit 
humanity". 19 
The News of  the  World thought it  right that "wise statesmen" in  the West should be 
alarmed at the "real prospect" of a united Germany.  They had to get together quickly 
with  leaders of the East to talk about  security otherwise  "today's joy could  swiftly 
become tomorrow's terror".20  Woodrow Wyatt,  the  "Voice of Reason",  betrayed  a 
palpable  sense  of confusion  about  whom  to  fear  most,  Russia  or  a  new  united 
Germany.  For example,  he  recalled  that Germany was divided  after the war to give 
"protection to Russia against another Hitlerian type onslaught.  II  When Russia became 
the new enemy, Stalin used East Germany as  a " launching pad from which to threaten 
western Europe". However, it  seemed from Wyatt's point of view that this was okay 
since  "a divided Germany was a guarantee against a new German military menace". 
Now with  the  Wall  down,  the  guarantee  was  gone.  "We  face  a  momentous  fact. 
Germany is  about to be reunited .... Are you  frightened? I am".  What was there to be 
frightened of? Wyatt listed his reasons. A combined German economy would dominate 
Europe:  the  West  German  economy  was  already  "turning  destitute  Poland  into  its 
economic vassal". A combined German army would threaten Europe.  And, worse still, 
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The Daily Mirror set  out to answer some of the questions it  claimed  people  were 
asking in the wake of  the Berlin Wall's demise, one of  which was  "Would a reunified 
Germany go to war again?"  The reply was in the British 'stiff-upper-lip' mould:  "We 
can only hope they have learned their lesson  after  two world wars" .22  In a similar 
vein, Martin W oollacott reflected on the essence of  Britain's national consciousness in 
light of  events in  Berlin.  "Britain",  he  said,  "has  spent the last  1  00 years fighting 
against  the facts  of German  power:  indeed  our modern  national  identity  has  been 
forged in the fires of  the great conflict with Germany while our sense of moral  worth 
rests in part on our role in the defeat of  Nazism.  23  And William Russell noted that "for 
many people in eastern Europe  a divided  Germany is  seen as a guarantee that  never 
again will Germany embark on the kind of  predatory actions which caused the Second 
World War".24 
The Sunday  Express leader,  "Germany:  the joy and the jeopardy"  put the German 
Question  in  subtle context with Britain's objections to EC policy.  It was a case of 
"Steady! Stop! Think!" on any number of "vexed questions" such as "Is this really the 
time  for  all  of Europe  to  put  its  fortunes  irrevocably  into  the  hands  of the 
Bundesbank?".25  Norman Tebbit  recalled  that  he  forecasted  German  reunification  a 
year  earlier  but  was  dismissed  out of hand.  He thought  it  would  almost  certainly 
damage NATO and wondered  "if in  10 year's time all the optimism about the dawn of 
wonderful  new times in  Europe will  have  worn  a  little  thin". 26  Alexander McLeod 
feared  that  a  new  German  superpower  would  sooner  or  later  assert  it  military 
independence and "face a standing temptation to  ... play off Western Europe with what 
remains of  the Soviet empire. It would, in short, be a dynamo of instability at Europe's 
heart, much as it was until  1945 ... Suddenly, the spectre of a united fatherland is back 
on  the  agenda" .27  John  Keegan  argued  that,  "German  reunification  will  bring 
disarmament to Europe - except in the one country  which the victor nations of 1945 
determined should not rise again as a great military power, Germany itself'  .28 
Television news 
Television journalists did  not air the more extreme scenarios of  a united Germany  that 
appeared  in  the  press.  But they  did  report  the fact  that  for  official  and  unofficial 
opinion in  East and  West,  a united  Germany did  not  seem  such a good idea.  At 
times,  the language which reporters used belied their working assumptions,  as  when 
Michael Brunson,  ITN's political correspondent, asked Mrs Thatcher, "Are there any 
dangers  of the  possible  reunification  of the  Germanys?"  (my  emphasis).  Geoffrey 
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of militarism" among Western politicians but remarked that "some anxieties are bound 
to  be  expressed"  by  "old  soldiers"  in  Remembrance  ceremonies  (ITN,  13.00, 
10.11.89).  A  BBC  journalist remarked that: 
The talk of German unity may  scare many  people who  remember that  a united 
Germany started two world wars.  But the Germans are now anxious to reassure 
the world.  (BBC1, 18.00, 10.11.89) 
There was also the reality that the two Germanys were divided by a host of barriers: 
economic, social, ideological and cultural.  The news did not ignore this in spite of  the 
'good news'  value of  the story on a human-interest level. 
In western popular culture Berlin was the Cold War city,  full  of spies from the CIA 
and the KGB,  MI5 and the Stasi. It was the place where spies were exchanged and 
defectors defected. It was a potential flash-point where the forces of 'good' (the West) 
and 'evil' (the East) faced each other in perpetual stand-off It was a secular 'city on the 
hill-top':  a visible and perpetual reminder to the West why capitalism was 'better' than 
communism. West Berlin was "a beating capitalist heart in a Communist body"  where 
the streets were alive and full  of shops offering an  abundance of goods and  services. 
East Berlin was a drab  and  grey place and  its  shops offered  much  less in  terms of 
consumer choice and quality.29 In the West,  they drove BMWs and Mercedes Benz~ in 
the East, they chugged around in Trabants and Wartburgs. For some journalists,  these 
differences remained despite the collapse of  the Berlin Wall,  and despite the allusions 
to unity: 
I went across to the East. .. and the contrast is  still  striking: it's cold,  it's dark, the 
lights are dim over there. It's a bright exciting place here in the West. 
(ITN, 22.00, 13.11.89) 
But for more revealing indicators of how television news saw opposition to short to 
medium  term unification, we have to look at how they mediated public opinion.  As 
shown in  Table 5.1,  the greatest single sources of opposition to unity are Eastern -
the GDR (10 references) and the Soviet Union (12 references). However,  it becomes 
apparent from Table 5.3, below, that there were as  many negative references to unity 
from the West - from NATO countries. Taken as an East-West aggregate, this works 
out evenly at 22 references from each side.  As with section one, on the issue of  reform 
in  the GDR,  a look at the framework  of  meaning  in  these references occur reveals 
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Table 5.3: Visions of a new Germany 
Short-medium term options for the two Germanys  after fall of  the Berlin Wall as 
debated  on BBe News  and ITN,  9  -13 November  1989 (References from 
reported statements,  direct statements, and interview responses) 
OPTION 2: Two Germanys should remain separate 
Governments 
OPT  GDR  USSR  FRG  US  FRA  GB 
2  7  10  - 2  1  6 
The GDR Government 
TOT 
26 
The government's opposition to any talk of German unity  - short-term or long-term  -
was reported within the same prevailing negative framework used to report its reform 
proposals.  Its resistance was  seen as a reactionary attitude informed by its instinct for 
self-preservation at all  costs.  Thus when Helmut Kohl  arranged a meeting to discuss 
the situation,  on  11  November,  "the embattled" Egon Krenz made his  position clear. 
His statement was reported on all bulletins from early evening,  11  November and was 
headline news on the BBC's main bulletin: 
Egon Krenz says he'll talk to Chancellor Kohl but reunification will not be on the 
agenda.  (BBC 1, 2l.  00,  1l.1l.  89) 
It was  reported  that  "talks  would  be  about  improving  relations  between  the  two 
countries" (BBC1, 17.00) and that for Krenz,  "the stability of  Europe depends on East 
Germany surviving as  a separate state"  (BBC1,  2l.00). Hans Modrow repeated this 
line on 13  November on his election as Prime Minister (BBC2, Newsnight,  13.11.89). 
John  Simpson remarked that whatever about Krenz's opposition,  reunification  "may 
force  its  way on  (to the agenda)  like  it  or not"  (BBC1,  17.00,  2l.00, and  BBC2, 
Newsview). 
The GDR reform movement 
The  reform  movement  was  also  advocated  separate  Gennanys  but  this  was  hardly 
considered throughout the coverage.  The one instance in which it was given access to 
express its view ended in farce.  One of  Neues Fornm's  co-founders,  Professor Jens 
Reich,  took part in  a studio discussion on Newsnight (BBC2,  10.11.89). He told the 
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Reich: if it  comes to serious choice,  everybody will  think twice before giving up 
what we have here from the socialist achievements. And I think not many will  be 
ready to option for elbow society, for competitive society where life is hard. Well, 
it's more affluent but I think they will prefer to have some of  the old social ideals. 
I'm simply convinced. 
However,  opposite  Thomas  Kielinger,  a  West  German  journalist,  Professor  Reich 
came across as shy and quite nervous on television.  His English was not as fluent  as 
that of  Kielinger and he was unable to speak as concisely and forcefully.  Whenever he 
tried to convey something of what his  group  stood for,  and  what they rejected,  he 
sounded  hesitant and uncertain. He was totally unprepared for the piece of television 
theatre that was to follow when, a short time later, the discussion was disrupted by an 
unexpected and dramatic entrance (see Photo Sequence 5,  below): 
Snow:  Now look,  we're joined by  our reporter Olenka Frenkiel...who's  walking 
into the studio with a large brick in her hand. Olenka, what have you here? 
Frenkiel: Here is a brick from the Berlin Wall,  symbol of  your trip here (pLACES 
IT ON COFFEE TABLE, AND EXITS). 
At this point, Kielinger  presided priest-like over the brick and gave a long sermon to 
Reich  on the glories  of capitalism,  dismissing  his  fears  as  unreasonable.  His  vision 
seemed to sum up what Reich and his colleagues  feared most about the opening of  the 
Berlin Wall and its long-term implications: 
Kielinger:  And  once  they  start  on  that  liberal,  free-wheeling  way  of ours, 
Professor  Reich,  they  will  become  a  competitive  society.  Never  mind  about 
elbowing!  We don't want to be brutal capitalists in the West but that's the way it 
goes! Once you let liberty fly easy and unfettered ..... people will begin to  develop 
their entrepreneurial skills and become competitive. And we don't like some of  the 
ills of  capitalism. We hate them! We hate each other's guts because we get on each 
other's nerves.  We're  impatient  with  one  another.  (SHRUGS)  And  yet  that's  the 
price you pay for freedom!  (BBC2 Newsnight,  10.11.89) News after the Wall  142 
Photo Sequence 5 (Newsnight, BBC2, 10.11.89) 
"We're joined by our reporter OlenkaFrenkiel...who's  walking into the studio 
with a large brick in  her hand" 
And we don't like some of the ills of capitalism. We hate them!  We hate each 
other's guts because we get on each other's nerves. We're impatient with one 
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A  BBC  news  analysis  programme  seemed  to  share Kielinger's  view  that  the East 
Germans would soon come round to the idea of  unity: 
East Germans remained reluctant to admit straight out they wanted reunification. 
(BBCl, On The Record, 13.10, 12.11.89) 
Yet the reform movement was speaking for a large majority of  East Germans when it 
advocated an independent East Germany. The News At Ten reported that: 
reunification may stay a dream for the West. Most East Germans don't want it. 
(ITN, 22.00, 13.11.89) 
However, this has to be considered along with very different results of opinion polls. 
BBC News reported one which claimed that 60% East Germans wanted unity (BBCl, 
13.00, 13.11.89).  A telephone survey of 1000 East Germans was conducted by MORl 
for the London Weekend Television programme, Eyewitness. It asked if they believed 
reunification was a good idea: 38% said it was, 48% said it was not, and  14%) did not 
know.30 Channel Four News reported a West German newspaper poll that suggested 
official  German  opinion was somewhat  out of touch with the  popular mood  in  the 
GDR.  It claimed that 74% of East Germans (from a sample of 1000) were against 
unity: 
The discovery that ordinary East Germans are rather less enthusiastic about it all is 
only dawning slowly here (in West Germany). ... There's no  doubt  that the West 
German government sees the economy as the motor driving  the two Germanys 
towards reunification.  That's more than the East Germans had bargained for and 
that includes the opposition. They want economic aid but not to lose control over 
their own affairs .... Much still divides the two Germanys and it would be premature 
to see one German state emerging inevitably after the tearing down of  the Berlin 
Wall  (13.11.89). 
This fear in East Germany of being swallowed up by the bigger, fatter counterpart in 
the West was presented in very stark terms by a journalist on Newsnight. He remarked 
that: 
it's  the relative  poverty of the East  Germans  which  increases the  possibility of 
West Germany patronising them and, in their eagerness to embrace them, ramming 
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The Same But Different: The Soviet and British View 
Section One showed how the news treated almost identical Soviet and British positions 
on reform within somewhat different frames.  News reports  took the same approach 
when reporting Soviet and  British reservations about discussions of unification.  The 
main Soviet spokesperson was Gennady Gerasimov, who maintained throughout that 
any discussion of the future for the two Germanys had to take place with a view to 
geo-political and strategic realities: 
Gerasimov  said  it  was  unrealistic  to  talk  of reunification  between  the  two 
Germanys.  He said  Europe was  divided  as  a result  of war and  the  forming  of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact - it would be almost impossible to unite over such a 
great divide.  (BBCl, 13.00, 10.11.89) 
Gerasimov  also  backed  Egon  Krenz's  view  that  the  two  countries  had  to  remain 
separate for the sake of stability in Europe (ITN, 1740, 10.11.89). 
The British government,  like the Soviets, argued that public debate was "going much 
too  fast"  in  talking  about  German  unity  (Margaret  Thatcher,  all  ITN  bulletins, 
10.11.89),  and  that  even  its  medium-term  prospect  would  jeopardise  current 
conventional disarmament talks in Vienna (CFE) and,  ultimately, the stability of East-
West relations (ITN,  20.45,  BBCl 22.00,  12.11.89).  The official Labour line  hardly 
differed.  ITN reminded the  Shadow Foreign Minister,  Gerald  Kaufinan,  of his  most 
recent pronouncement on the 'German Question': 
Newscaster:  Mr Kaufinan,  you  said  on a visit  to Poland,  last  month (October 
1989), "Any talk of German reunification is  premature". Have last night's events 
changed your  view?" 
Kaufman: [  ... ] One day, it may be that reunification of  Germany can be right at the 
top of  the agenda. But I think it ought to be the conclusion of the process rather 
than  the start  ... because we've got to think  carefully  what  a  reunified  Germany 
would mean for Europe, whether it would be a vacuum ... a wild card. We've got to 
think what (it) would mean for the  .... negotiations on disarmament. .. 
(ITN, 13.00, 10.11.89) 
However,  in  spite  of these  similarities,  there  were  suggestions  in  the  press  and 
television  news of  a hidden  Soviet  agenda.  George Walden  summed  up  the  West's 
worst Cold War nightmare: that the Soviets would "[ ... ] some  day  play  the 'German 
card'  - that is,  propose the  reunification  of  Germany on the basis of neutrality  in the 
hope of weakening NATO, removing  the Americans  from  Europe,  eliminating the 
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in Europe"  .31  Dominic Lieven thought that rather than waste time running against the 
tide,  Gorbachev  might  better  "accept  self-determination  for  the  Germans,  link 
reunification to the principle of  no foreign armies on German soil, and seek thereby to 
take the moribund Warsaw Pact and NATO to the grave".32  Norman Stone quoted 
Lenin to highlight what he saw as the inherent dangers should the Soviets play this 
'German Card': " 'We shall hang the capitalists with rope that they themselves will have 
sold us' ".33  Within a few weeks of the Wall opening,  Stone reckoned that the noose 
would begin to tighten as,  "The West  Germans will  be fed  up  with East  Germans 
working for lower wages and occupying scarce housing. The Poles and Hungarian may 
deafen us with recriminations  about borders.  The West  Germans  may  make  noises 
about  leaving  NATO,  and  the  EEC  may  become  intolerably  strained  because  the 
British  and  the Americans  pull  away  from  the  Germans" .34  In  a  special  report  on 
Newsnight, Jeremy Paxman  suggested that, 
there are others who think  ... Mr Gorbachev may have considered the implications 
of  possible unity and not found them entirely distasteful. 
These 'others' were represented by a  BBC World Service journalist who told him that: 
Tim  Whewell:  In the long run, [Gorbachev] must be thinking of  a way of  reducing 
American influence in Europe, even though he's got no card to play against that. 
He can't play the card of  the Warsaw Pact if it's going to crumble by itself.  And I 
think one possibility he must now be beginning to think about is of a reunified but 
neutral Germany.  (22.30, 10.11.89) 
FRG Government 
Official  West  German  oplruon  solidly  adhered  to  the  rhetoric  of unity  - crafting 
speeches and statements to the media around popular ideas and phrases such as  "one 
people, one fatherland".  John Simpson followed Chancellor Kohl on his state visit to 
Poland (which he had to interrupt to rush to Berlin).  One feature of the visit which 
Simpson highlighted in a series of  reports was the rapturous reception given to Kohl by 
ethnic Germans in Poland. The reporter contextualised their nationalistic slogans - "We 
are and remain German!",  "Helmut, you are our Chancellor, too!" - with concurrent 
events in Berlin (BBC 1. 22.00, 12.11.89),  and  he noted that, 
the  unlikely,  cumbersome  figure  of Chancellor  Kohl  has  emerged  in  his  true 
importance as a representative of  German power in middle Europe. 
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However, Kohl received a different reception when he  addressed  a public  rally with 
Willy Brandt and other leading politicians in West Berlin, on 10 November.  When he 
mentioned German unity, the crowd began to hiss and jeer despite pleas from Brandt 
and others to hear him out. That was not so widely reported. Most news reports that 
evening referred to it briefly and in positive light.  Some quoted the various references 
to unity (BBC2, Newsnight).  Others  focused on the  historic resonance of the speech, 
its location at the Brandenburg Gate, with Kennedy's famous visit in 1962 (lTN, 17.40, 
22.00).  Only one made a light reference to the level of  protest in the crowd: 
A banner in the crowd said no to a united Germany. 
(BBCl, 18.00 & 21.00, 10.11.89) 
Among the press, most reports the next day were that Kohl  addressed "thousands of 
cheering Berliners",  35  while  The  Guardian  said  only  that the  crowd  "reserved their 
greatest enthusiasm" for Willy Brandt.36 The Daily Express reported that Kohl "had to 
shout above the cheers as he spoke".  37 The truth finally emerged in a Newsnight report 
by Julian O'Haloran (13.1l.89).  He referred to the speech in context with the growing 
discontent about the East German 'refugee problem' and gave a much more accurate 
picture of  what happened with the evidence on film: 
(Pictures of  Kohl struggling to speak) Indeed, so unpopular was Chancellor Kohl's 
message  with  sections of the  crowd  ... that  at  times  he  was  in  danger  of being 
drowned out altogether. Mr Kohl had been given a hard time by the crowd before 
he even uttered a word.  It was an  acutely embarrassing occasion for Herr Willy 
Brandt. ... and ... Mayor  ... Walter Momper.  (BBC2, 13.1l.89) 
News  reports  also  featured  dissenting  German  oplruon  (4  references~  see  Fig.5.1 
above).  The main opposition party in the Federal Republic was the Social Democratic 
Party  (SPD).  However,  under  the  country's  federal  system,  it  was  the  party  of 
government  in  West  Berlin.  The  Mayor  was  Walter  Momper,  the  city's  main 
spokesperson throughout the period.  He was critical of Kohl's  reunification rhetoric 
because it  endangered the positive relationships between the two Germanys that had 
been nurtured by Ostpolitik and the Inter-German treaty 1972. His alternative to unity 
was to maintain the status quo as far  as  national boundaries were concerned but to 
establish Berlin as  a free, or at least,  open city.  This would take full  advantage of  the 
new  opportunities for  more  liberal  trade  and  cultural  links  between  the  two  halves 
without  upsetting  East- West  aspirations  or  sensibilities  (Channel  Four  News, 
13.11.89).  The former German Chancellor, Helmut  Schmidt,  thought German  unity 
unlikely given the Soviet Union's strategic stake in the GDR (BBC1, 22.00, 12.11.89). News after the Wall  147 
French Government 
The French government's attitude to unity was presented  in  the  news  as  somewhat 
ambiguous. The Telegraph reported that, "Latent but deeply held fears of a powerful, 
reunified Germany surfaced in France yesterday as Paris officially welcomed the East 
German people's new freedom".38 Patrick Marnham described a cartoon in the French 
newspaper, Le Figaro, which he thought "summed up the nation's subconscious fears". 
The cartoon was in three parts: 
The first frame showed a pair of  jackboots facing each other across a crack in the 
ground. The second showed the crack closing up with the boots now placed side 
by side. In the last frame,  one of  the boots was taking its first step. It was a goose 
step,  and  few  French  readers  will  have  thought  that the boots  were  marching 
east.  39 
ITN presented it as a stark contrast of  opposing political viewpoints: 
In  France,  Prime  Minister  Rocard  said  unified  Germany  would  help  anchor  a 
lasting  peace  in  Europe,  but  ex-President  Giscard  d'Estaing  said  reunification 
would pose new problems.  (ITN, 1740, 10.11.89) 
The government claimed  to support the idea  of unity  in  principle  but  saw it  as  no 
reason to slow the pace ofEC integration. The Independent argued that "Although one 
of Britain's interests has always been to prevent anyone power from  dominating the 
continent  of Europe,  the  French  government  has  been  much  quicker  ... to  see  the 
possibility  of a  Europe  dominated  by  Germany,  and  to  conclude  that  a  Europe 
dominated by the EC would be preferable".4o  The Nine O'Clock News went to Paris to 
gauge French reaction to developments in Berlin.  A report opened with shots showing 
preparations for Armistice Day,  "a reminder of the history that brings caution to the 
French response". Furthermore: 
A  reunified  Germany  could  endanger  the  main  objective  of post-war  French 
foreign policy  ... a special relationship that would put France and West Germany at 
the heart of the new Europe  ... (and)  tonight,  some French politicians  expressed 
concern about a headlong rush towards one Germany.  (BBC1, 10.11.89) 
President Mitterand wondered why disintegration of  Eastern Europe should cause the 
dislocation  of Western  Europe - a  remark  that  belied  French  fears  about  German 
dominance on matters  economic and strategic. The Times reported that "the prospect 
of  a reunited Germany throwing its even greater weight around Europe is unacceptable 
to Paris" and that"  ... the French keenly resent the way the European Monetary System 
has  effectively  enslaved  France's  economy  to  the  stern  disciplines  of  the News after the Wall  148 
Bundesbank".41 Indeed, just before the Wall opened,  Rella Pick reported that "France 
is considering a motion to invoke the quadripartite agreement on Berlin and calls for a 
meeting of the US, Britain, the Soviet union and  France to ensure that the status of 
Berlin remains inviolable when the Berlin Wall,  and all  it  symbolises,  comes crashing 
down".42  BBC  and  ITN both reported  on  scheduled  meetings  of  EC  Finance  and 
Foreign Ministers in Brussels, on 13 November, when  these anxieties were very much 
in  focus: 
France's Foreign Minister,  Roland Dumas,  talked  to his  West  German opposite 
number (Genscher) against a background of French fears  about the prospect of 
German reunification. President Mitterand's call for an emergency summit reflects 
the French concern that  a unified  German  state could  dominate  and  distort  the 
existing European structures.  (BBC1, 21.00, 13.11.89) 
On  the  military  front,  Woodrow  Wyatt  invoked  the  spirit  of the  Grand Entente 
between Britain and France in the face of  a potential new enemy. In his view,  "France 
has most to fear from the dramatic alterations to the map of  Europe. Already too much 
under German sway,  she will need the support of Britain in much stronger friendship 
than  for  decades.  Two  world  wars  have  proved  that  militarily  she  depends  on  an 
alliance with us and America and the same applies to the new economic situation. We 
look  forward  to  more  agreeable  noises  from  Paris,  to  which  we  should  respond 
enthusiastically,  for,  au fond,  we  have  always  liked  the  French  far  more  than  the 
Germans. Both of us fear domination by Germany" .43  Philip Jackson recalled that for 
France,  "The prospect of a  Germany that  may  one  day  decide  to slip  anchor from 
within the Western defence alliance is a recurring nightmare.  A glance at the military 
balance sheet suggests that East and West Germany combined could put into the field 
the  largest  army  outside  the  USSR,  and,  as  one  French  defence  expert  wondered 
aloud,  who is  to say  that  such a force  would  remain  non- nuclear forever?". 44  But 
George Walden called this thinking "out of  date". The threat was no longer military but 
economic and came not from the traditional  "enemy", the Soviet Union,  but from  a 
friend,  West  Germany.  "For  the  British",  he  concluded,  "a  massive  training  and 
educational effort would be a more intelligent response to the 'German threat' than new 
strategic arrangements with the French".45 
The US government 
In Chapter Three, I showed how dominant Cold War narratives in the western media 
cast the US in the leading role in  defending Europe against Communism.  Yet  as  the 
Berlin Wall, a symbol of that war, collapsed, the official  US  response was muted and 
cautious.  There were references to a "Superpower on the sidelines" ,46  and reports that News after the Wall  149 
"Mr Bush is  cheering  cautiously  on the  sidelines"  (BBC1,  18.00,  10.11.89).  There 
were other, more pointed observations.  With the President of the US apparently at a 
loss for words, the leading US newscaster,  Dan Rather,  described him as "relaxed as 
a  pound of liver"  about  events in  Berlin.47  And Patrick Brogan argued  that  "Bush 
suffers from a crisis of imagination"  in formulating a coherent US foreign policy at a 
critical juncture in history.  48 
However,  the earliest  official statement to be reported was by the Secretary of State, 
James Baker,  who suggested that "it may be a little premature to take the jump from 
free travel in  East Germany  ... to the subject of reunification.  There are a lot of other 
steps  in  between"  (BBC1,  18.00  10.1l.89).  Non-government  commentators  like 
Caspar Weinberger  - former US Defence Secretary and Cold War 'hawk'  - ruled out 
German unity because, he claimed, the Soviet Union would never allow it:  the GDR 
was too vital to its strategic interests.  In a classic  Cold War framework,  then,  the 
Soviets  are  presented  as  impeding  progress.  Weinberger's  view  was  reported three 
times  during the  sample  period  (BBC1,  13.00,  ITN,  17.40 &  22.00).  The view  of 
another US source fitted  the British mould.  Ray Gartov,  a former national  security 
adviser  to  Reagan,  told  Newsnight  that  unity  was  not  the  priority.  He thought  it 
preferable to reassure, not alarm,  the Soviet Union and thus guarantee stability and 
Western security in the process. (BBC2, 10.11.89). 
Option  Three:  German  unity  within  existing  western  economic  and  security 
structures 
"The events broadcast live  from  Berlin",  said  the Sunday  Times,  "are the first  step 
towards  the  creation  of an  80m-strong  Fourth  German  Reich.  We  do  not  know 
exactly how it will come about but, de jure or de facto, it will happen and sooner than 
most people think".  49 
Newspaper articles and film  reports from Berlin on events at  street level were full  of 
the  imagery and symbolism  of one  people and one Germany.50  The most prevalent 
images were of  the people and the city of  Berlin reunited. The press included headlines 
such as.  "The end of  the great divide" (Daily Mirror,  10.1l.89), "Patriotism is evoked 
by vision of reunion"  (Telegraph,  11.11.89), and,  "United city revels  in  transport of 
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Television news focused  on the emotional  impact  of the  event  on the  people,  with 
scenes of families and friends being united after  the long separation: 
For almost 30 years, this Wall  has  symbolised the separation of  East and  West 
Germany but,  as one man  said to me tonight,  "You can't build a wall around an 
entire country!"  (lIN, 22.00, 9.11.89) 
Reporter 1:  Two nations, one people, merged in joyful reunion 
Reporter 2:  In the euphoria in  Berlin today,  events  may  soon  be  beyond  the 
control of  the old Four Powers that have controlled the city for the past 44 years. 
Today, the Germans are taking over their own capital.  (BBCl, 13.00, 10.11.89) 
It's the city  reunifying itself, at least in spirit. 
(BBC2, Newsnight,  10.11.89) 
Standing  so  close  to  this  new  breach  in  the  Berlin  Wall,  and  amid  so  much 
excitement, there's a real sense that the division of Germany is coming to an end, 
that the post war map of  Europe is finally changing.  (BBC 1,  13.00, 11. 11.89) 
(The) centre of  Berlin was reunited in a flood of  people, memories and tears. 
(BBCl,  13.00, 12.11.89) 
The story of  Berlin as the city reunited was common to all the news media.  Journalists 
moved  around  Berlin  as  if through a  museum,  referring  to key  buildings  for  their 
historical  significance  in  light  of current  developments  in  the  two  Germanys:  the 
Brandenburg Gate,  the Reichstag parliament building,  and  Potsdamer Platz.  Each 
had  its  own story which  was used  to recall  the  days  when Berlin  was the  imperial 
capital of a united and  powerful Germany:  "Berlin goes on  a binge as  it  relives  old 
splendours",  "Berlin  ist  weider Berlin!  Berlin is  again  Berlin!"(Observer,  12.11.89). 
News reporters recalled that: 
Potsdamer Platz was once the busiest intersection in Europe, and  Berliners were 
eager to see the  heart of  their city restored.  (BBCl, 13.00, 12.11.89) 
This  was  the  biggest  breach  of the  Berlin  Wall,  reuniting  the  city  at  a  major 
junction, reviving memories of  the old German capital, dormant for a generation. 
(lIN, 20.45, 12.11.89) 
The  newscaster,  Peter  Snow,  opened  a  live  edition  of  Newsnight  from  a  highly 
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We're standing here in  West Berlin on the balcony of the old Reichstag building 
where the  last  parliament  of  a united Germany sat in the 1930s 
(BBC2,  13.11.89) 
On Sunday,  12 November, Berlin's the mayors of  East and West Berlin met and shook 
hands at the Wal1. Sl The encounter was held in as another symbol of what the future 
might bring for the Germanys and made headline news 
The Mayors of  East and West Berlin have met  at the Wall which divided their 
city.  (BBCl, 18.20, 12.11.89) 
The mayors of East and West unite across the divide 
(ITN, 20.45, 12.11.89) 
Another powerful and prevalent story in  this narrative was of communities,  families, 
friends reunited. ITN and BBC both featured reports from towns on the inter-German 
border.  They highlighted  the impact  events  in  Berlin had  for these communities and 
what the future might  mean.  ITN went to Helmstedt and  reported on,  "A People 
Reunited" : 
The  people  ... turned  out  in  their  hundreds  to  welcome  the  seemingly  endless 
numbers of  East Germans, taking advantage of  their first opportunity to cross the 
border  dividing  the  two  Germanys.  F  or  some  the  emotion  was  two  much, 
overcome by the warmth  of the  welcome from  their fellow  Germans .... (Y  oung 
man  and  woman  hug)  One  couple  who  were  reunited after a  long separation 
seemed in a moment to symbolise just what it means to be German on this day. 
(ITN, 22.00, 10.11.89) 
BBC  reported from Phillistahl, on the western side of  the border: 
Newscaster: The border has split the village but now it's effectively been reunited 
Reporter: A little boy writes  "Here was the border" (Over sign in German, "Here 
is  the border"), and  crowds gather. Up to now, this was a quiet  country lane,  a 
road to nowhere ending at the Wall which sliced through Germany. 
The report  then switches its focus from the general to the personal and joins a family 
reunion in the home of  a local teacher: 
(Family reunion) Peter Lechardt is a teacher in  Phillistahl:  his  cousin Hubert is  a 
teacher in a school only a mile away but, until now, on the other side of Germany. 
This  is  the  first  time  the  two  families  have  been  able  to  spend  time  together, 
looking  over old  photographs  of their  shared  grandparents.  (Peter  and  Hubert News after the Wall  152 
discussing current events) Talking politics like this is  a novel  experience but,  as 
they say good-bye, they know there will be other days like this. 
(BBCl, 18.00,  13.11.89) 
There were similar items in  other news media.  David Goodhart told the story of the 
Runge family through Mrs Gisela Runge.52 She recalled that she had been on holiday in 
Italy with her sister,  Ingrid,  when the Wall  went  up.  They  realised  that  when they 
returned home, they would be separated for a long time:  Gisela lived in  the western 
zone, Ingrid in  the eastern zone.  Now,  after 28  years,  the Wall  was down and  they 
were together again.  ITN reported on a reunion in the home of  the Grote family: 
The Grote family was reunited today. Twelve of  them came West for the first time 
- four generations together.  (ITN,  13.00, 12.11.89) 
BBC News Review looked back on the scenes of Thursday night and focused  on the 
image of  two friends hugging and crying, with the simple caption: 
Twenty-eight years of  separation.  (BBC2, 11.11.89) 
Compare it to a story in the  News OJ The  World  the next morning: 
OLD PALS REUNITED IN RUSH TO WEST - Jubilant Germans Jurgen Zinke 
and Freidrich Ruck had a drink in their local yesterday  - their first together in 28 
YEARS.  (News OJ The World,  12.11.89) 
These  narrative  strands  cohere  under  the  theme  of Germany  and  the  future.  The 
country  is  united  symbolically  and  emotionally  but  what  happens  next?  Is  unity  a 
realistic,  foreseeable  option?  The  BBC  report  from  the  border  town  of Phillistahl 
concludes: 
Friends  and  families  have  been  united  across  the  Wall  which  divided  the  two 
Germanies, a movement of  people with consequences that are hard to predict. 
(BBCl, 18.00, 13.11.89) 
German unity: the debate on television 
Those politicians, experts and commentators who talked about reform in the GDR and 
those who warned against  German unity,  did  so  on the basis that the  status quo  in 
Europe should be preserved. But those who the tried to talk in terms of  unity did  so in 
the face  of uncertainty and  doubt  from  all  quarters because German unity  would  of 
itself mean change in  the status quo:  in  the existing economic,  political  and  security 
frameworks.  How did television news approach this option as opposed to the others? News after the Wall  153 
Table  5.4,  below,  shows  how  the  extent  to  which  the  news  reported  European 
government sources on the option of  German unity.  It shows, hardly surprisingly,  that 
the Bonn government  was the  greatest  source  of positive  references  (12).  It  also 
highlights the relative dearth of public  statements on unity from  other governments. 
But it  does not reveal the nature of these references  - were they rhetorical  or real 
politik?  - and how were they reported on the news and dealt with in discussions. The 
following sections set out the parameters of  the debate 
Table 5.4: Visions of a new Germany 
Short-medium term options for the two Germanys  after fall of  the Berlin Wall as 
debated  on BBe News  and ITN,  9  - 13 November  1989 (References from 
reported statements,  direct statements, and interview responses) 
OPTION 3:  German unity within existing western  economic and security 
structures 
Governments 
OPT  GDR  FRG  US  USSR  FRA  GB  TOT 
3  - 12  2  - 3  - 17 
FRG Government 
Chancellor Kohl's pronouncements on unity were widely reported and made the news 
headlines the day after the Wall came down: 
West Germany's Chancellor Kohl says a united Germany is clearly in prospect. 
(BBCl, 18.00, 10.11.89) 
Helmut Kohl has gone to Berlin to tell the world "We are one nation!" 
(BBCl, 21.00, 10.11.89) 
The News At Ten, juxtaposed its headline quote with the image of a man and woman 
embracing after being separated by the Wall for years: 
And  the joy of seeing  a  loved  one  agaIn.  Chancellor  Kohl  says,  "We  belong 
together!"  (lTN,10.11.89) News after the Wall  154 
The press were a day behind with these quotes (11.11.89) but their headlines were all 
very similar: 
Kohl says, "We belong together" (The Times,  The Financial Times) 
Kohl: "We are one nation" (The Guardian) 
We belong together (Daily Mail) 
Bulldozers move in to smash open gates as Kohl says,  "Long live the Fatherland" 
(Daily Express). 
However, there were some contextual differences.  The Chancellor's initial  references 
were  pitched  in  the  grand  rhetoric  of historic  inevitability  and  destiny  and  were 
delivered in the mood of  popular euphoria that followed the decision to open the Wall. 
Once the party mood subsided and the country began to contemplate the implications 
of what had happen, he was more careful to reassure Germany's neighbours that he 
was not talking about a new, unilateral Anschluss. BBC reported that: 
Chancellor Kohl has been trying to calm fears that any future merging of  the two 
Germanys could once again lead to German domination of Europe.  During his 
visit to Poland, (he) said reunification was implausible without Europe's consent. 
(BBCl, 21.00, 13.11.89) 
ITN  reported  a  similar  reassurances  from  Kohl's  Foreign  Minister,  Hans  Dietrich 
Genscher, when he  met with his European counterparts in Brussels on 13 November: 
Genscher told (them) that the events of the past  days would not weaken  West 
Germany's commitment to NATO or the European Community. There's been much 
speculation about how the coming together of the two Germanys could alter the 
political and military balance in Europe.  (I  TN  , 22.00, 13. 11.89) 
What the Chancellor had in  mind was to a gradual path to unity in  full  consultation 
with them.  But, as I  showed in  the previous section,  whatever he  said about unity 
attracted criticism.  The implication seemed to be that he should not have mentioned it 
at all.  On the other hand, some commentators wondered what else he could have done 
in the circumstances. Edward Heath delivered this defence on Newsnight: 
In all  fairness to Kohl,  I really don't think he  had  any  alternative.  Unification is 
now  discussed  everywhere  and  can  he  stand  up  and  say,  "I  don't  believe  in 
unification"?  Not for  one moment.  Every  German  Chancellor  since  Adenauer 
said,  "Of course I believe in the reunification of Germany!"  And when it's being 
discussed by the other countries - the Poles are terrified of  (it) and other people in 
Europe are frightened of  it as well ... I think he's absolutely right to deal with it  and 
what he has to do is find a way of  removing the fears of  other people (13. 1 1  .89). News after the Wall  155 
Some  non-government  sources  reinforced  the  theme  of responsibility  by  reminding 
journalists of  West Germany's democratic credentials. These would inform the creation 
of  a new united Germany  so neither East nor West had anything to fear.  David Owen 
thought  it  was  "strange  how  commentators  representing  the  foreign  policy 
establishment  in  the West cling  to the  division  of Germany  like  a  child  to  a  safety 
blanket". It was important, he said,  not to cast doubt on "the robustness of the post-
war democracy in  West Germany". 53  Edward Pearce argued that Britain could learn 
from just such  a  Germany  rather than fret  about  it.  "The  truth  is",  he  said,  "West 
Germany  - shrewdly  lean,  clean,  efficient,  scrupulously  democratic,  art  and  music-
loving,  generous,  high  conscienced,  a  little  over-anxious,  but  through  and  through 
decent - values the things we British had easily and  have grown complacent about. 
West Germany has worked at their civilisation ... If unity  with the East comes,  West 
Germany,  whatever the economic glitches,  is  equipped for  it,  not just financially  but 
politically and, most of  all, morally". 54 
British non-government 
There  were  no  statements  from  British  government  sources  positively  affirming 
German unity, or at least conceding its inevitability. But, as Table 5.5 shows, below, 
there  was  no  shortage  of discussion  among  non-government  sources  about  these 
Issues. 
Table 5.5:  non-government  officials,  political commentators, and others 55' 
OPT  GDR  NF  FRG  US  USSR  FRA  GB  NATO  EC  TOT 
3  - - 4  - - - 14  1  1  20 
Of the 14 references to unity in this category, most came in the course of long,  panel 
discussions on Channel Four News and Newsnight.  The proponents were careful to 
qualify their support for or acceptance of unity with the condition that it  take place 
within  existing western economic and  security  structures.  This  prescription  came  in 
two forms.  A simple  version,  proposed a united Germany  safely 'anchored' to NATO 
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Edward Heath:  For those worried about having a united Germany,  I would just 
say one thing.  The answer, if we get to that stage, is for Western Germany to be 
so tightly bound into the European Community that it would be impossible for her 
to pull out. Or, if  Eastern Germany joined her, it would be impossible for a united 
Germany to do damage to Europe.  (Channel Four News,  10.11.89) 
Paddy Ashdown:  The whole question of German unity can really only safely take 
place within (an) integrated, unified Europe.  (ITN, 22.00, 10.11.89) 
A  more  complex  version  outlined  transitory  measures  that  would  accommodate  a 
gradual  withdrawal  of Soviet  armed  forces  from  the  former  GDR.  David  Owen 
described his idea of gradual unity, with the eastern part of Germany signing up with 
the Western European Union Treaty (WEUT),  a wholly European defence  alliance 
separate  from  NATO.  But  this  amounted  to  the  same  West-centred  rhetoric  of 
victory: German unity, yes, but on our terms only: 
Owen:  I  don't think,  of course, that East Germany,  once a  united  country,  will 
remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. I don't think it will  even necessarily be a 
member of NATO.  But I  think  it  would  be  perfectly  possible  - and  I  think 
desirable  - for it to be a signatory to the WEUT which all  it  does say that any 
signatory  will  come  to  the  defence  of other  member  states  and  that's  nine 
countries, all of  them in the European Community. I do think,  therefore,  that East 
Germany  will  be  drawn  slowly  away  from  both  the  Warsaw  Pact,  from 
communism,  andfrom Soviet influence.  (Channel Four News,  9.11.89) 
There was little or no recognition that it was somewhat anomalous to reunify Germany 
within the very security structures which the Four Powers had designed to  perpetuate 
its division.  Denis Healey was a lone voice in  proposing new structures for the new 
European order that would surely follow the fall of  the Wall.  In the last of  Newsnighfs 
panel discussions (13.11.89), he  was clear about who in the West was standing in the 
way of  imagination in this regard: 
Healey:  So the most urgent thing is to is to try and create a new security structure 
by cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO for very, very deep cuts in 
existing  weapons  and  restructuring  of forces  so  that  they  are  incapable  of 
aggressive action. The Americans and Russians have set themselves this objective: 
it  worries me that our government does not seem to be supporting it,  and nor do 
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However, the newscaster,  Peter Snow,  was more concerned with  how Kohl's  unity 
rhetoric would affect the chances of  new structures being adopted: 
Snow:  But what do you  think .... of the way Chancellor Kohl  is  talking  in  quite 
colourful language, "We are one country, we must be united!", that kind of talk? 
Do you think that is wise against the background of  the managed change that you 
want to see? 
Healey:  Well,  I  think  it's  stupid  demagogy  and .. .it  will  be  counter-
productive  .... German unification may come but it will be very difficult to achieve it 
unless we have a new security structure  .... 
Conclusion 
In  this  chapter,  I  have  showed  how  the  news  reported  public  debate  in  the  two 
Germanys,  and the wider international scene,  about what should  happen  in  the next 
five  to ten years after the Berlin  Wall.  I  showed  that  an  extensive  body of official 
opinion  - East and West - did  not see unity as  a realistic or desirable outcome on a 
shorter  time-scale  than  that.  Their  reservations  were  based  on  historical  fears  of 
Germany  and  on the  strategic realpolitik of Cold  War thinking.  There  was  also  a 
strand of unofficial  thinking that focused  on  the  implications  of events for  the East 
German people, especially the dangers of being swallowed up in  an  Anschluss rather 
than  move  in  a  careful  and  considered  process  of gradual  unity.  Against  these 
reservations,  only  West  German  sources  openly  advocated  short  term  unity  within 
existing western structures - NATO and the EC - with muted backing from the French 
and  US  governments.  Some  unofficial,  pro-European  federalist  voices  in  Britain 
preferred this option, too. It was evident from my analysis that British television news 
reported  German unity as an inevitability, whether East or West liked it or not.  The 
fragments of  negative opinion or images that emerged from the coverage in this period 
- and there were plenty  - were  reported within  this interpretative framework.  As I 
will  show in Chapter Six, this would have implications for the way the news reported 
the high-speed rush to Germany  unity  in an uncertain post-Cold War order. News after the Wall 
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News on the fast track: reporting German unification 
Within a  year of  the fall  of the Berlin Wall,  Germany was united.  This was a time 
scale  that  exceeded  even  the  most  ambitious  forecasts  of the  West  German 
establishment.  Since  then,  however,  the  optimistic  picture  of Germany  united  and 
prosperous has been confounded by  a widening economic,  social  and political  gulf 
between the  east  and  west.  This  chapter,  therefore,  shows  how  television  news 
journalists reported the political  and  economic  realities  of  German  reunification.  I 
argue that throughout most of the period routine television news structured coverage 
around  the  optimistic  predictions  and  subsequent  revisions  of the  West  German 
government.  Thus they  presented a picture of  unification as  a process that tried to 
solve the economic problems of the former GDR,  not as  one that  caused as  many 
problems as it took on.  In comparison with the liberal press, and some current affairs, 
television news failed to note the serious contradictions between  official rhetoric and 
reality.  It  was  slow  to  acknowledge  the  existence  and  validity  of a  powerful, 
alternative view: that what was called 'the fast track' to unification  was  badly judged 
and ultimately disastrous, and that it was  instigated by Chancellor Kohl  for no other 
motive than political expediency. 
The chapter is not based on the detailed, structured method used in Chapters 3-5. It is 
specifically  designed to track dominant themes in  routine reporting over a long period 
of  time. Thus, it includes news coverage of  only the most decisive moments on the way 
to unification:  the  East German elections,  18  March  1990;  monetary union,  1 July 
1990; and Unity Day, 3 October 1990.  It then looks  beyond unity over the following 
three years to see how the news marked  the anniversaries of  unity and the fall  of the 
Berlin Wall.  Such an  approach provides a discreet impression of the picture that the 
news has constructed of  Germany since unification. 
A Happy New Year 
Berliners celebrated  New Years Eve 1989  with the opening up of the Brandenburg 
Gate, a monument to German imperialism. ITN  reported the festivities with an upbeat 
item that began by  reporting Chancellor Kohl's  New Year message to the  German 
people, East and West: 
Headline:  Berliners say good-bye to the year  that saw the Wall come down 
Newscaster:  The  West  German  Chancellor,  Helmut  Kohl,  has  called  on  his 
countrymen  to  strive  for  a  united  Germany  and  a  united  Europe.  He  said  the 
1990s could be the happiest decade of  the century. 
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The  report  that  followed  described  the  party  on  the  streets  of Berlin  around  the 
Brandenburg Gate and the remains of the Wall.  The  scenes were reminiscent  of the 
days after the Wall came down: 
Tonight in  Berlin,  the  boundary  between the two  Germanys  is  becoming  even 
more blurred  .... We're standing here on what used to be the most closely patrolled 
and guarded areas of  East Berlin. (CROWD ON WALL WITH BALLOONS AND PARTY 
STREAMERS) And just look at it now!  The balloons are floating high, the bangs of 
fireworks and, below  the magnificent monument (Brandenburg Gate), the biggest 
New Years Eve party in the world is underway. 
The reporter  closed the item with an endorsement of  Kohl's optimistic message to the 
people: 
As the fireworks burst high from West to East, they can look forward to a new 
decade full of  uncertainties but rich in opportunities.  (lTN, 21.05, 31.12.89) 
This  in  effect  signalled  the  dominant  framework  in  news  coverage  of German 
unification throughout the following year to its formal ceremonies on 3 October 1990. 
It accepted  that  Chancellor Kohl's  'fast  track  to  unity'  was  the  natural,  inevitable 
course to adopt, and that there could be no real alternatives.  The East German people 
would suffer,  and the West German people would resent the mounting costs,  but in 
the long run it would be for the best.  In the most extreme example of the approach, 
the economics editor of Newsweek  saw it as the stuff of  fairytales.  His item from July 
1990 is worth citing at length: 
There's  a  fairy-tale  quality  to  West  Germany's  economic  take-over  of East 
Germany. The fable goes something like this. 
Once upon a time,  a rich  kingdom took over a poor one.  The money in  the  15 
million bank accounts of the poor kingdom was no  good,  so  - poof!  - the rich 
kingdom exchanged it for the Deutsche mark, a currency better than gold. The air 
in the poor kingdom was so fouled that it  stung the eyes.  So - abracadabra!  - the 
rich kingdom started a big clean up.  The houses in the poor kingdom hadn't been 
fixed up since the government seized everything 40 years ago, so - shazzam!  - the 
rich kingdom gave everybody back their property. The stores were only half filled 
with crummy products, so - presto!  - companies from the rich kingdom restocked 
them with really good stuff. Only one problem remained.  A lot of  businesses in the 
poor country  were likely to fail  when  forced  to compete with firms  in  the rich 
country.  So  merry  old  king  Kohl  promised  that  all  laid-off  workers  would  be Reporting German unification  162 
supported and retained for new jobs:  "Nobody wiUlose", Helmut Kohl promised 
the East Germans, "and most will win" 
The journalist then insisted that this was not a fairytale. This was reality: 
The crazy thing about this tale is  that it  is  going to come true.  There will  be  a 
couple of years of  enormous turmoil - unemployment, bankruptcies, perhaps even 
political  unrest.  Many East  Germans  will  still  go  west  to find  work and  West 
Germans east to get rich.  There will likely be a burst of  inflation and higher taxes, 
too. Every fairytale has its villains. But after the rough transition, the 16.3 million 
who call  the German Democratic Republic  home  are  likely  to live  happily  ever 
after. I 
The  'crazy  thing'  about  this  article  was  that  it  was  not  atypical  of assumptions  in 
western  journalism  about  what  a  united  Germany  would  tum  out  to  be:  a  'new 
economic  super-power'  and  an  'economic  colossus  in  the  heart  of Europe'  were 
common labels.  This framework accommodated other less positive narratives such as 
the bad news story about an unabashed Anschluss, or take over, by West Germany of 
the GDR and the consequences of  this for the people.  A good, first case study for this 
was news  coverage of the East  German  elections,  on  18  March  1990.  The  sample 
consists of all  evening  bulletins from  16-19 March and  includes  references to press 
coverage where they demonstrate the existence of  alternative perspectives. 
East Germany's free elections 
Just  as  the  election  campaign  was  getting  under  way  in  the  GDR,  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  were  voting  in  a  general  election.  The  result  was  a  disaster  for  the 
Sandinistas.  After governing for eleven years in a state of  military and economic siege, 
they  lost  to the  high-powered,  American-backed  UNO  coalition.  Noam  Chomsky 
presents a critique of  US media coverage of  this event. He writes that, 
In the case of  the  ... elections (in Nicaragua), the US interfered massively from the 
outset to gain victory for its candidates not only by the enormous financial aid that 
received  some  publicity,  but  - far  more  significant  and  considered  quite 
uncontroversial - by  White House announcements that only  a victory by  the US 
candidate would bring an end to the illegal US economic sanctions and restoration 
of  aid. In brief, Nicaraguan voters were informed that they had a free choice: Vote 
Go. 
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Chomsky  identifies  two  dominant  media  perspectives  on  these  contradictions. 
Conservative journalists did not mention them "and then hailed the stunning triumph of 
democracy". Liberal journalists did refer to them "and then hailed the stunning triumph 
of democracy" (1993 :25). The same principle can be applied to media coverage of the 
East  German  elections.  With  few  exceptions,  television  news  coverage  was 
preoccupied with the spectacle rather than the substance of  the elections as 'democratic 
process'.  It glossed over two disturbing aspects of the campaign.  First,  that the real 
candidates  and  the real  winners  were from  another country,  West  Germany~  and, 
second, that German unity was being brokered  on strictly western terms. 
The dominant theme of  coverage was the celebration of  the people's unique democratic 
choice: they had been starved of choice for the forty years their state had existed but 
now they suffered an embarrassment of riches.  A leading SPD politician in Bonn was 
confident that the East German voters had  made  an  informed choice:  "Y ou have to 
remember that East Germans  have been looking at  West  German TV for 40  years. 
They know what awaits them and they want to live as we do in the Federal Republic".2 
Channel Four News reported that, 
this  is  not  East Germany's  first  election  but  choice  is  certainly  a novelty.  East 
Germans are no strangers to the trappings of  democracy: not for nothing was this 
the German Democratic Republic  (NEWSCASTER'S  EMPHASIS).  They voted with 
greater fervour than practically anywhere else in the Eastern bloc in a dozen votes 
since ... 1958, always producing 99-point-something-percent in a no-choice contest, 
the red banners of  the communist party eternally the victors  ... Now, suddenly, they 
have  a  choice  ... But  with  a  list  of more  than  24  parties  to  choose  from,  these 
erstwhile no-choice voters are left reeling.  (19.00, 16.3.90) 
What was the choice that so overwhelmed the East German voter? Looking back on 
the election later,  Jonathan Steele thought it  a tragedy that  "even when the country 
had a chance to elect its first democratic parliament, it produced a weak and pathetic 
set of  men and women".3 On the right, there was the East German Christian Democrat 
Union  (CDU)  who  had  been  discredited  after  years  of compromise  with  the  East 
German regime.  When it became apparent early in the campaign that they were doing 
rather badly in the opinion polls, Chancellor Kohl advised them to realign with a range 
of right-wing  parties  and  pressure  groups  to form  the  Alliance  for  Germany.  This 
included the German Social Union (DSU), a party of the far Right closely linked with 
the  Bavarian  Christian  Social  Union  (CSU).  The  Alliance  campaigned  for  speedy 
German unity and on a commitment to NATO and  European integration.  On the left, 
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superiors,  wanted to slow down the pace of unity to three or four years.  In the early 
stages of their campaign, they proposed the idea of a neutral Germany within a new, 
pan-European security framework.  But when they  lost  ground in  the  opinion  polls, 
they modified the position considerably by  declaring  a new commitment to NATO. 
The  old  communist  party  reformed  itself  and  took  the  new  title,  the  Party  of 
Democratic  Socialism  (PDS).  They  campaigned  on  issues  of  social  welfare, 
employment,  and  other anxieties  about the impact  of unity  on the  lives  of ordinary 
citizens.  They  favoured  a  neutral,  united  Germany  and  a  pan-European  security 
framework. 
A  party or alliance needed only a simple majority to form a government but required a 
two-thirds majority vote across all  parties in the new parliament to bring about unity 
with the Federal Republic.  Polls indicated that no one party was likely to secure such a 
majority so it looked as if some form of  coalition between right and left was essential. 
This  would  prove  problematic.  Neither  the  centre-right  alliance  nor  the  social 
democrats  were  interested  in  a  national  coalition  that  included  the  reformed 
communists  (PDS).  The  Social  Democrats,  on  the  other  hand,  refused  to  form  a 
national coalition that included the DSU. But all this seemed  academic when the real 
choice for  East Germans was vote for Chancellor Kohl and get rich quick, or vote for 
the Social Democrats and get rich much later. 
British  television  news  saw  it  differently.  When  the  result  was  declared,  a  BBC 
reporter thought that: 
what really  mattered today was not the result but rather the fact that for the first 
time in living memory, they (the people) had a real choice and that from now on 
those elected would have to be accountable to them. 
(BBC2, Newsnight: The Ballot in Berlin, late evening 18.3.90) 
This seems to imply that there is no correlation between the result of  an election and its 
consequences  for  those  who  voted,  and  that  the  phenomenon  of 'free  elections' 
somehow guarantees a positive outcome.  Some  reporters mentioned  the fact  that  it 
was nearly sixty years since East Germans were able to exercise their democratic right 
in  an  open election.  This was the all-German general election  in  1933.  Adolf Hitler 
won it  and became Chancellor.  One can hardly imagine a journalist looking back and 
reflecting that 'what really mattered was not  the result but that the people had  a real 
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With headlines like,  "Kohl's hard sell  seduces the East"4,  and  "East Germans rally to 
Western clones"5,  the liberal British press showed it was possible for journalists to 
take a more jaundiced view of  the election as an exercise in democracy. For example, 
Michael Ignatieff argued in the Observer that,  "In our impetuous and condescending 
haste to teach the Eastern Europeans lessons, we may forget that. .. democracy is more 
than a procedure for choosing one's rulers. It is an ethic, a way oflife".6 
Tony  Snape  underlined  what  he  saw  as  the  real  West  German  agenda:  "The  big 
question,  they are agreed,  is  what will  be the likely  structure of the new coalition 
government and haw easily will it toe  the  West  German line".7  It was vital that all 
parties in the new,  democratically elected parliament  should  "toe the West German 
line",  for  the  bigger,  richer  parties  across  the  border  had  invested  heavily  in  the 
process. Catherine Field reported that, "The copious amounts of money being poured 
into some campaigns by allied parties in West Germany does not affect the payment (of 
state election subsidy)" and that, "Parties do not have to declare the extent or source of 
any  outside  financing".8  It  emerged,  however,  that  the  West  German  government 
financed  Alliance  for  Germany to the tune of £2.8  million.9  The fate  of the reform 
movement  in  all  this  summed  up  the  consequences  of western  subversion  for  the 
independent  reform  parties  who were feted  as  heroes  back in  November.  As Neal 
Ascherson put it:  "Revolutions are famous for devouring their children but this one has 
managed  to  eat  its  own  parents  before  it  is  out  of nappies".1°  In November,  the 
reformers  "thought they had discovered a new sort of  politics in which citizens would 
participate in the management of their own affairs".  Now they were spectators in  "an 
election campaign masterminded by the political  professionals of West Germany".  11 
Barbara Bohley, a co-founder of  New Forum, felt bitter that the voter was "behaving 
like a sheep again, yet fondly imagining he is taking part in his first free elections"  .12 
I found few examples in the sample of television news where the lack of real  choice 
was spelled out very clearly.  After the results of the election had been declared, New 
Forum's  Jens Reich told Channel Four News that: 
Reich: It's not our class to stand for parliament - that's more for the parties with 
the apparatus.  So,  we have  been  steam-rolled  over,  in  particular  by  the  West 
German parties with their apparatus, their logistics, their people, their politicians. 
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The BBe correspondent Charles Wheeler was not particularly saddened by the demise 
of the GDR but when he  reported  on the election  campaign,  he  noted  the  level  of 
western intervention with irony and unease: 
At  the  Halle  headquarters  of the  Social  democrats,  the  signs  abound  of a 
sponsored  election  in  which  the  big  West  German  parties ... take  over  the 
campaign,  showering the neophyte locals with gifts  - fax  machines,  computers, 
stationery  and  carloads  of shiny  election  souvenirs  with  which  to  dazzle  the 
natives  ... 
At this week's election rally,  (the local chairman) attempted to talk to the crowd 
about the ways a new government might contribute to East Germany's salvation. 
He wasn't given a  hearing.  The toughs at the front  shouted  him  down.  It's the 
politicians from the West who are welcome at  these rallies,  the ones who make 
promises, the ones who hint that any day now, the East German workers will find 
West German marks  .. .in their pockets. That is what this election is all about. 
(BBC2, Newsnight,  15.2.90) 
Two days before polling, the News at Ten  contradicted the conventional wisdom that 
the election was about free choice: 
Despite the  24 parties and hundreds of  candidates, this is  a one-issue  election 
and it's not an issue on which the 12 million East German voters will have much 
of  a choice.  Because as soon as this election is over, and whatever the outcome, 
the new East German parliament will  sit down immediately to discuss one thing -
how long the process of  unification should take.  (lTN, 22.00, 16.3.90) 
Given  the  lack  of real  choice  and  the  scale  of western  interference,  then,  the 
assumption that the elections were free and pluralistic somewhat stretches credibility. 
Yet  television  news  reported  the two  contradictory  elements  without  any  sense  of 
irony.  On one level, they reported that the elections were free and fair.  Thus, on the 
eve of  the vote: 
The East German polling-stations will  open in  nine  hours time for  the first  free 
and democratic elections in the country's history.  (BBCl, 20.55,  17.3.89) 
East Germans go to the polls in a few hours time for the first free elections in their 
country's history.  (ITN, 22.10.  17.3.90) 
But  the  main  focus  appeared  to  be  the  spectacle  of the  elections  rather  than  their 
substance or consequences: Reporting German unification  167 
The early winner was the process itself, a uniformly high turnout with nine out of 
ten people voting.  (BBCl, 21.55, 18.3.90) 
F or the first time in their lives they were voting in a free election with a choice of 
parties and a secret ballot, an experience so unique some didn't want to share it. 
(ITN, 21.45, 18.3.90) 
This was a day for the nation to set the record straight, to prove themselves,  after 
the wasted years, capable of  democracy. 
(BBC2, Newsnight: Ballot in Berlin, early evening, 18.3.90) 
On another level, reporters were very clear that Chancellor Kohl, not his counterpart in 
the  East, Lothar de Maziere, was the real winner.  But that did not seem to jar with 
their 'free election' theme: 
The  48-year  old  Berlin  lawyer  (Lothar  de  Maziere)  is  East  Germany's  Prime 
Minister in waiting. But the real winner is Chancellor  Helmut Kohl. 
(ITN, 21.45, 18.3.90) 
Reporter: Above all, this was  a triumph for the Christian Democrats of  the West. 
Newscaster:  The  results  here  in  the  East  are  a  triumph  for  West  Germany's 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  (BBCI, 21.55, .3.90) 
Headlines:  After the revolution, the revolutionary election as the voters of East 
Germany give a  landslide  victory to the centre-right and  a personal triumph  to 
Chancellor Kohl of  West Germany. 
(BBC2,  Newsnight: Ballot in Berlin, late evening, 18.3.90) 
There's no doubt then that Chancellor Kohl has scored a major victory 
(BBCl, 13.00, 19.3.90) 
The Constitutional route to unity 
The  subversion  by  West  Germany's  politicians  of the  East  German  elections  was 
equalled only by  their subsequent subversion of their own Basic Law,  or provisional 
constitution.  In  short,  there  were  two  constitutional  routes  to  unity.  One  would 
accelerate  the  process  while  the  other  would  slow  it  down.  The  West  German 
government sold the former option to the voters in both Germanys and, on the whole, 
British television news accepted the  sales  pitch at  face  value.  But before looking at 
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Throughout the election campaign, the eDD-Alliance told voters that Article 23  of  the 
Basic Law allowed for a straightforward accession by the five  East German Lander 
(states) to the Federal Republic  after a two-thirds  majority vote by  parliament.  For 
most of  their campaign, the Social Democrats countered this option with reference to 
Article  146 of the Basic Law which allowed for  referenda in  the two Germanys to 
decide whether the people wanted unity and  a completely new constitution.  Such an 
option, in  other words, did not assume that unity was 'inevitable',  never mind  that it 
would come about in one year or two.  However, the party changed tack much later in 
the campaign when polls suggested that a once commanding lead of  65%-plus was fast 
slipping to the Alliance for Germany.  Suddenly, they accepted unity as  inevitable and 
focused solely on the timetable. 
Leading  German  commentators  and  intellectuals  on  the  left  argued  that  the  real 
complexities of the  constitutional  question  had  to be  addressed  in  public  debate. 13 
Writing  in  Die Zeit just  after the  election,  Jurgen  Habermas  argued  that  the  West 
German constitution demanded, 
an agenda for reunification which gives priority to the freely exercised right of  the 
citizens to determine their own future by  direct vote, within the framework of  a 
non-occupied public sphere that has not already been willed away.  This means, 
concretely,  that  the  will  of the  voting  public  is  given  precedence  over  an 
annexation cleverly initiated  but. .. which  dishonestly  evades  one  of the  essential 
conditions for  the founding  of any  nation of state-citizens:  the  public  act  of a 
carefully considered democratic decision taken in both parts of  Germany.  14 
But the point appeared to have got lost in the wider,  more emotive issue of German 
nationalism and  patriotism.  Habermas,  and other like-minded intellectuals and  artists, 
like the writer Gunter Grass, provoked bitter criticism from the establishment for their 
critique of unification. Ulrich Greiner wrote that  there was a "preliminary trial against 
these  intellectuals  because  of insufficient  love  for  the  Fatherland, ... apolitical  day-
dreaming, (and) wilful desertion from the troops" .15  For example,  historian and Hitler 
biographer, Jochen Thies, called them "the last burnt children of  National Socialism".16 
This counter-assault had the effect of burying important constitutional principles from 
public view.  One was that the decision to unite was a matter for  the citizens of both 
Germanys to decide  in  a  referendum  or even  referenda.  Another was  that  unity  via 
Article  23  did  not  have  the effect  of determining  German  frontiers  conclusively  as 
would a new constitution via Article 146.17 Reporting German unification  169 
Judging from accounts in the British media at this time, the constitutional question was 
not widely referred to and was seen to be a formality.  The CDU-Alliance had only to 
forge  a coalition with the SPD to obtain the two-thirds majority needed to vote the 
country out of  existence.  ITN  reported that: 
The historic win by the (CDD) and its alliance partners  means that it is now when 
rather than whether the two Germanys will unite.  (ITN, 13.00, 19.3.90) 
BBC  News  made brief reference to the issue  in all its main evening bulletins the day 
after the election: 
The conservatives  ... want to use Article 23  of  the constitution to extend it to East 
Germany.  (BBCl, 21.00, 19.3.90) 
The only inkling we might have had that there was an alternative route via Article 146 
came in an interview response by a communist party (PDS) official: 
(We) believe that the constitution of  a united Germany should be negotiated. 
(BBCl, 21.00, 19.3.90) 
I found only one news item in  the sample - on Channel Four News - that got to the 
heart of  the issue: 
When Konrad Adenauer founded the state in the late '40s, he signed a constitution 
that  left  open  the  possibility  of  unification.  But  there  are  now  different 
interpretations  of how  that  can  happen.  The  Constitution,  called  the  Basic 
Law  ... contains an article, Number 23, which allows other German lands to join the 
Federal Republic.  But elsewhere,  the  document says that when a new Germany 
comes into being,  it can start afresh with a new constitution.  The East Germans, 
now about to join the West, may demand that their social rights be protected, that 
the constitution should change to accommodate them. It's an argument about the 
values of  a future Germany. (MY E~HASIS)  (19.00, 16.3.90) 
News  accounts  showed  considerable  awareness  that  East  Germany  was  already 
undergoing serious economic and  social upheaval.  However,  they did  not report this 
within  a  framework  that  suggested  that  an  "argument  about  the values  of a  future 
Germany"  even  existed.  They  assumed  that  the  problems  were  inherited  from  the 
communists - the legacy of centrally planned  economic chaos - and  presented West 
Germany's 'Anschluss' as a panacea for these problems rather than as  a contributory 
factor. Reporting German unification  170 
Reporting economic unification 
A feature  report on Newsnight (BBC2) examined the  prospects for  East Germans 
after  the  election  and  their  Western-inspired  hope  for  an  'economic  miracle'.  The 
newscaster introduced the report using a metaphor of partnership to explain current 
expectations of  unification. But he cast  it in a somewhat one-sided mould: 
The  hope is  that  after  the  long,  acrimonious  separation,  there  can  again  be  a 
marriage  of two  minds,  with  the  commercial  flair  and  dynamism  of the  West 
bringing new life to its partner's economy; and with the German industrial giants 
lending their weight to the work of reconstruction.  Already,  the Frankfurt-based 
Bundesbank, the guiding force behind the post-war economic miracle in the West, 
is poised to move to Berlin. 
However the central question was not  if  the miracle would happen but when: 
But can a new economic miracle transform the GDR at  the pace its  people are 
demanding? 
The report that followed constructed an image of East Germany as  a going concern, 
the biggest business opportunity of the  decade with the  economics  minister  cast  as 
managing director: 
Today,  East  German  Enterprises Limited  was  born.  At  8  am,  its  new  finance 
director was on his way to Bonn, head office,  the source of all  his  capital. Elmar 
Pieroth, a West German business man and former CDU minister in Berlin, is today 
East  Germany's  new  economics  minister.  His  task:  change  socialism  into 
capitalism. Never has a businessman had such an opportunity. 
The reporter did  not ignore the problems that might  hinder  his  mission  but,  before 
looking at them, she fixed them firmly within the framework of 'democracy'. Now that 
East Germany was a'real'  democracy,  anything was possible: 
Today, Berlin, a city of anachronism, came back to life - the east still occupied by 
Soviet troops but now aglow with democratic grace.  They're going to need that 
grace and all  their strength to cope with all  the reconstruction now ahead.  The 
country's infrastructure is threadbare, communications primitive. If they're to join 
their partners without sinking, the revolution ahead  will  have to reach into every 
recess of  this country's being.  (BBC2, Newsnight, 22.30, 19.3.90) 
Again we can glean a different  impression from  the liberal  press.  John Eisenhammer 
saw little or no evidence of a city  "aglow with democratic grace", and  predicted that 
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their unprecedently vicious and  distressing election campaign  in  East Germany will 
now flow into German society as a whole" .18 He based this prophetic statement on the 
political  realities  - the  prevailing  problems  and  divisions  between  East  and  West 
Germany  - not on the declarations of Bonn politicians. For example, there was public 
disbelief among West Germans,  and  in  the West in  general,  that Kohl  could  achieve 
unity without raising taxes and inflation. The News at Ten  reported that: 
The Chancellor  ... faces a formidable task. He promised the East Germans a social 
security system,  pension rights,  and  unemployment benefits for those who'll lose 
their jobs when the economy feels  the impact of the free  market.  Now he  must 
deliver.  No one has even dared  calculate the total cost but West  Germans fear 
they'll  have to pay it.  Opinion polls  show  75%  think taxes will  rise  despite the 
Chancellor's  commitment  to  keep  them  down.  And  the  value  of their Deutsch 
Marks may be threatened, too. Monetary union is now expected at the end of  June 
- it could bring inflation with it.  (ITN, 22.00, 19.3.90) 
Kohl canvassed in three very different constituencies:  not only the two Germanys but 
the  'international  community'  as  well.  Robin  Smyth  reported  how  West  Germans 
received "contradictory signals from Kohl"  about the speed of  unification. "First it was 
to be  a long process; then it was going to happen as  soon as  possible because of the 
danger of  economic collapse in the East; now the orders are again for a slow advance. " 
He told how Kohl took part in a TV talk show from Leipzig which showed film of the 
extent of  economic problems which  the West  proposed to take on:  "(Kohl)  rather 
surprisingly complained that (it) ... had painted too black a picture  ... Re wanted to give 
his  new supporters in the East and viewers at home a more upbeat impression of the 
burden they were going to shoulder" .19  David Gow reported that  East Germany's new 
finance  minister,  Elmar  Pieroth,  promised  monetary  union  by  1  July  only  to  be 
contradicted  by  officials  in  Bonn  who  said  that  was  an  impossible  timetable. 20 
Television news failed to point out this contradiction even though it was very evident 
from coverage overall. For example, one ofITNs first reports on the election result led 
with the headline: 
Kohl's triumph means unification of  Germany may be only months ahead. 
(13.00, 19.3.90) 
And the News at Ten reported that: 
The winners of yesterday'S election, the Christian Democrats and  their allies,  said 
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But the story was rather different  on  Channel Four News  when they  spoke to the 
General Secretary of the ruling West German Christian Democrats: 
Reporter:  Volke Ruhe  showed  the  party's  growing  realism  when  I  asked  him 
when he expected German reunification? 
Ruhe :  Within the next two or three years, the reunification of the states. And still 
after that, you will need plenty time for adjustment of  laws, etcetera, etcetera. 
(19.3.90) 
A  report  on  Channel  Four  News  just  after  the  election  belied  the  contradiction 
between vague  "et  cetera,  et  cetera"  of politically  interested  sources  - government 
officials and western  'analysts' - and the evidence the reporter sees for himself: 
Support  for  rapid  reunification  had  been  resounding.  Chancellor  Kohl  had 
correctly read the mood here but East Germans remain apprehensive about the 
cost to them of  the high-speed, high-risk strategy  ... 
In  West  Germany,  the  stockmarket rocketed.  Share  prices  rose  highest  in  the 
companies who are fast  investing  in  East Germany.  But on  the  streets of East 
Berlin,  the daily struggle continues.  360,000 East Germans have  left  since  last 
summer  but  almost  16  million  remain  to confront  the  reality of unification  -
massive  price  increases  instead  of  low  subsidised  prices,  unemployment, 
uncertainty about the future of  pensions and the social welfare system. 
Economists  believe  that  one  day  there  will  be  an  economic  miracle  in  eastern 
Germany but the transition is  expected to be painful.  Productivity here  is  400/0 
that of  West Germany. Some analysts predict that up to 1.4 m workers will  lose 
their jobs, but in recent weeks analysts say the slide into an economic abyss has 
been halted. (MY EMPHASES) 
The reporter then informed us that the flow of  East German labour out of the country 
to West Germany was continuing. In spite of the Wall coming down, the promises of 
monetary  parity,  and  the  holding  of elections,  thousands  of people  were  still  not 
convinced that things would get better: 
(The)  likely  future  East  German  economics  minister  ... painted  an  optimistic 
forecast for the East. ..  But when East Germans look around at the  legacy left by 
the communists, they face now a test of  extreme patience. (MY EMPHASIS) 
(19.00, 19.3.90) 
Predictions that German monetary union was only months away were vindicated on  1 
July  1990,  when the value of  East German currency and  wages was fixed  on a par 
with  the West German  mark.  This  was what  Kohl  had  promised  East  Germans  in Reporting German unification  173 
return for their vote in  their first  'free  elections'.  In vital  economic terms,  they had 
become  citizen-consumers  of Fukuyama's  post-communist  "universal  homogenous 
state".  Whereas  Marxist-Leninism  declared  that  Communism  was  the  soviet 
government  plus  the  electrification  of the  whole  country,  Fukuyama  declared  the 
universal homogenous state to be  "liberal democracy in the political sphere combined 
with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic".21  When the day came for East 
Germany, there were plenty of VCRs and stereos but,  like the staples of bread and 
vegetables,  they were beyond their price-range. With echoes of their coverage when 
the Berlin Wall came down,  ITN and BBC News still  seemed fascinated  with East 
Germans turned western consumers.  In this BBC item, the journalist seems blissfully 
ignorant of  a glaring inconsistency in his reporting: 
The goods were of  a price and a quality not previously seen here and the crowds 
were as if  for a  Christmas shopping spree.  Where last  week,  the goods they 
could get here were only 10% Western, now it was 80%, a bewildering variety for 
some. And an especially high demand for radios, televisions and video-cassettes, 
all to be paid for in crisp new bank notes. 
But the reviews are more mixed in the supermarket where subsidies are off.  The 
price of  some staples has doubled and more than doubled. But fruits are available 
which were  not on the shelves before. Shoppers are cautious  .... 
They were also beating a path to the doors of  travel agents for package holidays 
to  be  paid in  Deutsch Marks  to  places  previously  beyond  the  reach  of East 
Germans. {MY EMPHASES)  (BBCI, 21.00, 2.7.90) 
The people were 'cautious' about buying  staple food yet  they were buying western 
electrical goods with 'crisp new bank notes'  and  snapping up holidays in the sun with 
Deutsch Marks.  It is difficult to reconcile these two images. 
ITN adopted a similar line.  This report sounded like advertising copy for the Berlin 
chamber of  commerce: 
East Germans got their new money at the weekend. Today, they poured into the 
shops to spend it, and they found shops once drab and bare had been transformed 
into sparkling palaces full of  the best Western products. People needed time just 
to look.  After years of poor quality and  no variety,  even the packaging was a 
novelty (FILM,  TWO MEN SCRUTINISE  A  MILK  CARTON),  and  so  was the food. 
Others complained about the higher prices  ... Staff  learn to use price-sticker guns 
and identify the new notes and coins. {MY EMPHASES)  (lTN, 22.00, 2.7.90) Reporting German unification  174 
On another level, these BBC and ITN items differed when they went on to report the 
wider and deeper implications of  monetary union for east and west.  BBC News saw it 
more as an  economic rite of passage for East Germans:  they were now part of the 
western, consumer society and were empowered by the mighty Deutsch Mark. 22  ITN, 
on the other hand,  implied  that the magic  moment  did  nothing  to close the gulf of 
social and economic difference that persisted between East and West Germans.  Thus 
the headline: 
In East Germany, western goods fill the shops but thousands of  jobs go. 
(ITN, 22.00, 2.7.90) 
BBC structured its item around the optimistic views of  government officials,  the stock 
market,  and expert opinion to come up  with what the money markets would call  a 
'buoyant' forecast: 
All  this will take some time to work through the economy and there are fears it 
will  fuel  high  inflation.  The  government  says  'not  so'  .. .It  was  a  confidence 
reflected in  share  prices  in  Frankfurt  stock  exchange  where  conditions  were 
described as 'friendly'.  The expert opinion? There could be problems ahead in the 
event of large scale plant-closure but the  wider Deutsch Mark is off to a good 
start. (MY EMPHASES)  (BBC1, 21.00, 2.7.90) 
As an economic outlook, this had two major blindspots. First, where the West German 
government was making confident predictions, it was also sending out warning signals. 
For example,  the Guardian  reported one  such transmission with the headline:  "East 
Germany faces mass unemployment, says Bonn". 23  The day after monetary union, the 
West German Economics Minister, Helmut Hausmann, stated that it was "essential for 
investment that over the next three to five years low wages and longer working hours 
prevail in East Germany".  24 Second, a focus solely on the stock market did not tell the 
whole story about market responses to monetary union.  As Milner pointed out in the 
Guardian, the stock markets were buoyant because they were speculating on potential 
profits to made from wholesale investment in the East by big West German companies. 
A look at the bond market revealed a different  picture.  It was counting the costs.  It 
would  have  to  pay  the  bills  and  underwrite  public  spending  on  bringing  the  East 
German  infrastructure  up  to  West  German  standards. 25  Hutton  estimated  an 
expenditure of £45  billion  on transport,  £ 1  0 billion  on  new  power  stations,  not  to 
mention investment on health, education and housing: "Small wonder the German bond 
market  .. .is a trifle shaky". 26 Reporting German unification  175 
In contrast with the BBC, ITN eschewed stock market speculation altogether: 
West  German  ministers  who  devised  and  forced  through  monetary  union  are 
confident about its  impact. ... However,  as the last visible  barriers were removed 
today (FILM,  CHECKPOINT  POSTS  TAKEN  A  WAY),  there  are  doubts  about how 
quickly that dynamism can revive the East. (MY EMPHASIS) 
They also reported  doubts over the West German government's optimistic predictions: 
But there are clear uncertainties about this overnight transformation of  a state-run 
economy to the free-market. .. This factory .. .1ike almost every other, was producing 
too much - even before monetary union.  Now it  may be forced to close.  Today, 
4,000 metal workers  staged a lightning strike because of  fears of  unemployment  -
action that might become common-place throughout East German industry.  (MY 
EMPHASES)  (lTN, 22.00, 2.7.90) 
In spite of all these doubts, the timetable for full  political unity continued to confound 
all  expectations. There were still many complicated problems to address, not least on 
the international level,  and it was thought that these would be resolved in time for a 
special  sitting  of  the  CSCE  in  November.27  Yet,  the  Four-Plus-Two  Talks  had 
finalised a treaty by September, allowing full  unification on 3 October. Alex Brummer 
described the whole process as "the big Bang theory carried to the ultimate": 
The speed at which  events have  moved,  stampeded by  Helmut  Kohl,  is  simply 
astonishing.  It is  like  watching  (the  soccer  player)  Lothar Matthaeus storming 
towards the goal in (World Cup 1990). They have been unstoppable as a Panzer 
division.  No amount of  diplomatic disguise,  in the shape of  the two plus four 
formula, the European Community, NATO or even Mrs Thatcher has been able to 
withstand  the  pressure.  We  have  all  been  bowled over  by Dr Kohl,  the  only 
European  statesman who knew firmly where he was going.  His steam roller has 
balked at nothing .... {His) willingness ... to gamble all for a place in the pantheon of 
German leadership,  in  the name  of Das Volk,  has  inspired  imitation  in  finance, 
industry and commerce.28  (MY EMPHASES) 
The Independent advertised its coverage of Unity Day with this box notice: 
It is the cabaret act of  the season in Bonn: the German jaw jutting, shouts,  'Come 
on, of  course we can pay, we're Germans! What,  the Americans want afew billion 
for the  Gulf,  no problem.  Ah,  the  Russians,  too,  only 20  billion,  petty cash. 
Poles,  Israelis? hand me  that cheque  book.  This  is Germany,  we  can afford 
anything!' German unification this week in the Independent.29 Reporting German unification  176 
The jibes at the  pace and manner of unification appeared to vindicate Habermas when 
he  argued that the opportunity for  a  new  and  permanent  German  constitution  was 
being missed by the short-sightedness of  what he called "Deutschmark Nationalism".30 
The writer Gunter Grass saw the German mark as  "a  substitute for thought,  an  all-
purpose adhesive" .31  Tony Barber reported that economic chaos and widespread fear 
and  anxiety  still  reigned  in  the  east,  while  those  in  the  West  harboured  growing 
resentment that they would ultimately pay the price of  unity. This was hardly surprising 
"when one considers that the cost. .. will run into hundreds of  billions of marks over the 
next  decade:  far  more than originally  predicted,  and  likely  to mean  higher taxes".32 
The Guardian warned that the "internal strains of reunification are already evident as 
stress marks on the surface of official joy".  It noted Kohl's unrestrained optimism and 
underlined how relative this could prove to be: 
The structural changes  now underway backed  by  new technology  and  a  strong 
Deutschmark, are supposed to create a new German lift-off with jobs across all his 
new  land.  But  it  will  require  a  combination  of faith  and  sheer  German 
determination to see this through. First,  the dislocation of  the East's economy, its 
loss of  social benefits a grim counterpoint to the loss of  jobs, has to be weathered. 
The most optimistic forecast is that it will get worse before it  starts to get  better 
in the mid-1990s. If  there is a world recession, can even the strongest currency in 
Europe bear the load?33 
Brasier reported that  criticisms about the huge costs was by  now taboo in  German 
public debate.  Chancellor Kohl's political opponents were finding  it  difficult to use it 
against him - an ideal  situation given the extent to which Germany was sinking into 
debt.  Figures for the real costs varied greatly between media accounts depending on 
their source and what they included in their calculations.  Brasier quoted the German 
Ministry of  Finance which had just revised the budget for the third time  and revealed 
that the country would go into the red to the tune of DMI00 million  (£34  million), 
increasing by another DM50 million the following year.  This compared with a DM 5 
million surplus in  1989. These  figures did  not include a range of costs in  the private 
and  public  sectors  which  neither  government  nor  banks  had  begun  to  consider.34 
Munchau  cited  more  far-ranging  estimate  from  the  Deutsches  Institut  fur 
Wirtschaftsjorschung which forecast that  the budget deficit would quadruple in  1991 
from  DM30 billion in  1989.35 
But there were other,  more optimistic  soothsayers who  continued to  argue that  the 
pain was worth it and that a new, better Germany would emerge as the leading power 
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through  reunification  when  many ... saw  only  the  dangers  and  the  pnce,  not  the 
advantages  ... Unification  was  a  German  choice  and  the  country  should  accept  the 
financial  burden as it will  expect to reap the benefit". 36  Frankland concluded that the 
freedom  that  the  east  German  people  had  won  was  worth  bearing  in  mind  when 
talking about the costs of  unification. 37  Neal Ascherson argued that "the omens were 
good"  for the new Germany in that it was not being founded as "the fulfilment of an 
ideal".  Whereas Bismarck, Hitler and Honecker led their German polities to disaster, 
the Weimar and Federal republics were "delivered down the chimney"  to become the 
only two decent German states in recent history.38 This does not seem to be a judicious 
use  of history  given  that  the  Weimar  Republic's  'decency'  did  not  save  it  from 
economic chaos and  political extremism. 
As  with the  press,  television  news  continued  to  accommodate  both  optimistic  and 
pessimistic views of unity, but in the final  analysis their framework continued to give 
unification the benefit of the doubt.  Both ITN and  BBC News reported that  huge 
economic  difficulties  persisted  in  spite of  Helmut  Kohl's  promises to the East and 
West Germans alike that the upturn was just around the comer: 
Here, outside the Reichstag, Berlin's former parliament, there will be an enormous 
party. But the jollity will  hide the subdued reality of hardship and uncertainty, of 
the price Germany must pay, both in unemployment and hard cash,  a price which 
the leader of the  opposition  Social  Democrats told  me  continues  to be  under-
estimated.  (Channel Four News, 2.10.90) 
The  problems  of unity  are  enormous.  West  Germans  must  find  the  money  to 
rebuild the East.  It'll cost hundreds of billions  of pounds and  take well  into  the 
next century. Meantime, the east must cope with the consequences of dropping a 
state-run economy into a free market. Two-thirds of  their industrial companies are 
predicted to close, and half their work-force lose their jobs within a year. 
(BBC1, 21.00, 2.10.90) 
The big nightmare in  East Germany is  unemployment.  Short-time working hides 
the  true  extent  of it,  now  about  2  and  a  half million,  a  third  of the  working 
population.  (BBC2, Newsnight, 22.30, 2.10.90) 
A  week  before the East German election in  1990, BBC Panorama  considered the 
likely result  and,  while arguing that unity was almost inevitable,  raised the spectre of 
it  going terribly wrong: Reporting German unification  178 
Although many people initially rejoiced with the Germans, it hasn't taken long for 
the euphoria to fade, in Germany and abroad  ... Mating a Communist with a market 
economy  poses  a  challenge  for  Germany.  It  could  become  an  economic 
superpower but such is the run-down state of  East Germany that it could prove 
more burden than opportunity.39  (BBCl, 12.3.90) 
In BBC's Notes in the Margin series,  Will  Hutton looked  at  the economic  options 
open to East Germany in context with events throughout Eastern Europe. He  analysed 
the search in  east Germany, and by  extension Eastern Europe as  a whole,  for a way 
forward in the wake of  the so-called 'revolution'. Hutton first considered the brand of 
economics that had prevailed in Britain and the US throughout the eighties and which 
now claimed to have triumphed over communism.  'Thatcherism'  and  'Reaganomics', 
however,  were  part  of a  'spiv  culture',  the  wholesale  speculation  of the  state's 
economic resources in the financial markets: 
Easy money has created in Britain and the USA alike not so  much an enterprise 
but a spiv culture. To make money you've got to guess the events of the next five 
minutes, not the five years that real economic life requires.  40 
The disastrous effects of this for these economies were only just becoming apparent. 
They were sliding into deepening recession without a sound manufacturing base:  this 
they had already destroyed themselves.  Hutton  then argued that  gradual adoption of 
the social-market system of  West Germany was in fact the ideal for the East Germans. 
It was a system that evolved out of a consensus between capital and labour,  and  an 
abiding commitment to investment in  manufacturing and technology,  and to research 
and development.  In tum, the running of the economy was controlled by a system of 
public accountability not by a regime of financial  deregulation.  "And",  as  Hutton so 
succinctly put it,  "it works!".  But Kohl abandoned whatever chances there were  to 
manage unification in this way in favour of the 'fast track' and the 'fast buck'.  The rush 
to  unity  was  a  gamble  that  not  only  pushed  East  Germany  into  chaos  but  also 
damaged West Germany's economy. 
Reporting social and political unification 
News reports also highlighted the serious social divisions  between East and West that 
threatened real unity  between the  people. Throughout the process of  unification there 
was  a  persistent  and  profound  disdain  among  West  Germans  for  East  Germans. 
Sometimes it bordered on racism. There was  little sympathy for their grievances about 
unemployment and their fears for a western 'take-over'. West Germans only anticipated 
the rising cost of unification and its impact on their standard of living.  According to Reporting German unification  179 
Tony Barber,  the West German  media  produced  an  image  of East  Germans  as  a 
people incapable of  making informed decisions, and thus unready to meet the demands 
of sophisticated life  in  the West.  They would need the guidance of Big Brother for 
some time to come: "Articles in ... magazines describe the lifestyles of East Germans as 
if they  were  talking  not  about  brothers  and  sisters  but  about  freaks  from  another 
continent".41  A Channel Four News reporter remarked that: 
Unification is meant to unite the people of Germany but one negative side of the 
process has been the animosity between some  westerners  and  some  easterners, 
almost racist with unpleasant undertones.  (3.10.90) 
Michael Farr wrote that,  "When the unity party is over and world attention is  turned 
away,  the  new  Germany's  ... people  will  have  to  set  about  achieving  'inner 
reunification"'.42  The Guardian argued that the unity celebrations did  not  "mask the 
strongly subterranean dislike  felt  by  many  West  Germans  for their comrades in  the 
East".43  Barber pointed out that West  Germans  took some  years  after the  second 
world war to recover their dignity and sense of pride. East Germans would experience 
the  same time lag in  terms of their standard of living  but,  more critically,  "the East 
German  sense of humiliation  is  also  caused  by  a  feeling  that  West  Germans  have 
geared themselves up, in  a slightly self-righteous way to be tutors in  democracy to a 
misled people".44 This was not an  unreasonable feeling.  The West German journalist, 
Thomas Kielinger,  captured the sea-change in opinion.  When the Wall came down in 
November,  he  ridiculed the East German reformer Jens Reich on Newsnight for being 
fearful of what the event might mean for his people. There was much to celebrate, not 
least the entrepreneurial spirit of  the East German people and the prospects of  German 
unity  (see Chapter Five).  Six months later, his tune had changed: 
West Germans will not simply roll over and pay any prices for a privilege they, put 
coldly, can well do without. For example, should the new leaders in East Germany 
choose to  request  rewriting  of the  West  German  constitution  as  part  of their 
coming under one German roof,  one can safely  predict that this  request will  be 
courteously but firmly  rejected by a no-nonsense population in  the  West.  They 
have learned too well to enjoy the renaissance of  democracy in their country to be 
inclined to tamper with its foundations. 45 
On the eve of  German unity,  Newsnight's Charles Wheeler reported on how the wider 
political  and  administrative  structures in  East Germany  were  undergoing a  process 
similar to that of  de-nazification in West Germany after world  war two: 
Like Germany in  1945, this is a state and a system in abject defeat, waiting to be 
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be purged, what we used to call de-NaziJication, with public servants being taught 
that their primary concern is no longer the extension of  the power of  the party and 
the  state.  For weeks  now,  West  German  officials  have  been  helping  to  set  up 
regional government here,  closely modelled on the West German Lander.46  (MY 
EMPHASIS)  (BBC2, Newsnight, 22.30, 2.10.90) 
Jonathan Steele wrote of a counterrevolution in  the east  that  swept away  even the 
most  enlightened  policies  on  education,  welfare,  women's  rights,  and  culture.  47  A 
more sinister aspect of this  counter-revolution was the witch-hunt  for  state  security 
(Stasi) agents. Various estimates put the number of  east Germans who worked or even 
merely had contact with the Stasi at between half a million to six million. 48 For a great 
majority, the association  was formal and  routine because of their membership of the 
communist party.  The witch-hunt - real  or imagined  - was  instilling  fear,  suspicion, 
paranoia and guilt in the minds of  millions of  East Germans. 
It was ultimately a question of  winners and losers, of leading and following.  The News 
at Ten led with a story that seemed to sum up their perception of the order of things, 
unification notwithstanding. The bulletin opened with the image  of a brand new West 
German car full of happy passengers followed by a rickety old Trabant, the symbol of 
all  East Germany stood for in  Western eyes:  broken down and going nowhere.  The 
headline was: 
Germans - all united now - learn who leads (Family in  Volkswagen saloon),  and 
who follows (Family in Trabant). 
The family in the Volkswagen were identified as former  'refugees' who had come to 
West Germany on the first 'wave' in the summer of 1989. ITN retell their story -
how they got to West Germany and how they found jobs and prosperity. Now it was 
their tum to welcome their friends from the east and show them the ways of life in the 
West: 
Then, (they) took their friends to see the sights, their shiny new car an inspiration 
to the  newcomers  following  in  their  old  East  model,  as  obsolete  now  as  the 
country that made it.  (ITN, 22.00, 3.10.90) 
In  the final  analysis,  the news  maintained  their overall  framework,  that  is  that  unity 
would ultimately absorb and surmount  all difficulties: 
The  merger of two  disparate  economic  systems  will  be  costly  and  painful,  bill 
these are Germans and they'll make it work. (MY EMPHASIS) 
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Despite these celebrations, there are also fears for the future.  In the east,  where 
the economy is  collapsing  and  unemployment  is  rising,  and  in  the  West  where 
they're  having  to  pay  an  enormous  price  for  unification.  But all  that  is for 
tomorrow.  Tonight, the revellers can only give thanks that their two nations are 
finally  becoming  one and  that they  are  here  for  the  moment  of history  they've 
waited so long to see  .. .In fact,  an opinion poll of Germans East and West shows 
88% of  them are behind reunification. Though some think it's being badly rushed, 
there's  little  they  can  do  about  that  now  except  to  make  the  new  nation 
work. .. The unification party here has perhaps been a little smaller than expected 
but that's because Germans were anxious  all  along  not to make this  look like  a 
display of  nationalism, just a display of  joy.  (BBCl, 21.00, 3.10.90) 
Just in case the party does get out of  hand, 3,000 riot police are waiting in the side 
streets but so far the atmosphere remains festive.  The party's warming up just two 
hours now to unity.  Time  to enjoy the unexpected, plenty of  weeks afterwards to 
count the cost and adjust to the new ways.  (ITN, 22.00, 2.10.90) 
The police referred to in the last quote were in fact deployed in Berlin hours later to 
break up an  anarchist  demonstration  against  unification.  As  might  be  expected,  the 
news reported this as an aberration, an illegitimate act of  protest, and a damper on the 
party.  But  this  protest  was  part  of the  wider  backlash  of political  radicalism  in 
Germany,  especially from  the Far Right,  that  was only becoming  apparent  in  this 
period and that is  still  haunting the German establishment years after unity.  With its 
uncomfortable resonance with Nazism in the Weimar Republic, it became a major and 
persistent news story in the media which reported it within a changing framework for 
understanding the new united Germany. A cursory glance at coverage of key moments 
in  the years since unity  illustrates this point quite succinctly.  I looked at prime-time 
news reporting of  anniversaries of  unity and the fall  of the Berlin Wall,  and also their 
coverage of  major demonstrations and racist violence by German neo-Nazis. 
Reporting the aftermath 
One  year  after the  East  German  election,  Barbara Beck  reported  that,  "The  East 
German economic miracle,  once pencilled in  to start late in  1991,  will  be indefinitely 
delayed".  This,  she  said,  was  on  no  lesser  authority  than  the  President  of the 
Bundesbank,  Karl  Otto  Pohl.  He  referred  to  monetary  union  as  a  "disaster"  and 
thought that eastern Germany was "completely uncompetitive".  Beck went on: Reporting German unification  182 
Disaster is the right word. The economy of  the "new Lander", as they are known, 
is in free fall  and the parachute of  investment, from West Germany and abroad, is 
refusing to open. Of  a workforce of  under 9 million, 3 million will soon be jobless, 
and the crowds that once lionised Helmut Kohl ... are back on the streets in a mood 
of  fury and despair.49 
Huge  differentials  in  rates  of pay,  employment,  and  production  were  operung  up 
between  east  and  west.  Germany  was  united  but  economists  continued  to  make 
separate estimates and forecasts for the western half and the eastern half  50 
David Gow has reported on Germany's progress since unification.  In  1991, two years 
after  the Wall,  he looked at the range of predictions for the future,  from doomsday 
prophecies  to  the  wild  optimism  of planners  and  politicians.  He  concluded  that 
"Germany, as yet, appears unable to develop a vision of  its own future in a Europe tom 
between  west and east and  subjected to new and  old hopes and  suspicions from  all 
sides" .  51  In an article from  1992, headed "In The Kohl Light Of Morning",  he wrote 
that "Germany has been living in a dream world since the euphoric days of the fall  of 
the Wall and of unification but, even so,  the scales of illusion about its new tasks are 
taking an inordinately long time to drop from the eyes of  its 80 million citizens".  And, 
he added:  "Unification has simply hastened a profound challenge  to the assumptions 
and  behaviour that have lain  behind  West Germany's  post-war economic  miracle".52 
In January 1993, he asked "Who's still afraid of Germany?" Not many,  it  seemed, for 
"The  big  bad  wolf of popular  imagery,  towering  over  Europe  economically  and 
straining at the leash to impose its political will over both the western and eastern parts 
of the continent,  is  turning out to be  a  sheep".53  Gow's  line  of  vision,  then,  was 
entirely  consistent  throughout  the  three  or  four  years  since  the  heady  days  of 
November 1989.  He showed  it was possible to see, even at an early stage and without 
much extraordinary effort, that  the official German drive for high-speed unity, and its 
supportive rhetoric,  was  fundamentally flawed. 
The Financial Times Survey of Germany,  25  October  1993  ran  to twelve  pages of 
special feature items on the on-going public debate about Germany's ability to compete 
internationally and how that touched on the country's socio-economic fabric.  Popularly 
referred to as Standort Deutschland,  the debate had been bubbling under for  ten or 
more years but had been brought to the surface by a number of factors:  the impact of 
unification and European integration, the collapse of east European markets,  in which 
Germany had invested heavily over the years, and increased competition from  the Far 
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Germany's  much vaunted consensus between capital and  labour. 55  Economists came 
under fire for their inaccurate predictions.  56  In an interview with Christopher Parkes, 
the chairman of the much-troubled car firm,  Volkswagen,  argued that  only  20%  of 
German industry's  problems stemmed from labour  - the blame for the other 80% lay 
with management.  57 
On  the  socio-political  front,  the  unemployment  rate  in  eastern  Germany  was 
outstripping that of  the west and was provoking a review of  the state benefit system. 58 
This  was just  one  of many  rethinks  in  social  policy  since  unification  and  it  was 
provoking a  widespread backlash against the established political parties. In the run up 
to  1994,  a  super-election year,  this  could  lead  to unsatisfactory  coalitions  between 
bitter  opponents  at  a  time  when  decisive  leadership  was  urgently  required. 59  The 
problem was exacerbated in  the East,  where the witch hunt  for  Stasi  agents among 
public officials inhibited talented people from putting themselves forward for election. 
"Paradoxically",  noted Judy Dempsey,  "the newly found freedom has had the bizarre 
and  disturbing effect of silencing them".  The result?  The  same  weak politicians that 
were elected on western coat-tails in  March  1990 would remain in  office.  Dempsey 
concluded: 
The  disappointment  is  caused  not  just  by  high  unemployment,  or  failed 
expectations raised by ... Kohl when he said in 1990 that eastern Germany would be 
a  "blossoming landscape in  a few  years",  and  that  "no  one would  be worse off 
after unification".  It  is  a  sense  of powerless  fuelled  by  the  feeling  of imposed 
shame; the loss of the Voice because its words are not believed; the loss of the 
spontaneity and  civic  courage which  helped  to break down the Berlin  Wall.  If 
Standort Deutschland is to have political meaning, it must help break the silence in 
the east.60 
The Treuhand, the special agency  set up in  1989 to manage the privatisation of east 
German industries, was fast earning the  distinction of  being even less popular than the 
Honecker  regime.  It  was  commissioned  to  close  inefficient  and  uncompetitive 
factories down and put the most promising up for sale.  Its most immediate and  most 
visible impact on the economy was to push unemployment up even higher.  And, in the 
long-term,  it  tried  to  save  factories  that  had  lost  their  original  markets  in  eastern 
Europe, which collapsed,  and which would or could never compete with their carbon 
copies in  the West.  The only  serious buyers appeared to be either big western firms 
which  closed  them  down  to  snuff out  the  competition,  or  western  real  estate 
speculators hungry for a fast  profit on the land.61  In  1991,  the BBC2 series,  Forty 
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Varna. The film  showed the effects of privatisation on working people who had been 
guaranteed job security for all  or most of their lives.  Now their company was up for 
sale  and they faced  almost  certain unemployment.  The future  seemed to offer only 
different versions of the same fate.  Would a western competitor buy them out and 
close them down? Or would a real estate firm buy them out and close them down? The 
film  looks  at  the  situation from  a  variety  of perspectives:  the manager  from  West 
Germany whose job it  is  to rationalise  the  operation for  privatisation,  the workers' 
representative whose job was to chair a committee to decide which workers should be 
made redundant and then inform them by  letter,  and a worker who was single with 
three children to look after. By intercutting from one to the other, the film  conveyed 
the real  nature of the  process,  that  ultimately  the  fate  of these  people  was  being 
controlled by forces in the west totally alien to them.  The worker, Rosie,  sees little 
hope of  getting another job given her personal situation. Even the wages she earned at 
Varna remained low while her rent had increased from  147 marks in November 1989 
to 572 marks two years later. She said that when the wall came down: 
It was wonderful  and we thought we'll  create a different  GDR.  No one would 
have said then that things would tum out the way they did with unification. And if 
unification  had  to  come,  we  wanted  West  Germany  and  the  GDR  to  grow 
together.  But at  the  moment,  it  seems  that  everything  from  the  GDR is  being 
wound up and that we're blindly adopting everything from the West, whether  it's 
good or bad. 
The film  ends with the news that the speculators had struck a deal only to pull out at 
the eleventh hour with an  announcement that they were unwilling to inherit Varna's 
debts.  The company is  put back on the market and the process has to start allover 
again. 62 
On  the first  anniversary of the  fall  of the  Wall,  the  main  theme  in  news  accounts 
appeared to be the 'hang-over after the party',  the sense of  disillusionment that  quickly 
took over from the euphoria of November 1989. The  Western promises had not been 
fulfilled: 
(CAPTION,  "A BlITER BERLIN AFTERMATH")  And  a special report one year after 
the breaching of the Berlin Wall:  bank robbery, corruption and disillusionment in 
the East.  (Channel Four News,  19.00, 8.11.90) Reporting German unification  185 
It was on  November 9  1989 that the East German  authorities  lifted  the  travel 
restrictions that had kept their people hemmed in.  And the people responded in an 
explosion of energy which  swept away the East German  state.  In  elections this 
March, East Germans voted for unification with their neighbours whose lifestyle 
they had coveted for so long. The Wall in pieces had become a collector's item.  A 
year on it's still being dismantled but the crowds have gone and the glamour has 
faded. Freedom spelt the end of  many problems but the beginning of many others. 
After the initial rush of  elation, life has settled back to become, once again, a hard 
slog for East Germans.  (BBCl, 21.00, 9.11.90) 
In the second and third year after the Wall,  the economic chaos in the East persisted 
but it was the violent backlash it gave rise to that captured the headlines.  They frame 
the problem  as humanitarian rather than economic: 
In Berlin, more than 30,000 people turned out to show their solidarity with the 
asylum-seekers  who've  been  attacked  and  fire-bombed  by  neo-Nazis.  Just  two 
years after the  Wall came down,  Germany is once again becoming a polarised 
country.  The divisions now are not between east and west but between tolerance 
and intolerance.  (lTN, 20.45, 9.11.91) 
Headline:  A Berlin rally by  350,000 Germans protesting against growing racism 
has  been disrupted by  violence.  Riot  police  moved  in  as  eggs and  paint  bombs 
were thrown at Germany's President 
Reporter:  It was  planned  as  a  great  demonstration  on  a  national  scale  - the 
German people showing their rejection of racism and the hatred of foreigners.  It 
was timed  on the eve of the  double  anniversary of Hitler's  pogrom against  the 
Jews and the coming down of  the Wall three  years ago. (BBCl, 21.00, 8.11.92) 
Three weeks after these demonstrations,  neo-Nazis killed  three Turkish people in  a 
fire-bomb attack on their apartment house. The ITN reporter referred back to the New 
Year's Eve Party at the Brandenburg Gate in 1989: 
When  they  opened  the  Brandenburg  Gate,  no  one  believed  Germany  was 
reopening the floodgates to her  Nazi past but, three years after the collapse of  the 
Berlin Wall, the spread of right-wing extremism has already dented her reputation 
abroad and, if  it's not stemmed, could endanger the stability of  the country itself. 
(lTN, 22.00, 23.11.92) Reporting German unification  186 
The first anniversary of  Unity Day, 3 October 1991, was also marked by violence: 
Celebrations to mark the first anniversary of  the unification of  Germany have been 
marred by clashes involving neo-Nazi groups and anarchists. 
(Channel Four News, 3.10.91) 
Newscaster:  The  German  Chancellor,  Helmut  Kohl,  has  been  jostled  by 
demonstrators during the second Anniversary of German reunification.  Later, he 
condemned attacks against foreigners and acknowledged that economic recovery 
in eastern Germany will take longer than he has first thought. 
Reporter:  But this was also a national holiday. Many people enjoyed it, especially 
in the east where they really do prefer the new Germany to the old one. 
(BBC1, 21.50, 3.10.92) 
ITN's  report on the incident  reached a  different conclusion: 
But the euphoria of two years  ago  has  gone.  As  Chancellor Kohl  discovered, 
unification alone is not enough. He must now deliver a better future. 
(ITN, 23.00, 3.10.92) 
The  third  anniversary  of German  unity,  on  3  October  1993,  was  not  reported  or 
marked  in  the main  peak-time  news  bulletins  but  BBC Breakfast News  featured  a 
special report  from Berlin by Brian Hanrahan.  He introduced his film  report with the 
remark that: 
I haven't been to Berlin since the country was unified and what's surprising is how 
little has really changed. Even without the Wall,  Berlin is still a frontline between 
East and West.  Unemployment in the East is  officially double Western levels and 
some even say it's much higher. It's differences like that that keep the two sides oj 
the city separated, with each turning in on itself  (BBC, 07.45, 3.10.93) 
Two common themes, then, emerge from  coverage over this long period of time:  the 
persistence  of economic  stagnation  and  hardship,  especially  in  the  former  East 
Germany, and  the rise of  political alienation and violence.  But television news seemed 
to take longer than the press to move away from the notion that  the fall  of the wall 
and German unity was good news for the East German people: that in socio-economic 
and psychological terms, the Berlin Wall never came down. Channel Four News picked 
up on this at an early stage, on the first anniversary of  the Fall: 
The  new citizens  of a  united  Germany  face  a  very  different  future  from  that 
envisaged  a  year  ago.  Few  guessed  how  fast  the  East  German  state  would 
disintegrate. (JUXTAPOSITION OF IMAGES: EUPHORIA AT THE WALL.  1989 - URBAN Reporting German unification  187 
POVERTY, EAST BERLIN 1990) But it's clear  that one year after the euphoria of last 
November,  the  removal  of the  concrete Wall  that  divided  East  from  West  has 
revealed different barriers which  can't be  so  easily  demolished.  Here,  it's being 
called the Wall in the mind, a vast difference in thinking and attitude. 
(Channel Four News,  19.00,8.11.90) 
Three years later, Brian Hanrahan concluded: 
The Wall has gone  ... (but) not every one likes the insecurity about jobs and homes 
that came with freedom.  The  Wall's  been replaced by a  void of understanding 
that matches the physical gash which still cuts across the  city.  (IMAGES  FROM 
NOVEMBER 1989)  It was here in  the Potsdamer Platz that Berliners  symbolically 
celebrated their unification. I remember the police from east and west linking arms 
between a crossing point through the barbed wire and the watch-towers. But the 
two halves of  the city soon pulled back to separate lives ...  The two Germanys had 
40 years to grow apart.  They won't grow together again just three or four.  It will 
take a new generation to do it.  (BBCl, Breakfast News, 4.10.93) 
Conclusion 
The examples offered above suggest that for the most part, television news only ever 
offered  superficial view of Germany after unification. But was there a concurrent and 
readily  accessible alternative perspective? Examples from  concurrent press coverage 
show that it did not require inordinate amounts of time and  space to present a fuller 
and more detailed picture, and a more critical stance. 
When the Berlin Wall came down,  journalists readily acknowledged that it spelled the 
end  of the Cold War as  understood by East and  West.  They accepted that the  old 
political and economic certainties were no longer valid making the future much more 
difficult  to predict.  The  problem was  most  immediate  in  the  two Germanies  where 
people east and west expected to make important decisions about the future.  Yet,  as 
shown in Chapter 5,  the German government quickly took advantage of  the prevailing 
euphoria to set out on  an  supposedly 'inevitable',  'fast-track' to German unity.  In 
absence of certainty, television news seemed to settle for that option and followed  it 
through to eventual unity on 3 October and far beyond.  They did not see that the 'fast-
track' option was ill-judged and hastily conducted. They acknowledged the persistence 
of serious economic problems in  the former East Germany but explained all  these as 
legacies of communism  rather than  the  result  of  derailment.  They  proclaimed  the 
advent of democracy in  East Germany but saw no contradiction between this and the Reporting German unification  188 
extent of  western interference and management in the 1990 election, and the expedient 
interpretation of the Basic Law to hasten unity before the West German elections in 
December 1990.  It does not require hindsight to reach this judgement. The evidence 
and the critique were available in concurrent coverage by  the liberal press. 
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189 CHAPTER SEVEN: 
Visions of a new world order in the news: a  paradigm found? 
1. Introduction 
German reunification took place in a post-Cold war world robbed of certainties.  The 
news media readily acknowledged that was so and it is their attempt to make sense of 
world-wide events in that  context  that forms the basis of  this last  chapter. 
The term 'New World Order' has been used to signify  a conceptual world view that 
replaces  the  Cold  War paradigm  in  the  post-Cold  war era.  Yet  the  term  is  highly 
problematic.  In a period when war and conflict appear to break out on a daily basis 
somewhere, it seems right to question it, to pose it as a problem of definition much as 
that explored in Chapter Three in respect to the East German 'refugees'.  The problem 
is that as a category it does not accommodate the empirical realities of  what is actually 
going on in the world.  Thus journalists might adopt it as an interpretative framework 
for  reporting the post-Cold War world only to find  that  it  fails  to explain the very 
global crises and conflicts that have taken place in the period.  Only a few years after 
the Wall,  some news media were already thinking  in terms of  a 'New World Disorder' 
that, as Hugo Young wrote, "touches its presumptive masters as well as its undoubted 
victims".1  In a special feature for the Independent on Sunday, Cal McCrystal  argued 
that,  "Despite the end of  the Cold War and promises of a 'New World Order', we are 
continually  reminded  that  war  remains  a  bad  habit".  He  estimated  that  there  were 
around 30 'substantial' conflicts around the globe.2  The Observer commented on  "A 
world crying out for order", arguing that,  " 'The New World Order' was not just over 
optimistic: it was stupidly misleading.  Order was always the last thing that was going 
to be achieved".  3  Certainly, from the perspective of the so-called 'Third World',  the 
post-Cold War  era already stands as  a disastrous time.  Panama,  Iraq,  Somalia,  and 
Haiti are just some examples of what Western peace-keeping and peace-enforcement 
can do for the powerless in  the name of  the New World Order.  For them,  little  or 
nothing has changed.  4 
The notion of  a 'New World Disorder' has also been cited as reason for the big powers 
to  exercise their military  muscle  and  boost the defence  budget.  This  was the most 
dominant of  the two broad world views to emerge from media debate about the post-
Cold  War order.  It emphasised  the  need  for  the  West  to  keep  its  existing  security 
structures in tact, to keep its guard up.  In an uncertain world,  instability was the new 
enemy and it came in  a variety of forms.  For example,  Mark Urban pointed out the 
dangers of  nuclear weapons falling  into the hands of a 'Middle Eastern despot' or a 
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'deranged Soviet colonel' (Newsnight, 8.1l.91). There was also the 'war on drugs; and 
the threat of  Islamic fundamentalism, and  nationalism. 
The alternative view was of  a transformed security, economic and political order in the 
world, based on the Helsinki process and tied in with the United Nations. The existing 
military alliances would atrophy and  no  one power would assume the task of global 
policing.  This view was pushed by the Soviets in the run up to German unification but 
it was never taken seriously by western governments for whom the preservation of  the 
status quo - a US-led Atlantic Alliance - was paramount.  And it was never  taken very 
seriously by television news media who continued to approach security issues from the 
dominant perspective. 
With these definitional problems in  mind  how can we approach an  analysis of media 
coverage? In Chapter Two, I referred to Chomsky's argument that essentially there are 
two broad paradigms for understanding the Cold War - as ideological construct, or as 
historical process.5 
The view of  the Cold War as an ideological construct was the dominant  paradigm in 
western discourse throughout the period.  It is  this,  I would argue,  that explains the 
difficulty in  making sense of the 'post Cold War' world.  As  shown in  Chapter Three, 
journalists presented the definitive history of the Cold War as being the continuation 
of the second world war,  a conflict between two  superpowers that represented and 
brought  into  confrontation  a  whole  range  of economic,  political  and  ideological 
oppositions. From its construction in  1961,  the Berlin Wall was seen as a visible sign 
of  East-West divisions, just as its demise in  1989 was taken as marking their symbolic 
end.  But at that same moment of defining the past journalists were immediately left to 
confront uncertainty in the present and future.  This apparent end to the Cold War left 
the West without an enemy as a focus of  ideological consensus and coherence. If  there 
was any triumphalism after the Berlin Wall it soon evaporated. 
In  the  first  few  months  after  the Berlin  Wall,  the  rhetoric  of various  international 
summits on security and economics (e.g.  the 1989 superpower summit in Malta;  the 
1990  NATO Summit in London; the 1990 G7 summit in Houston) seemed to confirm 
for journalists the persistence of uncertainty in  western thinking.  But then came the 
Gulf  crisis  a crucial  watershed that  marked the transformation of western rhetoric  , 
back to certainty and  which  seemed  on  the surface to  replace  the  Cold  War as  a 
referential framework for interpreting world events.  The apparent ease with which the 
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technological  superiority of western military forces,  and  the sudden rehabilitation of 
the United Nations,  seemed to signal the advent of the 'New World Order'.  Shortly 
after the war,  the Group of  Seven  of the  world's  'richest'  economies,  gathered  in 
London for  a triumphant summit.  BBC  News reported that: 
The  leaders  this  morning  published  far-reaching  political  declarations.  They 
amount to the first tentative steps in building the long-awaited New World Order. 
They're  shedding  their  inhibitions  about  states  concerning  themselves  in  the 
internal affairs of  others.  (BBC1, 21.00, 16.7.91) 
It seems somewhat ahistorical to talk in  terms of  Western  powers"  shedding their 
inhibitions"  about managing world affairs.  It takes no account of the past and makes 
presumptions  about  the  future.  Thus,  the  Gulf War  marks  Year  Zero,  ignoring 
centuries of  imperialist conquest and domination, while the 'New World Order' is taken 
not  as  a  highly  particularised  and  provisional  form  of public  expression  but  as  an 
entirely new system of international relations.  Since the  Gulf War,  the concept of a 
'New World Order'  has  hardly  survived  the US-UN debacles  in  Cambodia and  in 
Somalia,  the civil war in Bosnia, or the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people 
in  Rwanda. These instances have exposed  inaction and division in the west's response 
to crisis and they mark a return to 'uncertainty' as a central theme in western discourse. 
This, however, is not to argue that there is no order in the world. To adopt a historical 
paradigm is to work within a framework that accommodates certain continuities  such 
as  the struggles between capital  and  labour,  imperialism  and  nationalism,  North and 
South that  have  characterised  the  western  concept  of  'a  world  order'.6  Analysing 
events  in  the post-Cold War era within  this framework would  certainly  make  more 
sense because order would be understood as  an  empirical category,  as that which is 
constructed and imposed by the dominant world powers, not by an idealistic collective 
of nations.  To think of  the 'New  World  Order'  through the historical paradigm  is 
to think of the realpolitik of dominant powers, what they are actually about beneath 
the rhetoric and the propaganda.  The historical paradigm would also view the  Cold 
War  as  a  specific  and  provisional  phase  in  a  much  deeper,  much  more  structured 
system  of relations  between capital  and  labour.  Its  continuity  transcends  restrictive 
'Cold  War'  - 'end  of Cold  War'  frameworks  and  serves  as  a  more  efficient,  less 
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It is  my  purpose in  this  chapter to use  these  analytical  paradigms  to  differentiate 
between the rhetoric of 'New World Order' (ideological construct) and the rhetoric of 
realpolitik  (historical  process),  and  show  how  they  are  mediated  through  British 
television news and current affairs.  I focused on coverage of  two types of  events from 
the period late  1989 to early  1994:  those which yielded  official  'New World Order' 
rhetoric  (e.g.  international  security  and  economic  summits,  UN  peacekeeping 
operations  in  Bosnia  and  Somalia);  and  those  which  yielded  official  'realpolitilC 
rhetoric  (US  military  interventions  in  Panama,  the  Gulf,  Somalia,  and  the  West's 
contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union).?  I will  look at ways in which the 
news internalised the rhetoric of  'new World Order (Section 2) and realpolitik (Section 
3).  I will  then argue that with less ideological control over western discourse in  the 
post-Cold War period,  news journalism  can present  more  critical accounts of order 
and security issues, and of  western interventions in the 'developing world' (Section 4). 
2. The ideological paradigm: reporting the rhetoric of 'New World Order' 
When  the  Berlin  Wall  came  down,  many  in  the  West  noted  the  timeliness  of a 
superpower  summit  agreed  only  weeks  earlier  and  scheduled  for  Malta  on  2-3 
December 1989. The Soviet Union and the US insisted that it was a 'getting-to-know-
you'  meeting and would have no  fixed  agenda for  discussion on substantive East-
West issues like arms control. But such was the pace of  events in Eastern Europe that 
few  believed  this  would  remain  the  case  on  the  day.  The  changes  seemed  too 
momentous for  the  superpowers to brush  over in  casual  chat.  The British Foreign 
Secretary,  Douglas Hurd,  thought  that  if the  summit  had  not  been  scheduled  one 
would have to be arranged. "In other words", reported ITN, "Western leaders wanted 
reassurance as well as good news from the East" (22.00, 10.11.89). 
The basic theme of the Malta Summit was two superpowers trying to come to terms 
with rapid change in the world. It was to be set on warships off the coast of Malta, a 
symbolic evocation of post-war settlement inspired by the Soviet slogan, "From Yalta 
to Malta".8 However, a heavy storm disrupted the occasion and  provided journalists 
with "the lasting image of George Bush's foray  into  superpower negotiations"  (I  TN  , 
22.00, 2.12.89).  Another reporter remarked that "with Mr Gorbachev's reforms and 
the  turbulent  events  in  Eastern Europe  high  on the  agenda  here,  both leaders  are 
hoping  their talks  will  set  the  ground  rules  for  a  political  climate  of rather  more 
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A former US arms control negotiator told Channel Four News that in such a turbulent 
environment  both superpowers had  "an  interest  in  keeping  things  evolutionary  and 
making sure they do not go revolutionary" (19.00,  1.12.89).9 But news coverage as  a 
whole  presented  a different picture: one of two superpowers with ideas of their own 
about how the world  should be ordered after the Cold War.  The US favoured  the 
status  quo  and  so  used  the  summit  as  launching  pad  from  which  to  reassert  its 
leadership role in the West and  maintain the Cold  War military-security framework. 
The Soviet Union was depicted as rather insecure, hoping to recover its waning power 
and  influence  by  manipulating  the  west  towards  a  radical  transformation  of  the 
security framework.  This entailed moving  away from the system of East-West blocs 
and  spheres of influence towards a global blend of  the conference on Security and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE)  and  the  United  Nations.  Here  is  how  two  BBC 
journalists saw it: 
Newscaster:  Why is the Soviet side so intent on building up expectations, talking 
about water-sheds and  mile-stones,  even a summit to mark the end  of the Cold 
War? 
Reporter:  I think really what's happened is  that Mr Gorbachev seeing his  whole 
side,  as  it  were,  in  the  Cold  War  collapsing  around  him  and  he's  got  to  do 
something about it.  He can't  simply live with a West which is  built up  still,  still 
coherent and still all on the same side, when he can't... entirely trust any single one 
of his ... allies  (because) they're not going to be able  to form  a coherent military 
pact.  He's got  to find  some  alternative  ... He's going to be  persuading President 
Bush to move towards some new kind of system in Europe which will protect his 
interests as well as the West's. 
Newscaster:  What is that going to mean in practice? Will he be pushing for an end 
to  the  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  its  replacement  by  an  entirely  new 
European security system? 
Reporter:  Yes, I think he is going to be edging towards this new kind of updated 
Helsinki Agreement whereby you have 35  European countries working out their 
own destinies. The Americans won't like that very much,  of course, because they 
don't want to see themselves written out of  the script in this at all.  It's going to be 
quite a difficult and nerve-wracking time ahead, I think.  I don't think it's all going 
to be sweetness and light.  (BBC1, 21.00, 1.12.89) 
Little sense there, then, that journalists were taken by the notion of a 'convergence' of 
superpower interests. Cold War antagonism, confrontation, and mistrust still informed 
the  framework  of interpretation  but  we  were  also  able  to  see  uncertainty  and 
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relationship - historical fault-lines that Cold War ideology held together but never quite 
cemented. After all, NATO was an alliance of  traditional enemies - Britain and France  , 
Britain and Germany, France and Germany, and the most volcanic of all,  Greece and 
Turkey.  The US was always been able to bring its 'leadership role' into play whenever 
diplomatic animosity turned to hostility, such as that which emerges from time to time 
in relations between Britain and Germany (e.g., the Nato Summit, May 1989). But the 
US has also been viewed with suspicion and mistrust by its allies in Europe. The direct 
and  sometimes exclusive bargaining between the US  and  the US SR during the INF 
talks  process  in  the  1980s  even  threatened  Mrs  Thatcher's  legendary  'special 
relationship' with Ronald Reagan.  This was especially acute in  the aftermath of the 
Reykjavik summit. But if the Soviet threat transcended these  historic,  economic and 
nationalistic rivalries  in  the West  during  the  Cold  War,  what  would  happen  if the 
threat disappeared, and with it the system of relations within which confrontation and 
competition were managed? How would the alliance rationalise its existence? 
The NATO summit of 1990 was held in Britain and  produced the so-called 'London 
Declaration' in  which the alliance formally  declared the end of the Cold War.  But it 
was more than just a set-piece meeting. It was arranged to announce a radical rethink 
in the alliance's nuclear defence posture but ended up stirring up  some serious internal 
divisions. Britain objected strongly to the US idea of nuclear weapons  as weapons of 
last resort,  arguing that it defeated the whole purpose of the nuclear deterrent. Mrs 
Thatcher  insisted  that,  regardless  of the  international  situation,  the  "fundamental 
NATO  strategy of reliance  on  nuclear weapons  and  the  possibility  always  of using 
them hasn't changed" (BBC1, 21.00, 6.7.90). The Independent front page captured the 
mood and the rhetoric of  the occasion:  "NATO declares peace on the Warsaw Pact". 
But inside, the euphoria was qualified with doubts about NATO unity:  "Peace has been 
declared at NATO's summit in London  but the new European order is not without its 
stresses" (7.7.90). 
The difference between ITN and BBC coverage on 6 July was in their treatment of the 
summit rhetoric and the  emphasis they placed on the divisions.  ITN  quoted liberally 
from  a  summit  declaration  "brimming  with  historic  talk  of peace"  (Channel  Four 
News),  describing it as  "the most fundamental  shift in alliance thinking in  its 40-year 
history" (News at Ten).  This seemed to be based on the observation that having "cut 
through the remaining cobwebs of NATO thinking",  President Bush was now setting 
his  sights on  "clearing the cobwebs and misconceptions in  Soviet thinking"  (Channel 
Four News).  In his summit speech, Bush addressed the Soviet Union directly,  urging 
Gorbachev to view NATO as  "defensive and  not threatening"  and to "convince your Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  196 
military ... ofthis fact".  The problem with the Soviets, he claimed, was that  "they have 
viewed NATO as  much more threatening to them than the way (he  has)  looked  at 
NATO".  Hopefully, he  said, the summit would change all that and that "it should be 
clear to the Soviet military, to Mr Gorbachev, to his adversaries and his friends inside 
the Soviet Union, that NATO is  changing".  BBC News took a much more cautious 
view of  this sort of  rhetoric, describing  the declaration as "more a promise to change 
than an announcement of  change itself'. Charles Wheeler pointed out that, "NATO will 
change but it will go on being a formidable military machine armed with vast amounts 
of  the most lethal weapons men have been able to devise" (Newsnight).  The BBC also 
emphasised the divisions between individual members of the alliance over the concept 
of "last resort". 
The difference of emphasis between the two news  channels  determined their overall 
interpretations of the event. The BBC reported official claims "that the internal battle 
lines are already drawn" in NATO between the "cautious" (Britain and France) and the 
"pace-setters" (the US and Germany). The alliance leaders had, 
left  unsettled  the  most  fundamental  question:  NATO's  future  in  an  undivided 
Europe - whether it should remain a cornerstone for the West's defence or become 
a building block in an alliance for all Europe? (21.00). 
ITN  explained  the  differences  as  routine,  certainly  nothing  to  undermine  the 
significance of  the occasion. The reporter remarked on, 
the  upbeat  atmosphere  and  the  unity  - even  a  touch  of exuberance  - that 
cumbersome NATO has managed to tum itself on its head faster than the sceptics 
thought possible" (22.00). 
To get a measure of  the immediate impact of  the Gulf War on the West's view of itself 
through the news media, it is useful to compare coverage of  the major western security 
and economic summits pre- and post- Gulf War. 
Gulf Crisis - from uncertainty to certainty 
The Two Plus Four Summit in Moscow on 12 September 1990 set the seal on German 
unification  and  came  as  the  world  faced  into  crisis  in  the  Gulf  It was,  then,  an 
occasion of conflicting rhetoric of war and peace. On one level, the meeting provided 
an  ideal  platform for the four  victorious powers in  the second world war  to finally 
settle the post-war division of  Europe and declare the second world war and  the Cold 
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The two Germanys and the four wartime allies are at one over a united Germany. 
This morning's treaty celebrations mark the symbolic end of  the second world war. 
(BBCl, 13.00, 12.9.90) 
The Four Powers unite to toast the formal end of  the second world war 
(Channel Four News, 12.9.90) 
On another level,  it was presented as  an opportunity for them to take a united stand 
against a new,  common enemy:  Iraq.  No sooner had the West rid itself  of one 'Evil 
Empire' than another appeared to defy  the 'international community'.  As  the powers 
remembered their victory over Hitler, a 'new Hitler' appeared to haunt their visions of 
world peace.  In this example from  ITN,  the themes are  synthesised into  a drama of 
past powers (Germany and the Soviet Union) and present powers (The US, Britain and 
France),  and of  passive observers (the Soviet Union,  and  "the world at  large")  and 
actors (present powers). This was taken as proof positive of  a' new world order in 
the making': 
Sometimes  symbolism  has  great  substance.  So  it  was  as  today's  ceremony  in 
Moscow acquired a powerful meaning all of  its own ... .In the minds of everyone 
here this was the end of  world war two, the days when the scores of history were 
finally settled. But with President Gorbachev looking on they were also sending a 
clear message to the world at large and  Iraq in  particular,  the message that the 
great powers of  past and present will  now work together and that a new world 
order is in the making.  (Channel Four News, 12.9.90) 
The counterpoint between the rhetoric of  war and peace was also a dominant feature in 
coverage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) weeks 
later in Paris 19 November. ITN noted that the conference "was meant to forge a new 
framework for cooperation among former enemies but (was) haunted by the reality of 
a new enemy in the Middle East and by the threat of  war in  the Persian GulP'  (ITN, 
22.00,  19.11.90).  The US  was  preparing  to  double  its  forces  in  the  Gulf and  was 
softening  public  opinion  towards  an  acceptance  that  war was  inevitable.  The  BBC 
reported that President Bush  was  "trying to drum up support for his Gulf policy" and, 
"As  befits hopes for a  new world order,  Mikhail  Gorbachev  could  prove the  most 
important partner" (BBCl, 21.00, 19.11.90). 
Immediately following  the  1990 NATO summit  in  London the  Group of  7  "of the 
world's richest nations"  met  in Houston where, reported ITN, "President Bush ... set  in 
context  the  challenge  they  faced  in  dealing  with  the  new  world  economic  order" 
(22.00, 9.7.90). BBC news reports presented the meeting as being one of uncertainty Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  198 
and  division,  with  "each  ... nation  apparently  determined  to go  its  own  way  on  the 
crunch issue of  aid to the Soviet Union". And while US military leadership of  the West 
was beyond doubt,  "US  political leadership  is  much  more open to question"(BBC1, 
2l.00,  9.7.90).  Newsnight  went  further  to  suggest  that  the  seemingly  mundane 
proceedings at Houston should perhaps give cause for concern: 
It may be that the row between the (US) and Europe over trade should be causing 
us nightmares.  The fears of a future transatlantic Cold War over trade are based 
on the determination of the Bush Administration to force  the  (EC)  into  drastic 
cuts in financial support for farmers.  (9.7.90) 
When the Group of Seven met a year later,  in London (16 July  1991) they were still 
on  military high  after the Gulf War.  The tone of the  summit  was triumphalist  and 
belied in starker terms than ever before what they really meant when they spoke of a 
New World Order. Although it was billed as an economic summit to discuss their own 
economic  relations  it  was  used  as  a  platform  for  dictating  the  terms  of economic 
surrender to the Soviet Union, and the terms of radical arms control to lesser powers 
in the world. Charles Wheeler reported for Newsnight on: 
The London Economic Summit - that's what it's  called but times  have  changed. 
The  seven  ... went  heavily  political  today,  launching  what  looks  like  a  bid  to 
manage the foreign affairs of  the world ... 
The original goal of steering the world's economies has always been something of 
a pipe-dream - it still is.  At this, their 17th such gathering,  (they) have switched to 
an objective more suited to their talents: shaping the post-Cold War world .... 
What's important here is the way this highly exclusive group of western leaders, 
three of whom have permanent seats on the (UN) Security Council,  are giving a 
lead to the (UN), managing it as they did  in the Gulf War.  (Newsnight,  16.7.91) 
Back to uncertainty: whatever happened to the New World Order? 
After the Gulf War the West heralded  the real dawn of a 'New World Order'. But, like 
Post-Cold War euphoria,  this  sense of certainty  soon faltered.  The Western powers 
started to go their own ways again. The agencies through which they aimed to police a 
New World Order  - the UN and NATO  - were being locked into unaccustomed roles. 
The  conflict  in  Bosnia raised  questions  about  NATO's  role  and  identity.  Was  it  a 
military alliance  for mutual defence or an out of  area trouble-shooter? Should it widen 
its  membership to include former  Warsaw Pact countries?  The UN's  peace-keeping 
activities seem more like peace-enforcement as witnessed in Bosnia and Somalia.  The 
agendas of  national foreign policies and international agencies were in constant conflict 
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loggerheads with Japan.lO  And contrary to the original cooperative vision of the EC, 
that organisation now appears to be entangled in  conflict between the need of some 
states  to  assert  national  sovereignty  or,  more  significantly,  'regionality',  and  the 
readiness of others to accept centralised decision-making from Brussels. II  The theme 
of uncertainty  was  central  to  coverage  of the  NATO  summit  in  Rome  on  7-8 
November 1991.  The civil war in Bosnia was beginning to assume complexities that 
would confound all western attempts to bring about a permanent ceasefire. Against this 
background,  the  summit  focused  on redefining NATO's  role  to  cope with  "a  more 
complex  security  environment  characterised  by  uncertainty,  instability,  and 
unpredictable risks".12  We can best appreciate the extent of this transformation if we 
compare how news reporters summed up the meeting with their  assessment  a year 
earlier of the triumphant CSCE conference. 
As  the CSCE 1990 conference closed on 19  November,  Channel Four News  (lTN) 
and the  Nine O'Clock News (BBC) endorsed the hyperbole and the grand rhetoric of 
the occasion in  items  that were  practically identical  in  content and  structure.  Both 
saw it  as a successful blue-print for  the New World Order.  With a grand historical 
flourish,  they  accepted that the  conference  marked  the  greatest  "display  of unity" 
(lTN) and the "most comprehensive European peace settlement in  175 years"(BBC) -
that is,  since the Congress of Vienna in  1815.  Although 3  5 countries committed their 
signatures  to  the  final  declaration,  it  was  seen  primarily  as  a  "celebration  of 
achievement" by the three western victors of world war two to mark the end of the 
Cold  War,  "basking  in  the  pride  and  success  of their  45-years  of anti-communist 
deterrence based on military power"(lTN) and their "firmness in the face of the Soviet 
threat" (BBC).  The accounts differed on why the 'Soviet threat'  had  disappeared  so 
quickly. The BBC  put it down simply to  "the bold decision of Mikhail Gorbachev to 
withdraw from confrontation and the division of  the continent",  while ITN saw it as a 
more fundamental,  "de facto admission that Moscow's military (was) crumbling,  that 
Stalinist hegemony in Eastern Europe was a catastrophe, and that the East-West race 
for military supremacy was futile and an absurd waste of  resources".  But that was the 
past.  The 'international  community'  could  now  look to the  future  with  an  "historic 
declaration of  friendship pledging that East-West relations will never more be based on 
the threat of aggression" (BBC),  and  with "the old enemy,  the  Soviet Union,  now a 
partner  in  building  peace  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Urals"  (ITN).  Already,  this 
"unprecedented international  consensus"  was facing  up  to  "the threat  to this  newly-
won freedom and stability from Saddam Hussein  in the Gulf' (ITN), and was "proving 
its value in ... the sort of regional  conflict  that  five  years  ago  would  have  pitted  East 
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At the NATO summit one year later, the macho rhetoric of the Gulf War was almost 
forgotten and the news reported on an alliance that was once again uncertain as to its 
future role. No sooner had one threat been vanquished, the west was facing a new one: 
the Soviet Union. The Nine O'Clock News reported that this time the threat lay not so 
much  in  its  military  power  as  in  "the  consequences  of its  disintegration"  (BBC1). 
Channel Four News referred to "a deepening concern, even a hint o/panic"  within the 
alliance  "that  events  ... are  now  moving  so  fast,  so  unpredictably,  and  in  such  a 
potentially anarchic direction"  that  it  may  have  "little  practical  ability  to  preserve 
stability and peace  .. .in the Soviet Union (7.11.91).  Yet the West's negative approach 
to encouraging economic development and restructuring in the Soviet Union since the 
end of the Cold War appeared to contradict the professed wish to "preserve stability 
and peace" there.  This was very apparent in their gatherings during the period  1990-
1991. 
Privatising Lenin 
If  anything seemed certain in the post-Cold War world it was the decline of  the Soviet 
Union as a superpower and its disintegration as a national entity. To western capitalism 
this was the ultimate vindication of market economics and  liberal  democracy.  While 
Western powers issued endless and  'final'  declarations of  the end  of the Cold War 
and of peace with the Soviet Union,  their  economic agenda was characterised by  a 
very different tone.  The West delivered  an  ultimatum:  in  essence,  no  economic aid 
without  economic  surrender.  The  sight  of Mikhail  Gorbachev  turning  up  on  the 
doorsteps of the world's principal economic powers, cap in  hand for massive financial 
aid,  was  a  far  cry  from  the  heyday  of 'Gorbymania'. 13  Whatever  promises  or 
commitments were made to him in private, the public  rhetoric on these occasions was 
informed by hard realpolitik not 'New World Order' idealism.  The western news media 
were primary agencies in getting that rhetoric across.  The theme was well established 
in the western summits leading up to the Gulf War and seemed to sit quite comfortably 
with western powers whose own economic houses were less than well  managed,  the 
US and Britain in particular. In the 'New World Order', the watchwords for nations of 
the 'developing world' are not only "what we say goes" but also  "do what we say not 
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The treaty on the unification of  Germany in  1990 should have been an occasion for the 
F  our Powers to formally end the second world war but the news set it within the end-
of-the-Cold-War framework thus setting the  West apart from the Soviet Union at the 
slgmng ceremony: 
It's been another day for President George and his western allies to savour the 
New World Order that's emerged from a year of  revolutionary change ... For the 
West,  there can be no  more striking testimony to their victory in  the Cold War 
than today's treaty  .... Watching them  (Gorbachev) the man  who  had  made  it all 
possible by abandoning his country's military grip on Eastern Europe but had also 
suffered a severe diplomatic defeat: he had failed to keep the new Germany out of 
NATO. But the champagne drowned all talk of  winners and losers. 
(Newsnight,  12.9.90) 
Two months later, Gorbachev went to the CSCE  summit  in Paris to sign a charter on 
a building a new security and human rights order in Europe post-Cold War.  The ITN 
could hardly resist drawing conclusions as the Soviet leader committed his signature to 
the document: 
No one  ... has been so undiplomatic as  to talk of winners and  losers here but the 
Paris  Charter  .. formally  enshrines  the  triumph of democratic  values  over East 
European communism.  The Soviet leader has pledged himself to respect not just 
human rights and the rule of  law but the principles of  the free market, too. 
(13.00, 21.11.90) 
Wherever Gorbachev  met western leaders, the news 'set the agenda' for discussion. As 
he arrived  in London in July 1991,  reporters predicted that the G7 leaders would ask 
him  "'Why  spend  billions  on armaments  when  your  industries  should  be  producing 
consumer goods?'"  (ITN, 22.00, 15.7.91) The BBC reported that Gorbachev had come 
to "negotiate terms for converting the Soviet economy"  to capitalism, thus ending "a 
seven-decade experiment in  central planning"  (21.00,  16.7.91).  Newsnight  appeared 
to adopt a more critical line when it  wondered if "the G7  leaders more concerned to 
be global power-brokers than the Soviet Union's bankers?" (16.7.91). 
In  the event,  the  Soviet  leader got  little  more  than  promises  of aid  and  a  trouble-
shooting visit  from  the then British Chancellor of Exchequer, Norman Lamont.  He 
was  also  feted  and  applauded  at  end-of-summit  social  events,  awkward  moments 
which  ITN and BBC seemed to satirise in their reports. Channel Four News reported 
that at a dinner with the G7 leaders at Downing St, "the Soviet leader had joined  what 
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including 'If I were a rich man"'(18.7.91).  And the BBC described his 'prophetic' final 
engagement at "the opera Cinderella, the story of a poor relation who's finally allowed 
to attend the rich man's ball" (BBC1, 2l.00, 18.7.91). 
Gorbachev's first  summit meeting with George Bush after Malta was in Moscow, 31 
July  1991,  to sign the  START treaty  to  cut  long  range  strategic  nuclear  missiles. 
However Bush came with a  blunt ultimatum  that  the  Soviet Union  should  make 
drastic cuts in its military budget or else forfeit the promises of  financial and technical 
aid made at the G7 summit. He assured them he appreciated "the difficulties of  military 
reform (and) the competing demands of  people displaced when a Cold War makes way 
for a New World Order". It appeared to be an attempt to totally neutralise the Soviet 
Union as a superpower and thus consolidate the US's perceived buoyancy in the world, 
post Gulf  War. The headlines endorsed Bush's undiplomatic, macho-posture: 
Mr Bush spells it out for Mr Gorbachev: the price for American support 
(Channel Four News, 30.7.91) 
The  superpower summit  opens  and  President Bush puts  a  price  on  American 
support  for  the  Soviet  Union.  He  says  they  are  no  longer  adversaries.  Now 
Moscow must dismantle its military machine.  (BBCl, 2l.00, 30.7.91) 
The 'prize' for Soviet compliance was Most Favoured Nation  trading status with the 
US  but,  as  Michael  Buerk  noted,  this  was  "nothing  special"  since  "almost  every 
country on earth has it"  (BBCl, 2l.00, 30.7.91).  Bush claimed  that  the US was 
setting an example to the Soviet Union by cutting its own military  spending but,  as 
some reporters pointed out,  that was deceptive.  The Nine  O'Clock News  reported 
that  the  START  treaty  was  about  cutting  numbers  of already  out-dated  nuclear 
weapons. An arms control analyst argued that:  "The nuclear arms race hasn't stopped 
at all.  We are still under this treaty able to design and develop new nuclear warheads, 
new nuclear missiles" (30.7.91).14 As always in superpower number crunching, the real 
issue was not the quantitative but rather the qualitative nature of the arms race.  Nik 
Gowing concluded on Channel Four News that: 
Any euphoria at today's  (treaty) should therefore not mask the future reality - the 
numbers of missiles and warheads like on America's MX Peacekeeper have been 
reduced,  the ageing junk of both superpower arsenals  ... will  be  phased  out,  but 
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Tough rhetoric and hard bargains from the West, then,  yet there was a significant  gap 
between  rhetoric  and  realpolitik  in  their  approach  to  helping  Gorbachev  through 
turbulent times.  A measure of doublethink informed official explanations why massive 
aid should be withheld. The argument was that the Soviet economy would remain in  a 
state of chaos until  such time as  it  converted fully  to the stability of a  free  market 
system.  In  the  meantime,  the  policy  of  committing  hard  cash  was  tantamount  to 
'pouring good money after bad',  as Charles Wheeler put it when he interviewed Mrs 
Thatcher on this and other matters at the  NATO summit 1990: 
Wheeler:  Aid to Gorbachev  ... We're told that you're a bit unhappy about this - you 
want to see reforms in place before you pour good money after bad. Is that true? 
Thatcher: There's no point in just giving large amounts of loans for the purchase 
of consumer goods  ... (When)  we gave aid to Poland and to Hungary we insisted 
as a condition that they change the way their economies are run. We should do the 
same with the Soviet Union.  They want to change but they don't  know how to 
change.  (Newsnight, 6.7.90) 
As  long as  they withheld  aid  from  the  Soviet Union,  the  Soviet  economy  would 
remain unstable and in  crisis.  This was presented as one good reason for the West to 
refuse aid and resist all calls for cashing in the 'peace dividend'.  Here is an assessment 
from  a  journalist  on  Gorbachev's'  private  discussion  with  the  Cabinet  during  the 
summit: 
What emerged from the Cabinet room  ... was the impression of what one source 
called a leopard who has begun to change his spots but a leopard who, as he tries 
to persuade the likes of Mr Major,  is  also balancing on a high-wire of complex 
political forces ... which could unbalance him at any moment. 
(Channel Four News,  18.7.91) 
As the Moscow summit to sign  the START treaty ended with a joint-peace initiative 
for  the  Middle  East,  six  Lithuanian  border  guards  were  shot  dead  by  unknown 
assailants.  The  incident  was  presented  in  the  news  within  this  same  framework: 
Gorbachev's insecure position at home justifies Western  caution.  ITN observed  that 
the attack was "a sharp reminder that there are still forces at large here determined to 
undermine  Gorbachev  and  his  newly  improved  relationship  with  the  West  (22.00, 
31. 7.91). An element of  doublethink comes in when the G7, and journalists themselves, 
alert  us  to Gorbachev's  intention  to  use  "the  old  veiled  threat  of possible  political 
instability"  as  bargaining  leverage  in  negotiations  with  the  West  (BBC 1,  21. 00, 
17.7.91).  Journalists  discussed  this  at  the  G7  summit  - a  month  before  the  August 
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Newscaster:  How great  is  the  threat  to Gorbachev  of a  social  uprising  in  the 
Soviet Union if  he goes home relatively empty handed? 
Reporter: I don't think it's going to spark a conservative coup, because the Soviet 
public regard this as something of an irrelevance in their daily lives.  But it clearly 
is a weapon, the threat of  unrest is a weapon that the Soviets are willing to use to 
the full and I think it's little more than a bargaining position. 
(BBCI, 2l.00, 15.7.91) 
3. The historical paradigm: reporting  the New World Order as realpolitik 
The  historical  paradigm  presents  the  post-cold  war  era  in  terms  of its  historical 
continuity  with  the  emergence  of capitalism  and  imperialism.  It  eschews  more 
restrictive categories of Cold War or post-Cold order and  rests instead  on  a North-
South rather than East-West axis.  Dominant  among  the western  powers  is  the  US 
which  maintains  its  leadership  role  primarily  with  military  power,  the  doctrine  of 
'Invincible  Force'}S  This  was  used  to flout  international  law  by  invading  Panama 
regardless of  almost unanimous condemnation from the UN General Assembly and  the 
Security  Council.  It  was  also  used  to  bully  and  blackmail  small  countries  into 
supporting  the  Gulf War resolutions,  and  to  intimidate  North Korea and  Iraq  into 
complying with western arms control and nuclear proliferation restrictions. Within the 
historical paradigm it would appear that when George Bush told the developing world 
"What we say goes!", and when Bill Clinton warned  "Don't tread on us!",  they were 
underscoring the rhetoric of the European-US imperial project  over centuries rather 
than decades previously.  This  section examines the extent to which media accounts 
internalise the legitimating  rhetoric of 'Great Power' realpolitik. 
On the eve of  the Malta Summit, Gorbachev and Bush made their way to Malta with 
contrasting opening gambits that provided the news media with the desired imagery. 
Gorbachev  stopped  off for  an  almost  messianic  state  visit  to  Italy  where  he  was 
pictured swamped by huge crowds of adoring fans  in Rome and Milan,  and stepping 
onto the hallowed anti-Communist ground of  the Vatican for an 'historic' reconciliation 
with the Pope.  George Bush sent out a different  message.  As  he  landed  on the US 
aircraft carrier, Forrestal,  in the Mediterranean,  fighter planes were taking off from a 
base in the Pacific to help quash another attempted insurrection in the Philippines. The 
point was not lost on the British news: 
(pLANES TAKING OFF FROM AND LANDING ON THE FORREST AL) 
On the eve of  the Malta Summit, a display of  American military might. Just hours 
after ordering his  pilots to support government troops in  the Philippines,  George Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  205 
Bush  reviewed  US  air-power  in  the  Mediterranean  ... America's  action  in  the 
Philippines was the first major military intervention ordered by President Bush and 
has bolstered his reputation as a decision-maker. It follows criticism that he failed 
to help the recent coup attempt against Panama's General Noriega and  that  he's 
responded weakly to upheavals in Eastern Europe. Now, just before  his meeting 
with Mr Gorbachev, Mr Bush has a new,  bolder image.  (ITN, 22.00, l.12.89) 
This  has  the  ring  of a  washing-powder  advertisement.  Bush  is  presented  as  the 
'greenhorn' President still  overwhelmed by his  new responsibility as US leader and in 
need  of a  new  image  as  a  bold,  hands-on  decision  maker.  Yet  Noam  Chomsky 
chronicles  Bush's  past  record  as  a  national  security  apparatchik  in  successive 
administrations since the  1970s,  culminating in  his  post as  director of the  CI~ and 
shows that he had little to learn about projecting US  power around the world. 16  Far 
from  needing  "a  new,  bolder image",  then,  Bush was very  much  an  'old  brand'  US 
President.  Still,  it is a useful  public relations strategy, and  a persistent one as  media 
coverage  of recent US interventions show.  Two weeks after the Malta Summit, Bush 
was trying out his  new,  bolder image again,  this time to invade Panama,  capture its 
leader, General Manuel Noriega, and install their own replacement by a quick oath of 
allegiance.  As  Noam  Chomsky  has  demonstrated,  the  US  media  response  to  the 
operation was favourable with the military imagery going down a treat (1992).  But 
although  the  British  media  were  generally  more  critical  they  did  not  completely 
withhold their traditional support for  US right and might.  An ITN headline declared, 
"American  troops  fly  in  and  topple  the  Panama  regime"  (22.00,  20.12.89)  and  a 
Newsnight  report  on  the  operation  began,  "So  the  George  Bush  'wimp  factor' 
disappeared with one big bang in Panama"(Newsnight, 20.12.89). 
Whereas the US felt obliged to manufacture some sort of international 'consensus' for 
war in the Gulf,  it invaded Panama regardless of world-wide condemnation. It simply 
did  not  matter who  objected.  Unlike  in  the  Gulf area,  where  the  US  went  about 
undermining  and  neutralising  pan-Arab  solidarity  by  intimidation,  bribery  and 
blackmail, there was no danger of anyone in Central or South America coming to the 
military aid of Panama.  This after all  was the US's 'backyard'. Noam Chomsky shows 
how the US media pulled out all  the stops to:  manufacture  the crisis (Noriega defies 
international  law!  American  lives  in  danger!);  caricature  and  demonise  General 
Noriega;  minimise civilian casualties;  and  distract public attention away from the real 
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F  orty- five years of Cold War propaganda  and ideology  was not  simply put back in 
the box by the Soviet Sinatra Doctrine. When it came to reporting the Soviet Union's 
response to the invasion  some familiar  propaganda reflexes helped absorb the impact 
of international condemnation.  For example,  a BBC item recalled  Gorbachev's  state 
visit  to Cuba earlier that year.  While  the  reporter highlighted  the  contrast between 
Castro  and  Gorbachev  as  one  of  reaction  versus  reform,  of confrontation  versus 
rapprochement,  he  suggested that  a  crisis  like  Panama  could  bridge  the  gap  in  an 
instant: 
Despite  the smiles in Havana  ... the reformist Gorbachev and old-style Communist 
Fidel Castro have little in  common these days.  At  least they didn't  until  the US 
invasion of Panama.  The  reaction  by  both has  been  a  leap  back  to  Cold  War 
rhetoric 
The  problem with this  is  that  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba were  not  alone  in  their 
condemnation but just two voices among a United Nations majority.  Had they made 
that much clear they would have found it much more difficult to explain why the whole 
world except the US and Britain had taken a sudden "leap back to Cold War  rhetoric". 
The  reporter  resolved  the  problem  by  framing  it  a  "South  American"  crisis.  He 
reported that  the public consensus among Central and south American countries belied 
private divisions of  opinion and that the US was simply doing what they had long failed 
to do: 
Many South American leaders know that the invasion is,  at least in part, a result of 
their failure to find  a diplomatic solution ... When Latin American meet. .. this week 
the public talk will be about the dangers of America being a regional bully-boy. In 
private, they know  that President Bush has let them off  the hook. 
(BBC1 21.00, 20.12.89) 
Like his successor, President Bill Clinton also suffered a credibility gap when he eased 
his  into office in  1993.  The campaign smears concerning his draft-dodging,  cannabis-
puffing (but not inhaling) days at Oxford could not be allowed to linger in the public 
mind.  As he prepared to take office from Bush, the crisis in  Somalia provided his first 
major  test  of leadership.  Throughout  1992,  television  images  from  Somalia  of 
thousands of  starving people in the midst of savage civil war had brought home to the 
West the legacy of Cold War,  superpower rivalry in the so-called 'Third World'.  The 
superpowers had gone but much of their fire  power remained  in  the hands of  rival 
factions  who  fought  to  fill  the  power  vacuum.  The  images  also  served  as  a 
uncomfortable reminder that,  as  in  Bosnia,  the concept of a New World  Order was 
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and President-elect, Clinton, announced their intention to send in the troops to help the 
aid agencies distribute food around the country without hindrance or intimidation from 
the  various  armed  factions.  Thus  Operation Restore Hope was  presented  as  a 
mission of  mercy  rather than an old-fashioned, geo-political, Cold War style invasion. 
And it would do the image of either President no harm at all. 
Yet, according to a  Los Angeles Times report, there was another aspect to the story 
that the media in the US,  and it seems in Britain, did not include in their coverage: oil. 
It was oil which motivated the US to launch such a large-scale military operation at a 
time  when  it  shied  away  from  comparable  commitments  to  crises  in  Bosnia  and 
Rwanda. In what might have been better named Operation Restore Oil,  The LA  Times 
obtained documents that revealed that "nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to 
the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips in the final years before 
Somalia's pro-US President Siad Barre was overthrown  .. .in January 1991 ".  This land 
had  the potential to  "yield  significant  amounts of oil  and  natural  gas if the US-led 
military mission can restore peace to (Somalia)" .18 There is  also evidence that the oil 
company Conoco closely cooperated with the US forces in their 'humanitarian effort' 
and  even  leased  one  of its  properties  in  Mogadishu  to  serve  as  a  temporary  US 
embassy.  The LA Times report revealed that  the close ties between the US military 
and the oil companies "has left many Somalis and foreign development experts deeply 
troubled  .. .leading  many  to liken  the  ... operation to a  miniature  version of Operation 
Desert Storm"  .19  I looked at several samples of British television news coverage of 
the story but found no references to links with oil or any other major western interests. 
However,  coverage certainly  bore similarities with that  of  Panama and  the Gulf 
War. 
The major US media were alerted unofficially and in  advance to the exact place on a 
beach  near  Mogadishu  where  the  huge  military  landing  would  take  place  on  9 
December,  1992.  The day before, the BBC reported that it would be "an invasion by 
arrangement, not a dawn raid" and called it "a humanitarian mission but with muscle" 
(21.00, 8.12.92). And the News At Ten predicted that "the gun-men will find  out what 
they're really up against,  with the eyes of the world watching"(lTN, 8.12.92).  As  in 
coverage of the Panama and the Gulf War,  the show of military might and technology 
seemed to freeze the  critical impulses of the news media in Britain  as they launched 
into gung-ho rhetoric with the headlines like  "Hundreds of American  marines  storm 
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This ITN report captures perfectly  the tone and mood of coverage in the first critical 
hours of  the operation: 
(FILM, US LANDING) 
D-Day in  Somalia.  Outlined  against  the  moon-lit  Indian  Ocean,  the  spearhead 
force hit the beaches.  Giant hovercraft disgorged the American marines of T  earn 
Tiger. .. Out  at  sea,  the  warships ... Overhead,  wave  upon  wave  of helicopters 
thundered in  carrying yet more troops to secure the airport and  the docks.  The 
UN peacekeepers who've been holding the fort here just looked on as  this huge 
operation unfolded around them.  (12.30, 9.12.92) 
A  marines'  commander told  reporters  that,  "Our  objective  here  is  to  come  in  and 
display  maximum  force,  to  let  everyone  know  that  we  mean  business".  How  the 
warring  parties  in  Somalia  received  this  is  unknown  but  the  commander  certainly 
impressed ITN who reported that "The Somalis have been left in no  doubt that these 
US marines mean business"(lTN,  12.30, 9.12.92),  and on how "The Americans show 
who's in charge in Somalia" (lTN, 22.00, 9.12.92). 
Bill Clinton also chose to bomb Iraq twice and threaten North Korea over their alleged 
nuclear weapons programmes and their apparent reluctance to allow inspection by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  These foreign policy options were also designed 
to help to project his image as a "new, bolder" US president and again the news media 
were ready to oblige. For example,  when the US carried out its first bombing raids on 
Iraq in January 19932°, a BBC reporter noted that: 
passing the torch from Bush to Clinton is  a time when both men  want to show 
they are not going to be pushed about, so there's a certain amount of  domestic and 
world public relations involved in all thiS. 21  (BBCl, 2l.00, 13.l.93) 
Clinton's second strike against Iraq came in June  1993, this time on the grounds that 
Iraq had plotted to assassinate ex-President George Bush.  Suspects had been arrested 
and  their  trial  was  still  in  progress  in  Kuwait  when  the  US  decided  its  own 
investigation was proof enough to justify another Cruise missile bombardment on the 
capital.  The US President told the world that,  "From the first  days of our revolution, 
America's  security has  depended  on the  clarity of this  message:  don't  tread  on  us!" 
While he justified the bombing as self-defence under the terms of Article 51  of the UN 
Charter,  he  warned  Iraq  not  to  do  likewise.  And  he  emphatically  denied  that  the 
bombing  had  anything  to  do  with  image.  1m's newscaster  took  this  up  with  his 
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Newscaster: Any suggestion that he might have done it  to sharpen up his image? 
Reporter:  Well,  he  was  asked  that  question  today  and  as  you  might  expect 
specifically denied it.  But officials are not denying that it does give him a boost in 
those areas where he's seen to be weakest. He's not seen as being a decisive leader 
or as being a strong military commander.  But there was no  dithering,  no  public 
agonising about this and his  statement,  "Don't tread on us",  was  seen as  a very 
strong, almost Reaganesque warning.  (ITN, 22.00, 28.6.93) 
The BBC reported on Clinton's visit two weeks later to South Korea or, to be more 
precise, his day "in and around the demilitarised zone" dressed in military fatigues and 
threatening North Korea with "annihilation". The contradiction of military posturing in 
a demilitarised zone  was apparently lost on the reporter but he was quick to see it was 
"clearly designed to sharpen (Clinton'S) military image" (BBCI, 22.05, 11.7.93). 
The Gulf  War 
Far from criticising the US  leadership role in marshalling the Gulf  War effort at  the 
expense of  the UN, the British media largely endorsed it as proof positive that the US 
was in an ideal position to direct the New World Order.  As US  warships headed for 
the Gulf not to 'free Kuwait'  but to 'defend Saudi Arabia',  ITN noted that  "America 
is once again adopting the role of  policeman of  the world" (ITN, 22.00, 8.8.90). But in 
the first  stages of the crisis,  it  was  reported that the  option of  "Taking  on  a war-
machine  as  enormous  as  Iraq  has  already,  in  effect,  been ruled  out by  the  defence 
ministries of the western world",  and  that  "Foreign  Office  sources indicate that any 
military action is now out of  the question"(BBCI, 21.00, 2.8.90). A report on Channel 
Four News  concluded  that despite western involvement in  the Iran-Iraq war,  "Any 
new conflict would be unwinnable"(2.8.90). 
Nonetheless,  news items  were very  clear that  a solution  could  only  come from  the 
West led by the US.  In two items for the BBC John Simpson saw the Arab world as 
divided and powerless: 
(It's) impossible  to think that there could be an Arab solution.  There's simply not 
the power to settle the affair ... No one likes it but if there's to be a solution rather 
than a compromise it'll come mostly from the West.  (BBCI, 21.00,8.8.90) 
For 30 years  the  Arab  world  has  tried  to  establish  its  independence  from  the 
outside control. Now the West is coming in to sort out what is essentially an Arab 
problem. It's little short ofa humiliation.  (BBCI, 21.00, 9.8.90) Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  210 
By the end of November, the US was talking of  'freeing Kuwait' even if  that meant all 
out war. To this end it launched a propaganda campaign to forge a military alliance of 
western  and  Arab  powers,  and  overcome  divisions  in  western  public  opinion  over 
doubling its forces in the Gulf.  There was much criticism of the way the US hijacked 
the UN to forge his Western-Arab coalition against Saddam Hussein in the early stages 
of the crisis but history shows such criticism to be misplaced. Bush simply revived the 
original and principle purpose of  the United Nations: as an agency of  enforcement with 
a  hierarchy of leadership  and very clear parameters of conduct  in  the global  arena. 
President Franklin D.  Roosevelt set out the blue-print  in  1943  when he  determined 
that: 
there should be four policemen in the world - the US, Great Britain, Russia,  and 
China  ... The rest of  the world would disarm ... As soon as any of the other nations 
was  caught  arming  they  would  be  threatened  first  with  quarantine  and  if 
quarantine did not work they would be bombed.  22 
This was a  model of a 'New World Order' that did  not translate very well  into the 
grand, idealistic rhetoric of  the UN Charter but it was clearly invoked through George 
Bush's ideas in a speech on the Gulf crisis. He promised that by the time the US dealt 
with Saddam Hussein they: 
will  have taught a  dangerous  dictator and  any tyrant  tempted  to follow  in  his 
footsteps that the US has a new credibility,  and that what we say goes, and that 
there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf and in this New World 
Order that  we  seek  to  create.  And  we  mean  it!  And  (Saddam  Hussein)  will 
understand that when the day is done!23 
When Bush announced the beginning of  war,  he invoked the New World Order again, 
this  time  with  the  racist  undertones  that  informed  much  of  his  bellicose  rhetoric 
against Saddam Hussein.  "We have before us", he said,  "the opportunity to forge for 
ourselves and for future generations a New World Order,  a world where the rule of 
law, not the law of  the jungle, governs the conduct of nations".24  Some weeks later, 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Douglas  Hurd,  endorsed  the  rhetoric  when  told  an 
audience that,  "In the late 20th century nations must be able to conduct affairs by a 
code more worthy of  rational human beings than the law of  the jungle" .25 
On US media coverage of  the Gulf crisis, Edward Said remarks that "the central media 
failing  (was) an  unquestioning  acceptance of American  power",  and  he  argues that 
"public  rhetoric  ... (was)  simply  undeterred,  uncomplicated  by  any  considerations  of 
detail,  realism,  or cause and  effect"  of the  crisis  at  hand. 26  The  news  media  simply Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  211 
fulfilled their designated role as they had done so  well in their coverage of Vietnam, 
Grenada and Panama.27  When the crisis in the Gulf finally gave way to war,  Said was 
just finishing his  new work, Culture and Imperialism,  and  he tells of how he  looked 
again at what he had written: 
Here was a new chapter of  the imperial story, with the (US) now at the centre of 
the world  stage  instead  of France  and  Britain.  And  as  culture  in  the  form  of 
various narratives of western ascendancy  had  shaped  the  19th century imperial 
dynamic, so it was the media that now played the same role. 28 
Eqbal Ahmad reflected on how the 20th Century had  been  "most remarkable for its 
simultaneous capacity to promise hope and deliver disappointments", and seems to be 
ending as it began with "renewed hopes of a just and  peaceable world  order  ... being 
overwhelmed  by politicians and warriors whose political minds remain rooted in the 
past".29  He warned that, "We are being lied to; and we must not be deceived. What we 
are  actually witnessing  is  a display  of imperialism  relieved  of the  limits  imposed by 
superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence".  30  Indeed, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and 
precipitated a major post-Cold War crisis, the BBC looked on the bright side: 
There's only one good thing about the situation  .. .It's become plain that an incident 
that  might  have  brought the  world  to  the  edge  of nuclear  war won't  now  do 
anything of  the sort.  (BBC1, 21.00, 2.8.90) 
The  UN  sanctions  that  were  effective  in  November  were  no  longer  effective  In 
January. Diplomacy and negotiations via the UN had become 'unhelpful'.  By contrast, 
Bush's military build up in the Gulf was read as 'going the extra mile for peace', and his 
bellicose rhetoric as extraordinary diplomacy.  A world-wide coalition stood behind the 
world's  only  superpower against  a pariah  state whose  leader  could  not  see  reason. 
War had become  'inevitable'.  31  When the war finally  began,  the fascination with the 
hi-tech weaponry and  Top Gun  imagery  served up by  the Pentagon  in  daily  news 
conferences seemed to lull journalists into a ready acceptance that this really was the 
first  ever  clean,  casualty-free  war.32  Some  journalists  appreciated  the  wider  geo-
political  implications of this  for  US  military  power in  the  world.  David  Dimbleby 
remarked to the US Ambassador to Britain that  the bombing, 
suggests  that  America's  ability  to  react  militarily  has  really  become  quite 
extraordinary,  despite all  the critics beforehand who  said  it  will  never work out 
like that. You are now able to claim that you can act precisely and, therefore - to 
use that hideous word about warfare - 'surgically'. 33  (BBC 1,  1  0.00, 18. 1.91 ) Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  212 
There was nothing in this of the US decline' that academics like Kennedy  argued had 
resulted from 'imperial overstretch' (Kennedy,  1989). After the war, Bush declared to 
the  nation:  "It's  a  proud  day  for  America  and,  by  God!,  we've  kicked  Vietnam 
syndrome once and for all!". 34 In other words, he  served notice that no  Third W  orId 
country should dare stand up to the US  again and have the temerity to defeat it  in  a 
war.  At a US army victory cabaret,  a senior officer told the troops that the Iraqis 
"never had a chance".  Their whole problem, he thought,  was their complete ignorance 
of  US military power,  "the lethality, the speed and the vigour of  execution that resided 
in  our equipment and in our leadership".  There was only one snag for the US:  "We 
knew we were good - we didn't know how good".  35 
Arms control 
Top of the agenda at the 1991  G7  summit in London was the issue of arms control, 
specifically the assumption that the western powers should  play  a direct,  controlling 
role monitoring and limiting arms sales and arms proliferation around the world.  The 
'big idea'  of a western-oriented, US-led new world order post-Gulf - encapsulated in 
Bush's assertion, "What we say goes!" - seemed unassailable.  Charles Wheeler pointed 
out that: 
It's the Seven, and not the UN, that have conceived of  the idea of controlling the 
transfer of conventional  weapons,  though  they  may  have  to  go  to  the  UN to 
endorse sanctions against transgressors.  (Newsnight,  16.7.91) 
The official rhetoric belied  a profound level of arrogance and hypocrisy  since those 
same powers were the world's principal arms dealers and  made immense profits  by 
fostering  markets in  so-called  'sensitive areas'  like  the Middle  East and  Central  and 
South  America.  Yet  Mark  Urban  opened  his  report  on  the  summit  with  the 
observation that, "Cynics might note that the nations represented here supply 80% of 
the world's weapons" (Newsnight,  16.7.91) 
By this criterion, other reporters like  Ian Williams were being merely 'cynical'  when 
they underlined some of  the most glaring contradictions in western arms control policy. 
Williams  recalled the arms bonanza at the Paris Air  Show just weeks before the G7 
summit: 
The way western arms companies supplied Saddam has clearly alarmed G7 leaders 
but last month at the Paris Air Show, arms salesmen were aggressively marketing 
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He also revealed that the US government was the biggest arms dealer of  them all: 
US officials, led by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney,  have chalked up  $18 billion 
of  sales to the Middle East alone since the end of  the Gulf War. 
(Channel Four News,  16.7.91) 
There were also  some 'cynical'  current affairs  programmes  on the  subject.  Margaret 
Gilmore reported on "how the apparent success of hi-tech fire-power in the Gulf has 
triggered  a  new  demand  for  weapons"  (This  Week,  9.5.91).36  Dispatches  detailed 
western  arms  supplies  to  Bahrain,  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  Oman,  Egypt,  and 
especially Saudi Arabia, in the immediate aftermath of  the Gulf War.  Paul Rogers told 
the programme Saudi Arabia  went on an "all-time buying spree for new strike aircraft, 
cluster bombs, multiple rocket launchers - all the really devastating weapons that were 
used in the Gulf'.  37  Jane Corbin revealed that the huge  profits from  the arms trade 
came not just from sales but from the transfer of technology, a customer service that 
allowed countries like Chile,  Indonesia,  and Egypt to develop self-sufficient weapons 
industries and  then sell  it  on to other countries,  some of these blacklisted  by  their 
western  enemies  - North  Korea  and  Iraq  were  just  two  examples  (Panorama, 
24.6.91).38  Dispatches revealed still  another dimension to this - that the US  idea of 
arms-control was to carve out a monopoly.  Admiral  Gene LaRocque underlined  his 
country's hypocrisy: 
We say we're interested in curtailing the sale of arms. What we really have in mind 
there is curtailing the British, the French, and the other countries from selling arms 
while we go ahead and sell ours!  39 
Nonetheless  Urban  suggested  that  the  G7  summit  deliberations  on  arms  control 
represented: 
a small but important step towards curbing the international arms trade free-for-
all,  particularly in the Middle East.  It's been brought about by the realisation that 
if the more uncertain world requires greater use  of gun-boat  diplomacy  by  the 
developed countries, it's not a good idea to sell  Saddam Hussein and his like the 
means of  sinking your gunboats.  (Newsnight,  16.7.91) 
But as the Gulf War showed,  this  is  not  necessarily the case.  Western arms  sales to 
Iraq before the Gulf crisis have  caused uproar and  controversial public  enquiries but 
they boosted flagging western economies.  And  when friendship  turned to war,  Iraq's 
western  weaponry  proved  no  trouble  to  the  West's  more  powerful  and  advanced 
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In the post-Gulf war era,  arms-control became a useful excuse for the US  to remind 
'renegade'  nations that "what we say goes"  and to send  out a clear warning:  "Don't 
tread on us".  The US carried out three bombing raids on Iraq in January 1993, one of 
which  was  aimed  at  what  they  claimed  was  a  nuclear  missile  plant  maintained  in 
defiance of  UN resolutions and the UN inspection team.  The Iraqis insisted that it was 
no longer a nuclear plant but a machine tools factory. The inspectors revealed that they 
were still in the process of  inspecting the plant but had already sealed those parts given 
over to nuclear weapons production and testing. British television news reported claim 
and  counter-claim but,  largely,  accepted the US  justification for  the  attack and  the 
evidence on which it was based.40 
Trying to control North Korea's nuclear activities was a much more difficult task for 
the G7 "world managers". Firstly, North Korea was a closed society that regarded the 
west as hostile and threatening. Secondly, it had  not been bombed and humiliated in a 
recent  war and  was  not  obliged  by  extraordinary  UN  resolutions  to  open  up  to 
western inspection teams on threat of being bombed.  The crisis continued throughout 
1993  and into  1994 and  was marked by a  sudden media interest in North Korea.  It 
was portrayed as an isolated and dangerous 'renegade' state which, like Iraq during the 
Gulf crisis, was 'only months away'  from developing  nuclear  missiles.  A report for 
ITN showed familiar images of goose-stepping military parades and wondered if  the 
"Stalinist regime ...  might just be crazy enough to go to war rather than give in,  crazy 
enough even to use the crude atomic bomb that intelligence reports suggest has already 
been built".  The report also  reminded us that "The last time North Korea attacked, 
back  in  1950,  the  Americans  were  caught  unprepared  and  almost  driven  off the 
peninsula.  They  won't  make  that  mistake  again".  Noteworthy  here  is  that  North 
Korea's resistance to external interference - "Don't tread on us"  - is labelled "crazy", 
while  the US's right  to be  present on  'the  peninsula'  in  the first  place  goes without 
question. Thus, "The US  says an  attack on the South is an  attack on America.  North 
Korea could not  have been warned  more  clearly but it  may  not  be  in  the  mood  to 
listen" (22.00, 21.3.94). 
In March 1994,  President Clinton decided to dispatch Patriot missiles  in  defence,  he 
said  of "our national interests and  the interests of the people of South Korea".  He  , 
also  announced  plans  to  resume  joint  military  exercises  with  South  Korean  forces 
which had been  suspended in  1993 as part of negotiations with the North over access 
to it  nuclear facilities.  The Chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Lee Hamilton told journalists that  "The pattern here has been that North 
Korea does eventually cede if enough pressure is put on them.  All  we can do is ratchet Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found?  215 
that pressure Up".41  Television news in Britain did not quote or reference Hamilton's 
statement but reported that "President Clinton has decided enough is enough" and was 
"ratcheting up the pressure"(21.00, 21.3.94}. It was pure US propaganda designed to 
intimidate rather than take actual military action.  The US Defence Secretary, William 
Perry, "hinted at using American warships .... to increase the psychological pressure on 
Pyongyang" .42 
While  the  media  thought  US  rhetoric  about  annihilating  North  Korea  and  their 
constant military posturing was nothing out of the ordinary,  they were quick to  pick 
up  on North Korean  rhetoric  against  South  Korea  as  outright  provocation.  The 
Independent on Sunday, for example, reported that  while "North Korea is threatening 
to blast Seoul into a 'sea offire'  ... Washington  is resisting calls for a tougher response". 
The item featured a photograph of a South Korean military  parade with the caption: 
"Marching as to war? South Korean troops are on red alert,  while the North moves 
further towards the brink. Washington calls it rhetoric - others fear devastation".43 
Television  news  reports  appeared  to  accept  official  claims  that  North  Korea  had 
suddenly  become  a  dangerous  nuclear  threat.  In  April,  an  official  North  Korean 
statement announced the resumption of "peaceful nuclear activities"44 but, as with  the 
confrontation with Iraq, western evidence of the nature and extent of those activities 
was  by  no  means  conclusive.  If the  west,  led  by  the  US,  is  to  embark  on future 
confrontations  with  'renegade'  countries  in  the  'developing  world'  it  will  no  doubt 
present 'compelling' evidence to justify intimidation or outright attack.  As  shown by 
precedent, officials  need have few worries that western journalists will  ask questions 
and take a closer look at the evidence. 
4. The limits of rhetoric:  journalists ask the questions that beg 
It is  important to emphasise that the official rhetorics of realpolitik and  'New World 
Order'  are  not  unassailable  to  challenge  or critique.  For example,  when  the  US 
invaded  Panama  in  1989,  or when  it  bombed  Iraq  in  1993,  it  failed  to  marshal 
unanimous support for these actions among its western allies.  Similarly,  the rhetoric 
of a New World Order seems to have  lost credibility while the west disputes policies 
on  peacekeeping  and  humanitarian  aid  in  crisis  situations  such  as  those  in  Bosnia, 
Somalia,  or Rwanda.  The collapse of consensus and  the prevalence of uncertainty in 
the west, then, appear to have created more space for  the news media to ask questions 
about 'order'  and  'power',  and  to underline  contradictions  and  hypocrisy  in  western 
policy,  in  a way that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War or the Gulf 
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Noam  Chomsky  presents  a  detailed  account  of how  the  US  media  endorsed  and 
legitimised the US invasion of  Panama (1992), but  television news in Britain operated 
within a more critical culture in Britain, and in Europe as a whole. The tight ideological 
control culture if the Cold War had slackened  somewhat to allow a more dialectical 
perspective on the US  invasion. News bulletins pointed out the glaring contradiction 
between the foreign policies of the US and the Soviet Union at  a time when Eastern 
Europe celebrated freedom and democracy. The Berlin Wall had come down, and the 
superpowers had just met in Malta  to wax lyrical about  a new era of hope for world 
peace.  Some  accounts  contrasted  the  Soviet  Union's  'Sinatra  Doctrine'  of non-
intervention in,  and peaceful disengagement from,  the internal affairs of its allies  and 
client  states,  with  the  US's  continued  policy  of aggressive  intervention  in  its  own 
backyard. 
It is in the superpower game that America stands to lose most points. As Moscow 
pursues its new doctrine of  non-interference, permitting joy on the Berlin Wall and 
beyond,  America commits itself to a shooting war to pursue  its  interests  on  its 
backyard.  (lTN, 22.00, 20.12.89) 
The  BBC  reported  Mrs  Thatcher's  unqualified  public  support  for  the  invasion  but 
noted that "a  few Conservative MPs are worried tonight at what they see as a growing 
American tendency to play the role of international policeman"  (18.00,  20.12.89).  In 
reply to these misgivings in parliament, the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, recorded 
his exasperation that "it should be thought undemocratic to restore a democracy". But 
Hurd  was closely  questioned  on  both BBC  News  and  ITN.  Peter  Sissons  put  the 
invasion in the context of  a world "widely perceived to be a safer place" and wondered 
if "it (was) not a set back for that when one superpower puts itself about in this way?" 
He then went further to establish with Hurd whether Britain had "made it plain  to the 
(US) that there are some limits to support for armed action of  this kind?" (BBC,  18.00, 
20.12.89).  On Channel Four News, Jon Snow  asked the Foreign Secretary "whether 
Britain  hadn't  been  too hasty  in  supporting  the  American  action"  and,  when  Hurd 
replied no, put it to him that "the message of  the last few months here in Europe (has) 
been  that  whatever the  temptation  force  is  not  going  to  be  the  answer"  to  crisis 
resolution? Hurd replied that like the people of  Eastern Europe, the people of Panama 
cried  out for  freedom  and  democracy.  The US  was  merely  facilitating  that  wish  by 
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Explicit 'New World Order' rhetoric also appeared to flounder as the West professed a 
new  sense  of uncertainty  just  months  after  the  Gulf  War.  Recrimination  and 
controversy among traditional allies about policy in  Bosnia or Somalia - to keep the 
peace  or enforce  it  - have  created  a  situation  in  which  the  bounds  of legitimate 
controversy in news reporting  are much looser and  less well policed than was the case 
during  the Gulf War.  Journalists  like  Martin Bell  (BBC),  Ed Vulliamy  and  Maggie 
O'Kane (Guardian)  have been criticised  for  their advocacy of military  interventio~ 
with the Foreign Secretary labelling them "The Something Must Be Done Brigade" of 
western journalists. Whether or not such criticism is valid or deserved is not the issue 
here.  The crucial point is the readiness of western journalists to stand back and  point 
out the doublethink and contradiction that riddles western New World Order rhetoric. 
In  this  regard,  their  approach is  a  departure from  their willingness  to  swallow  and 
regurgitate the propaganda  line as so many did in their coverage of  the Gulf War. 
A brief look at coverage of  NATO's 'Partnership For Peace' (PFP) summit (10 January 
1994) highlights the extent to which  the  civil  war in  Bosnia has  transfonned media 
perceptions  of Western  military  and  security  structures  and  their  rhetoric.  The 
tendency to internalise the rhetoric has  markedly  decreased  and  the  news  seems  to 
provide a focus of popular contempt for inaction and division between NATO and the 
UN, and between the US and the EC. On Channel Four News, Nik Gowing remarked 
that, "Four years into this post-Cold War period, NATO continues to be proof of the 
gulf between public  commitments and  reality  when  it  comes  to crisis  management" 
(10.l.94). And on Newsnight, Gordon Brewer said that Bosnia served as  "a reminder 
that relying on the West is  not necessarily a cure-all"  for Eastern Europe where they 
wondered if 'Partnership For Peace' was  a viable  framework of security or "another 
recipe for (Western) indecision".  Brewer went further and  asked if PFP was "a bold 
initiative by a rejuvenated NATO  ... or an  exercise  in  doublethink?"  The  problem,  he 
said, was that they claimed to achieve two goals that were contradictory. On one hand 
they aimed  "to reassure the East Europeans the West  will  protect them against  the 
Russians"  and,  on the other, "to reassure the Russians NATO is  not a hostile force". 
But, he went on,  "the doublethink doesn't stop there" because PFP did not offer East 
European participants "the crucial protection of Article 5 of  the NATO Charter which 
says an attack on one NATO member will be resisted by all of  them".  Partnership For 
Peace, Brewer concluded, was "as much  about what it  doesn't say  as  what  it  does" 
(10.l.94).  Four months  later,  a  BBC  correspondent  in  Bosnia reminded  us  that 
"NATO's success during the Cold War was  in  threatening effective retaliation  in  the 
event of attack", yet four years after the Cold War it  was "trying to resurrect similar, 
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In section three, I argued that the US intervention in Somalia was reported solely as  a 
humanitarian mission, not as part of a geo-political strategy to make the country safe 
for  western  oil  exploration.  Nevertheless,  instances  of media  criticism  within  the 
humanitarian framework are still noteworthy. 
While the publicly  stated aim  of 'Operation Restore Hope' was to restore order to 
Somalia and facilitate the distribution of  food, the US forces also became involved in a 
highly personal  mission to capture General Aideed,  the so-called 'warlord' who dared 
resist their attempts at forcible disarmament and stand up to the aggressive,  gung-ho 
tactics of soldiers  trained  for  total  warfare,  not  diplomacy.  To  complicate  matters 
further, the UN peacekeeping force drawn mainly  from Pakistan also got sucked into 
direct conflict with Aideed, thus departing from their original brief: 'to keep the peace'. 
This had disastrous consequences for them but especially for the Somalis. 
After a year of  quite bloody confrontation, the US prepared the ground for withdrawal. 
In November  1993,  the UN  Security  Council  ordered  an  inquiry  into  what  went 
wrong  and in March 1994 the last US troops pulled out of Somalia.  By that time, the 
UN inquiry had yielded a highly critical 200-page report "(alleging) that the UN and 
the United States followed a misguided policy and  shared  the blame for  subsequent 
bloodshed with  ... (General) Aideed" (Guardian,  1.4.94).45  The report was deemed  so 
critical by UN officials  that they  suppressed it  from  publication  in  the  news  media. 
However,  this  was  rather futile  and  belated  censorship  because  media  coverage  in 
Britain offered space for a sustained critique of  the US and UN military operation from 
mid-1993, when it descended into chaos.  The close policing of the media that was so 
evident in Grenada, Panama and the Gulf appeared to be missing in Somalia in spite of 
the heavy PR campaign that heralded the arrival of  US troops. 
The crucial point of  departure came in June when 23 Pakistani soldiers were killed in a 
gun-battle  with  General  Aideed's  forces.  The  UN  responded  with  an  assault  on 
Aideed's headquarters on 12 June.  At  first  news reports endorsed US  reasons for the 
attack.  The BBC led with these headlines: 
United Nations forces attack the Somali capital in  retaliation for the killing of 23 
Pakistani peacekeepers. Four arms dumps are destroyed, 200 prisoners taken in an 
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With no sense of  irony the reporter summed it  up as "all part of  the UN's latest efforts 
to bring peace to Somalia".  He described it  as  "a  military  success,  albeit  against  a 
much weaker enemy"  and concluded that "the real test for the UN now is to win the 
hearts  and  minds  of the  Somali  people  while  keeping  up  this  hardline  approach" 
(2l.50, 12.6.93). 
The next day,  the tone of  news reporting changed  when Pakistani troops shot dead 20 
unarmed Somali protesters. BBC News reported that "Anger among Somalis over the 
actions of  the (UN) is rapidly turning to fury  (and) .. .is losing the UN the sympathy it 
cannot  do  without"  (BBCl,  18.20,  13.6.93).  ITN  showed  pictures  of wounded 
civilians  being  treated in  a makeshift  operating  theatre  and  reported  how  "Somali 
people are finding  it harder and harder to understand the purpose of a humanitarian 
mission  which  has  turned  into  a  military  offensive .... Peace-keeping  in  Somalia  has 
taken on a new and deadly meaning"(ITN, 23.15.  13.6.93). Another BBC item showed 
US  helicopter guns-ships targeting  missiles  at  mortar batteries  in  Mogadishu.  The 
reporter said it was part of  "the UN policy of destroying weapons here" but reported 
that  "they're  doing  it  during  the  day  and  over  busy  streets  filled  with  innocent 
civilians".  He remarked that "For many  Somalis,  hatred for the UN now overwhelms 
any animosity against General Aideed".  The item refers to Aideed's comparison of the 
UN's  deeds  with  those  of a  dictator  and  concludes  that  "The  sight  of French 
soldiers  ... planting  explosives  to destroy  a  radio  station  that  broadcasts  against  the 
(UN) does lend force to the comparison" (2l.00, 14.6.93). 
As  the last US troops withdrew from Somalia on 25 March 1994,  ITN  reported that 
they were getting out "before good intentions  paved  the  road  to hell"  yet  its  own 
assessment of  the operation would suggest that was too late.  The report recalled that 
"When US troops came, there was no government - there is no government now", and 
that "what began with a near farcical night-landing under TV lights soon degenerated 
into an undeclared war".  The US  commander  told the news media how he  prayed 
that "the Somali people would raise themselves out of  this turmoil and anarchy and to 
build  some  kind  of society  based  on  love  instead  of..the  gun".  ITN's  reporter 
countered his  piety with the reality that  "the US  has just given weapons worth £20 
million  to  the  Somali  police  to  subdue  the  clans  that  America  could  not  subdue" 
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Conclusion 
It is clear then that no persistent, ideological framework of interpretation has replaced 
the Cold War paradigm for reporting world events.  The 'New World Order' paradigm 
has  certainly  not  prevailed  since  the  Gulf War.  The  very  idea  seems  to  have  lost 
currency among journalists as  they attempt to make  sense of the various 'post-Cold 
War' crises in Bosnia,  Somalia, North Korea and Rwanda,  and the failure of western 
policy  makers  to  reach  consensus,  make  decisions,  or find  solutions.  The  Daily 
Telegraph  glanced  back  at  four  years  since  the  East  European  revolutions  and 
remarked that "the economic consequences of Western victory in the Cold War have 
brought chaos,  not a new  order,  to Eastern Europe"  with the imposition of market 
reforms  that  western  European  countries  have  long  since  mitigated  with  welfare 
provisions. "There is more to capitalism than simple deregulation and  privatisation", it 
said  without  even  a  nod  to  its  Thatcherite  heritage.  "Without  the  established 
institutions and conventions of  civil society, markets tend to be craved up by gangsters, 
as  has happened throughout the former  Soviet Union".46  One of the most telling and 
ironic headlines since the East European revolutions appeared in the Guardian just as 
Poland and Hungary voted for some form of  socialism in general elections: 
RED TIDE SWEEPS EASTERN EUROPE (21.9.93)47 
Time will tell if uncertainty,  conflict  and  chaos emerge  as  dominant  themes  in  news 
coverage of world-wide  affairs.  To  view  world  events  as  part of historical  process 
would  surmount some of  the confusion about what has replaced the Cold War order. 
The end of the Cold War has  freed journalism from  the restrictive East-West,  post 
World War Two framework of the  Cold War.  Thus the 'historical process' paradigm 
presents a model of domination of the 'developing'  South  by the 'developed'  North 
which  bears  continuity with western imperial  history.  Rather than making sense of 
'western policy' as being indicative, or not, of  some vague idea of  a 'New World Order', 
the  historical  paradigm  offers  the  possibility  to  analyse  global  politics  and  crises 
through the prism of the realpolitik of  individual western powers. 
This in  tum offers a more coherent framework for  analysing  media coverage.  If we 
accept  that  each  crisis  involves  disagreement  and  competition  between  various 
agencies,  rather than ideological conformity or consensus,  then we can  move  away 
from instrumentalist propaganda models to an analysis of how these agencies develop 
and effect strategies for shaping coverage in their favour or to their advantage. Visions of  a new world order in the news: a paradigm found? 
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Conclusion 
My thesis has examined the impact of  the East European revolutions on the Cold War 
news paradigm at one of the earliest moments of crisis:  the fall  of the Berlin Wall.  It 
has argues that the East European revolutions of 1989 and  the end of the Cold war 
have resulted in  a paradigm crisis  in  news frameworks.  The  fall  of the Berlin Wall 
marked  a  critical  moment  when  television  news  could  have  revised  the  orthodox 
history of the events leading to its construction.  Instead, they  largely reaffirmed the 
orthodox  account,  reinforcing  rather  than  questioning  the  old  assumptions  and 
certainties of  the Cold War. 
As  shown  in  Chapter  Four  the  paradigm  shift  also  resulted  in  some  senous 
inconsistencies  and  confusion in news accounts.  If the East German 'refugee' story 
had been reported as  one  of economic migration  from the beginning , there might 
have  been  little problem.  But it  was not.  News accounts followed  the dominant 
rhetoric  about  the East  German  exodus  from  the  very  beginning  and  accepted  its 
turnabout without serious inquiry.  In doing so,  they inadvertently gave lie  to their 
original premise:  that  this  was  a "refugee" story and,  as  such,  that  the "refugees" 
were "fleeing" a country without hope for reform. 
In Chapter Five, I showed how the news reported public debate in the two Germanys, 
and on the wider international scene, about what should happen in the next five to ten 
years after the Berlin Wall.  I showed that British television news appeared to endorse 
the view that  German unity was an inevitability, whether East or West liked it or not. 
The fragments of negative opinion or images that emerged from the coverage in this 
period  - and there were plenty  - were  reported within  this interpretative framework. 
I  showed  in  Chapter  Six  that  this  would  have  implications  for  the  way  the  news 
reported the high-speed rush to Germany  unity  in an uncertain post-Cold War order. 
In absence of  certainty, television news seemed to settle for the 'fast track' option and 
followed  it  through  to  eventual  unity  on  3  October  and  far  beyond.  They 
acknowledged  the  persistence  of serious  economic  problems  in  the  former  East 
Germany but explained  all  these as  legacies of communism rather than the result  of 
derailment.  They proclaimed the advent of democracy in  East Germany but saw no 
contradiction between this and the extent of western interference and  management in 
the 1990 election, and the expedient interpretation of  the Basic Law to hasten  unity 
before the West German elections in December 1990. 
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Finally I argued that it  seems clear then that no  persistent,  ideological framework of 
interpretation has replaced the Cold War paradigm for  reporting world  events.  The 
'New World Order' paradigm has certainly not prevailed since the Gulf War.  The very 
idea seems to have lost currency among journalists as they attempt to make sense of 
the various 'post-Cold War' crises in Bosnia, Somalia, North Korea and Rwanda,  and 
the failure  of western policy  makers  to  reach  consensus,  make  decisions,  or  find 
solutions. 
Time will tell  if uncertainty,  conflict and  chaos emerge as  dominant themes in  news 
coverage of  world-wide affairs. Eberwine et al argue that, 
Developing an  appropriate framework,  lexicon,  and  - finally  - paradigm  in  the 
aftermath of  the Cold War is a daunting challenge  for journalism.  it  requires the 
kind of  self-scrutiny that many journalists expect the profession, with its cultivated 
scepticism ( sic) to resist. 1 
They asked  thirteen US journalists, all of  them employed on major US dailies and TV 
networks, 1) what they thought the Cold War meant and  2) if they thought the end of 
the  Cold  war  demanded  a  change  in  how  the  news  media  reported  international 
affairs. 2 
What was the Cold War all about? 
Valentin  Zorin believes that "journalism will be the last fortification of  the Cold War"3, 
and among some of  these journalists it seems he may have a point. In reply to the first 
question, they displayed both lack of  objective criticism of the US in perpetuating the 
Cold War.  They seemed to be steeped in  Cold War ideology and while they declared 
the conflict  over they did so with a certain self-righteous triumphalism that saw it only 
in  terms  of right  (the  US)  and  wrong  (the  Soviet  Union),  of winners  (the  US, 
capitalism, liberal democracy) and losers (the Soviet Union, the planned economy, and 
socialism).  Their grasp of the failures  and  ultimate  collapse of the  Soviet  Union  is 
matched only by their blind assertion of  US right and might. According to Monroe~ 
The Soviets held at gunpoint since World War II a few small, sullen satellites. The 
West, on the other hand,  by the uses of freedom,  has converted the two military 
juggernauts responsible for World War II,  into great,  stable,  productive nations 
allied  with  the  West.  And  the  fuel  of capitalist  incentives  has  lit  up  other 
conspicuous gems of  prosperity: Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong.
4 
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What is  particularly remarkable is  the unspoken assumption that the  Cold War  was 
started,  maintained  and  sometimes  exacerbated  by  the  Soviet  Union.  None  of the 
journalists raised fundamental questions about the US role in the conflict.  "Revisionist 
quibbles aside,"  says Hertzberg, " the basic cause of the Cold War was totalitarian". 5 
Peter Braestrup,  who  worked  on  the  Washington  Post  and  the  New  York  Times, 
thought that 
the earlier journalistic preoccupation with events growing out of the  East-West 
contest was not irrational, while it lasted. The Soviets and their allies were directly 
involved in threatening activities in Europe, Asia and  elsewhere  - and  the West 
was  responding.  The  "Red  Menace",  although  imperfectly  perceived  and  often 
exaggerated for domestic political purposes, was not simply  a right-wing fantasy. 
The  ... Berlin Blockade, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet support for 
Egypt and North Vietnam, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Korean War  - these 
did occur. Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Brezhnev were no Boy 
Scouts.  Containment  of communist  expansionism  was  a story  - an  increasingly 
complicated story, but not an unnatural focus for American journalism.6 
Over the last few  years,  critics  such  as  Noam Chomsky  and  Edward Herman  have 
provided plenty of  examples of what an "unnatural" focus might be for US journalists 
like Baestrup: US support for some of the most murderous right wing regimes in the 
world, its bombing of  civilians in wars against Vietnam, Cambodia, Panama, Haiti, and 
Somalia, and its readiness to overlook  human rights abuses wherever US interests are 
stake.? 
Does the end of  the Cold War demand a change in  reporting  international affairs? 
The  response to the second  question was divided  between those who  thought their 
coverage was already adequate and up to the challenges of the post-cold War world, 
and  those  who  thought  that  journalism  needed  to  review  its  whole  interpretative 
framework. 8 
Peter Gumbel, for the Wall Street Journal, wondered if the Cold War was really over. 
He complained bitterly about reporting restrictions in the Soviet Union and concluded 
that "the Cold War will  only be over for journalists when we can work in  the Soviet 
Union as freely as in  any other foreign posting".  9  Along with cynicism and bitterness, 
there  was  also  some  complacency.  Bill  Monroe,  of the  Washington  Journalism 
Review, prescribed this course of  treatment for journalists wondering how to deal with 
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They should do what comes naturally: Report them in all their breadth and depth 
and in all  the fine,  telling detail now so  richly available.  And  in  particular, they 
should  give us chapter and  verse  on  how those gloriously  ancient,  wonderfully 
new ideas of 1776 America are taking hold in the Soviet Union with a potential 
for  subverting  authoritarianism  that  no  American  defence  budget  could  ever 
match. These passionate, explosive notions - not miraculous weaponry  - hold the 
real promise of  peace for our grandchildren. 10 
Other journalists conceded that new frameworks and themes were inevitable.  Hendrik 
Hertzberg, editor of  the New Republic, predicted a shift from reporting the US-Soviet 
nuclear stand-off to focus on the destruction of  the environment. I I  Hodding Carter III, 
press secretary to the Carter Administration, came nearest to conceding difficulties in 
reporting when he pointed out the pitfalls of a paradigm-shift, particularly the danger 
that  "the  disintegration  of one  set  of outworn  slogans  could  simply  lead  to  the 
substitution of new equally mindless ones - and of the kind of reporting that slogans, 
rather than careful scrutiny, produce" .12 
Journalists in Britain are also aware of the difficulties faced in reporting crisis, change 
and uncertainty.  In 1992, the BBC newscaster, Martyn Lewis,  published an  article 
criticising  prevailing news values and agendas.  He questioned the proportion of air-
time given in bulletins to 'bad news' as opposed to good news stories, with undue focus 
on wars, famines,  and crime.  The reaction from some of his journalist colleagues was 
speedy and sharp. They attacked the notion that news should be assessed for some sort 
of feel good factor.  John Simpson argued that BBC News is in not in the business of 
"engineering news". In a familiar  defence from news professionals, he maintained that 
journalists were simply 'reflecting reality': 
Nineteen eighty nine,  like  1956 and  1968,  was a  year when the entire world 
changed direction and we're still  living  through the consequences of that:  wars, 
upheavals,  the  collapse  of old  systems  and  old  certainties.  And  until  new 
certainties replace them, the real world will be a place of  violence and conflict and 
our television screens will have to reflect that. 13 
But there is  an expectation that the media do  more than simply 'reflect'  an  uncertain 
and unstable post Cold War world.  The Channel Four News journalist, Nik Gowing, 
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real  time  coverage of the  horrors  of Bosnia  or Somalia  or  Rwanda  not  only 
creates a demand that 'Something Must Be Done', but also  drives the making of 
foreign policy ... Televised horror in Bosnia: instant policy response in Whitehall or 
Washington. 14 
Government ministers such as Douglas Hurd may express horror at the pictures from 
Rwanda but  such reporting does nothing to force  a policy-shift that might  stop the 
conflict: 
The challenge for TV crews is cover a  crisis as ... comprehensively and as  rapidly 
as  possible.  The challenge for  governments  is  to appear to  react,  while  quietly 
adhering to the continuum of  a 'cold and rational' policy line.  15 
This is an intriguing clash of  agendas and assumptions in media and government circles 
and it presents some opportunities for  a systematic, multi-method approach to the role 
of  the media in reporting crisis and conflict . 
Research agenda 
Detailed  quantitative-qualitative  analysis  could  reveal  dominant  patterns  of  media 
representation of the many  crises the west has faced  in the post Cold War era (e.g., 
Somalia,  Bosnia,  Rwanda,  North  Korea,  Iraq).  It might  support  or challenge  the 
instrumentalist argument that there is a neo-imperialist narrative in news reporting of  a) 
the nature of the selected crises and conflicts,  and b) of actual western interventions 
or hotly  debated  proposals for  intervention.  The  sample  might  range  across  media 
formats - TV, radio, and the press - and perhaps current affairs and documentary, and 
periodicals. 
A production study  would gain some insights into how the news  media report  these 
crises without the certainties of the Cold War.  Such a study would aim to investigate 
how  the  conflicting  policy  agendas  of government  and  non-government  agencies 
influence coverage of conflicts and crises. It involve interviews with a large sample  of 
journalists  - correspondents,  photographers,  producers  and  editors.  It would  also 
require  interviews  with  representatives  from  governmental  and  non-governmental 
agencies such as 1)  Foreign Office, MoD, NATO,  UN~ 2)  aid  agencies,  e.g., Oxfam, 
GOAL~ and,  3)  human  rights  organisations  and  pressure  groups,  e.g.  Amnesty 
International, Africa Watch. Conclusion  230 
Using  research  method  developed  at  the  Glasgow  University  Media  Group,  an 
audience reception study would use compare public beliefs about the facts and nature 
of  two conflicts such as Bosnia and Rwanda. 
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8  Eberwine et af (1991: 129) 
9 Eberwine et af  (1991: 137) 
10 Eberwine et af (1991: 145) 
11 Eberwine et af (1991: 138) 
12 Eberwine et af (1991: 134) 
13 Simpson, 1. (1993) "Making News", Huw Whefdon Lecture 1993,  BBCl, 2 September 
14 Gowing., N. (1994:2) 
1.5  Gowing, N. (1994:7) APPENDIX  1 
Perceptions of the East German migrants ( 1-2 ) : 
231 
I.THE NEED FOR EAST GERMANS TO RETURN TO/STAY AT HOME IN  THE GDR 
FOR THE GOOD OF EAST AND WEST GERMANY (Source: Usually by state leaders 
and other politicians from both East and West  Gennany, US, Britain, Soviet Union) 
2.REFUGEES  WILL  BE/SHOULD  BE WELCOMED  TO  THE  WEST  WITHOUT 
RESERVATION, e.g.,  FRG coped with much larger numbers of refugees  in  post war 
period (Source: Usually FRG politicians at  Federal level) 
Effects of their movement on the country they were leaving,  East Germany,  and on the 
host country,  West Germany (3-6 ) : 
3. NEGATIVE  ASPECTS OF THE "REFUGEE EXODUS" FOR THE GDR, e.g.,  a "brain 
drain"  of young skilled workers,  debilitation  of the country's public services (Source: 
Usually by media) 
4.  POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EXODUS FOR THE GDR, e.g.,  ridding  the country  of 
dissidents, malcontents and  "nasties" ,  as  one  E. Gennan official put it in The Scotsman, 
9 November.  (Source: Usually by East Gennan officials) 
5. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE EXODUS FOR WEST GERMANY  (FRG),  e.g.,  strain 
on  economic  resources and  social  fabric,  politically divisive issue, potential to  provoke 
backlash from  extreme  right  (Source: Usually  by  media,  or FRG politicians  at  state, 
Lander, level, and ranging across ideological divisions) 
6.POSITIVE  ASPECTS  OF THE EXODUS  FOR  FRG,  stimulate  the economy by sudden 
upsurge in consumer demand with potential  boom in construction and retail sectors. East 
Gennans source of  cheap, skilled and reliable labour. Gennan speaking, they are easier to 
assimilate than  workers from Turkey, etc. (Source: Usually media, FRG economists) APPENDIX  2 
NEWS CONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST GERMAN  REFUGEE EXODUS 
STORY 
Abstract of public debate on the exodus AFTER the  Berlin  Wall opened 
The Centre 
232 
From  the Federal Government,  a warm welcome to the East  German people.  As  they come 
over in their  millions for a  weekend  in West Berlin,  to join the massive street party and 
experience  the  delights  of the  city's  shop-fronts,  each  person  is  entitled  to  100  DM 
"welcome money".  But while they might enjoy  all  this,  they  know it is not for them.  They 
must  return  to  East  Germany,  to  their  homes  and  to  their  jobs.  They  must  also  build 
democracy in East Germany by working for free, multi-party elections. 
The Periphery 
From  the  periphery,  a  note  of warning.  State  and  local governments are experiencing 
serious economic and social problems without  having  to cope with more refugees  from  East 
Germany.  Social  tensions  arising  from  high  unemployment  and  acute  shortage  of 
housing stock are being exacerbated by a  continuing influx  of "refugees" from East Germany 
and  "immigrants"  from  Poland  or  Turkey.  Such tensions  are being  used  for  political 
advantage by the Far Right. 
(Details  and sources of statements quantified in Chapter Four,  pp. 83-84,  Tables  4.4  and 
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Detailed Description of  Samples of  Media Collteflt used i1l  Chapters Three alld Four 
Chapter Three  referred to the period immediately following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 9-14 
Novemb~r. It analys~d television news accounts of the history of the Berlin Wall and  thus focused only 
on news Hems that featured such narratives on the evening of 9 November 1989. There were three in 
all. one each on BBC Nille O'Clock News. ITN News At  Tell, and BBC2 NeH'slligilr at 22.30. There 
was no comparable item on  Chanllel Four News  at  19.00hrs that evening,  when the  news of the 
opening of the Wall was only just breaking. 
The chapter also makes reference to the press. It drew from a sample of 13  British daily n'~wspapers on 
10,  II,  13  &  14  November 1989,  and to 8  British Sunday newspapers on  12  November 1989. The 
newspapers were as follows: 
I2ili..lx - Telegraph. Times. Fillallcial Times.  Illdepelldellt, Guardian. Mail.  Express,  Glasgow 
Jlemld. ScotslIlulI,  SIIII,  Mirror, Daily  Record (Glasgow), The Evening Times (Glasgow) 
SlIndjly -Telegraph,  Times,  Indepelldent 011  SlInday,  Obsen'er,  SCOlland 011  Sunday. SUI/day 
Erpress, Mail 011  Sunday, News of  the World 
Chapter Four analyst:d how television news reported the movement of  East German citizens to West 
Germany  from  Septt:lI1ber until  November  1989 when the Wall opened. It thus  referred  to  sample 
periods before and aha the opening of the Berlin Wall. These were as follows: 
Sample Pt:riod  I:  10-12 September 1989 
Sample Period 2:  5-8 October 1989 
Sample Period 3:  2-4 November 1989 
Sample Period 4: 9-13 November 1989 
These comprised of the  main daily  bulletins on BBC I  (13.00,  18.00, and  21.00) and  ITN  (13.00, 
17.40.22.(0); and also included Newsnight (BBC2, 22.30) and Challllel FOllr News  (Channel Four, 
I~.OO). 
The chapter  also compared television news coverage of the East German "refugee" story with their 
treatment of the  Vietnam "boat-people" story  in  Hong  Kong.  These secondary samples (Sample 
Periods 5 and 6) are detailed in Footnote 1 orthe chapter (p.113). 
References to the press were drawn mainly from the press sample used in  Clwpter Three. 
Finally,  an  important  note  011  current  affairs.  The  thesis  ~id  not  include  a  s~slt:matic 
analysis of a  sample of current affairs  programmes.  Although  t~ls  Illa~  now  ~eeill  an  II.nportant 
omission.  the  logic  at  the time of research was  that  the critical  f~~u.s at  attention  was  with  ne\~s 
frameworks at  moments of crisis.  It was felt  that since current affairs and documentary output  IS 
generated over a longer. more considered time-frame, it can and in many cast:~ docs  enjoy the benefit. of 
hindsight in  a way crisis news docs not. There is  no doubt. however. that tIllS  prc'>ents an opportunity 
for further research. 